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ABSTRACT OF TMESIS "BELIEF AND ACTIOIF* JUNE 1376
BY C.W.P.FEHRSON
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIWNSITY OF ST.ANDNEWS FOR THE DECREE OF PH.D.
The role of "believes" It Identified by finding e unique 
end unperephreieeble use of the term thet Is Intégré I to the stnietere of 
Important forms of language. This role ean only be roughly Indicated here. 
Roughly,"belleves" Identifies someone's reesons for doing or thinking something 
or what he counts as success In certain activities,without committing the 
speaker to accepting them; and so It allows the possibility of mistake.
Standard objections to dispositional accounts are 
reviewed and found unconvincing. The central difficulty Is feund to be that 
dispositional accounts give no satisfactory enplanatlon of the fact that It 
Is (part of) an enplanatlon of action to cite the agent's beliefs. It Is 
argued that causal accounts have the same deficiency,that the role or point of 
"believes" In language Is not satisfactorily enplalned. It Is concluded that 
neglect of this central question vitiates eventhe real strengths of these 
accounts. The relation between different questions about belief Is explored, 
and analogous questions about other cases«especially artefacts,are considered.
Explanations of actions are discussed to bring out the 
role of "believes." This appears In explaining the relation between the "point 
or purpose" of an action and the actions of which It consists at a lower level 
of description. "Believes" Identifies what go/&ms this relation while allowing 
the possibility of mistake.
Ryle's claims about thinking are consldered,and an 
Interpretation of the notion of an adverbial verb la suggested. The central 
difficulty concerns the cases of the thinking of le Penseur or of Euclid. 
Although It seems Important that we should be able to say what the constituents 
of thinking are hsre,we cannot do so,since the relevant vocabulary Is not 
adapted to giving the constituents of anything. These activities have their
ProQuest Number: 10166510
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166510
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2own "objects" as wall as thair own criteria of success. Activities,"objects," 
and criteria of success are bound up together,and do not connect In any simple 
way with the vocabulary that we try to connect them with In asking sfhat their 
constituents are. This Is far from unique. Music provides another relevant 
example.
The last chapters examine various contexts In which 
"believes" Is Important. Topics considered are reasons,evaluatlons,assertlons, 
belief and the wlII,IntentionalItyspeech-act accounts. In each case 
particular doctrines are critically examined.
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BELIEF AND ACTION
introduction
Those theories of mind that assume what is 
called a 'dualist* position have been devastatingly attacked by many 
philosophers recently, with Ryle and Wittgenstein in the lead# 
Behaviourism was a popular replacement. But this doctrine or 
approach has withered too. Ttm fundamental difficulty has been that 
it is not possible to find a statement of the doctrine that is wedc 
enough to be acceptable without the verification principle of meaning.
Neither Ryle nor Wittgenstein claim to be 
bWiaviourists. Indeed, both attack behaviourism. Certainly, their 
general positions seem to be independent of behaviourissu They 
neither stand with it nor fall with it. Nonetheless, Ryle at least 
accepted that belief is a disposition to behave.
m  "The Concept of Mind." he says*-
"In describing the workings of a person's mind, we are not describing
a second set of shadowy operations. We are describing certain phases 
of his one career. Namely, we are describing the ways in which 
certain parts of his conduct are managed. The sense in which we 
explain his actions is not that we infer to occult causes, but that we 
sifbsveie them under hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions."
Much of this I accept. What I do not accept 
is that "The sense in which we explain his a c t i o n s . , . i s  that we
subsume them under hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions."
This does not seem to me to be true, and particularly not true in the 
case of belief statements. Certain of the ways in Which explain 
actions need a won complicated conceptual frame-work than Ryle allows 
here. And this framework is the key to understanding belief in 
philosophy. Beliefs explain actions; and this point is not adequately 
accounted for by Ryle, nor by the traditional accounts of belief; yet it
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i# the key.
Ryle's turning to hypothetical and semi- 
hypothetical propositions is strongly reminiscent of behaviourist 
writing. Indeed, it may seem the only alternative to the occult 
causes of the demonology. since I do not accept these demons, I must
find a third possibility. But I shall not present a full case against
the traditional demons. That debate has, I believe, been pretty well 
thrashed out. But I shall have something to say about W%e idea that 
we explain a man's actions by referring to non-occult causes of them 
and a good deal to say about behaviourism. But I shall not attempt to 
consider either as a general theory of the mind, only as they apply to 
belief.
Of course, I sm not alone in finding 
difficulties in the idea that beliefs are dispositions to act, or are 
"like habits." P.T. Geach in "Mental Acts," R# Chisholm in "Sentences 
about believing," and W. Dray in "Laws and Explanation in History" are 
examples. But these dissidents tend to approach the problem as if it 
were to be resolved by 'analysing' belief in ways that are more 
consonant with traditional theories about belief. These can be 
characterised as "Occurrence Theories," since they explain what belief 
is by a^ ppeal to some occurrence 'in the mind.' Answers to philosophical 
questions do develop along lines that fit in wl^ the methodological 
ideas of the time. Traditional answers were given in the context of 
traditional ideas about philosophy, about meaning, and about metaphysics, 
we are no longer bound by the idea that there must be something - event, 
state, poverty or object - for every word to stand for or designate or 
describe. We have escaped from the limited and limiting insistence 
that truth-oonditions are the be-all and end-all of philes^Aiy. So 
perhaps these traditional ideas can be reconsidered, and we may talk of
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entertaining and accepting propositions without repressing a 
fastidious shudder.
Yet these notions cannot satisfy us. we 
offer statements about what a man believes in order to explain what he 
does. Why? Why should it count as an explanaticm? What 
illumination do belief statements throw on actions? Why should a 
man's acticxne coimt as evidence for or against statements about tdiat 
he believes? These questions cannot be answered in the traditional 
terms for discussing belief | indeed they are not even asked clearly.
Evan if an analysis of belief could be produced in these terms, my
questions would not be answered. And we may well wonder tfiat has been
gained. I shall argue that even if the analysis does refer to 
dispositions to behave, it still does not answer my questions 
satisfactorily. This is the fundamental inadequacy in the account.
I do not attempt to say what the nature, 
ultimate or otherwise, of belief is; nor have I attespted to carry out
any of the latter*day versions of this project. I produce no 
definitions, analyses or maps. Nor have I attempted to characterise 
the concept of belief, or provide truth-oonditions or criteria for 
applying the %#ord. My aim is to show "how the word works" as an
explanation and to show the context in which it works. My claim is that
both traditional and bdbaviourist accounts are inadequate because they 
do not do this, and cannot do it.
30 it is clear that my approach is in sympathy 
with the iq>proa^ of those who adopt the slogan "Don't look for the
meaning, look for the use." I will not indulge in any extended 
discussion of these ideas. But there are two corollaries that I would 
like to draw out. The first is Uiat there is no reason to expect that 
anything in the way of a ctefinition or analysis will emerge from my
discussion* But that is obvious «nou^*
But the second is not so obvious, nor even so 
orthodox* It is that the search for a definition or analysis is 
almost certain to go wrong. This comes out when we take the oft- 
drawn analogy between words and tools a little further. For the 
attempt to say what 'x* ij#, in philosophy at least, amounts to an 
attempt to find a synonymous eaqpression. That comes to finding another 
way or ways of doing the same job as is done by the %*ord under 
investigation. If we want to know what the job is, this is unlikely 
to be very illuminating, although it may be helpfUl together with other 
explanations. The analogy between words and tools, or between language 
and a tool-box allows us to explain Why. one does not mspmct to find 
tools dvplicated in a tool-klt. One suiy find without surprise that it 
has several screw drivers of different shapes and sises, or that three 
or four spanners can be used on a given sise of nut. But these
apparent duplications will not be mere replications. We can expect to
find circumstances under which only one tool will do the job properly; 
some screws can only be undone with a short-handled scrsw-driver; the 
nut that holds on a bath tap can only be undone with that particular 
spanner. m  a well-thought-out tool-kit, nothing is superfluous, and 
everything has its own essential job. We might find two instruments 
with exactly the same job, but we cannot expect to. And if we consider 
not particular tool-kits, but the whole range of different types of tool 
from which particular kits are a selection, the point is even clearer. 
Each type has been formed with a function or a range of functions in mind; 
one does not make a different kind of fastening for fUn or for mere 
variety, but so as to do a particular job better in soom respect than 
existing fastenings.
The claim that %mrds or phrases have exactly the
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#am# use should be regarded with suspicion. If in a given context it 
is true, then that is reason to suppose that one of then is not really 
at home, is not doing its own special job. The same is true in the 
case of tools. Of course, it is always possible that this clue will 
fail us, that we do have a duplication of %#ords or phrases. But we 
should not expect this. m  any case, it is my claim that "believe" 
has just such a unique use as I suppose; and it is isq)ortant and 
revealing# We find it in the context of explaining actions. Hence 
the ^^roach of this thesis, through an examination of belief and 
action.
The idea that in philosophy one should eaqxlain 
the uses of words is, so far, ambiguously phrased. Explaining the use 
of something may involve explaining how to use it or, explaining what 
it is used to do. Giving the criteria for applying words correctly 
answers the first question, but not the second. suppose someone asks 
what a goal is . We could eaq)lain how and when the %x>rd is to be used, 
citing the relevant rules of the game. If the questioner grasps the
answer, he will correctly be able to say %«hcn a goal has been scored.
But he would not know %Aiat the consequences of scoring a goal wdre, and 
so would not know what, the point of scoring goals is. Could he be 
said to know idvat a goal is? Only in a weak sense, if at all. our 
questioner needs to know, not only when he may correctly say "That's a 
goal," but also what the point of goals is. And these two questions 
are independent of each other. Clearly one may know the point of 
scoring a goal, but not when one may correctly say "Qoall" - as when one 
is not familiar with a particular game. And equally someone might be 
able to say When a goal has been scored, without knowing what the 
consequences within the game of scoring a goal are.
A point that is very similar to mine is made by
Toulnin in "Us—  of Argument." whan he distinguish—  between the truth- 
GX>nditions and the force of certain nodal terut-
"The meaning of a modal term, su^ —  * cannot, * h—  two — pects; these 
can be referred to —  the force of the term and criteria fOr its use.
By the 'force* of a modal term I mean the practical implications of its 
use; the force of the term 'cannot' inelud— , for instance, the 
implied general injunction that something-or-other has to be ruled out 
in this-or-that-way and for sueh-a-reaaon. This force can be 
oontr— ted with the criteria, standards, grounds and reasons, by 
reference to «diich we decide in any context that the use of a particular 
modal term is appropriate. we are — titled to say that some 
possibility h—  to be ruled out only if ws can produce grounds or 
reasons to justify this claim and under the term 'criteria' can be 
included the many sorts of things we have then to produce. We say, 
for instance, that something is physically, mathematically, or 
physiologically impossible, that it is teminologically or linguistically 
out of order, or else morally or judicially improper; it is to be ruled 
out, accordingly, qua something or other. And when —  start ea^laining 
'qua What' any particular thing is to be ruled out, we show what criteria 
we are appealing to in this particular situation." (P.30, Essay X, under 
"Force and Criteria.")
Tbulmin is talking about modal terms, but 1 spply the distinction much 
more generally, and so X talk of the point of using a %#ord.
Austin's scheme of illocutionary, locutionary 
and perlocutionary qpeech-acts rev— Is some similar concerns. We can 
discern a distinction between the conditions of appropriaten— s of a 
speech act, the conditions that have to be k^t if "infelicity" is to be 
avoided, and the effects or consequeno—  of the speech-act, the point of 
performing it. And there are finer distinctions that could be drawn 
within this frame-work.
There is another kind of qu— tion that — y be 
asked, and that needs to be disentangled. suppose somsone asks what 
a sextant is. we might first — t out to answer by describing the 
object, showing pictur— , producing an exasq>le of a sextant. This %#ould
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enable the questioner to identify (end re-identify) sextants, end 
distinguish sextants from arm-chairs and compasses. And we can often 
say that someone who has these abilities knows what something is.
But does this really amount to knowing %#hat a sextant is? In a weak 
sense. Yes. A nurse knowing this much about the instruments could 
correctly hand to the surgeon %diat he needed when he aWced for it.
But in a stronger sense, no. For he cannot use the sextant. so 
we could teach our questioner how to take a sight. But even this 
would not be enough. TO coaqplete the answer, we have to explain 
the point Of taking sights; we have to set the instnaeent in its 
context of the sci— ce of astro-navigation, and of surveying and 
map-making. These second two stages of explanation amount to 
explaining the point, use or purpose of sextants, in two rather 
different stages. But there is yet another explanation that may 
be demanded. This is roughly an explanation of %*hat sextants are 
made up of, what they consist of, or how they work. Being able to 
identify and use soa&ething is compatible with not knowing what it 
consists of, how it is made. All of us. use gadgets and equipment 
%d.thout knowing much about their insides. Of course, there is an 
indefinite amount to be known about any given object. But we do 
soawtimes say **I don't know what it is** ev—  «hen we can identify it 
and understand what to do with it. It of tens happens that we enjoy 
fOod, for exsRple, but don't know «hat it is. If we find out that 
it is octopus or s«#eetbreads, we may be put off, so the ans%mr to 
this question can make a difference.
This has considerable relevance to philospphy. 
one of the things that I shall be concerned to argue is that the 
different philosophical accounts of belief - or at least the different 
kinds of philoa^^dcal account - are concerned to answer rather
•8-
different questions. If we can get straight the question that each 
theory is ansi^ ering, we can see «hat is right about them, as well as 
what is wrong with them. questions like "What is belief?" or "What 
is the nature of belief?" or "What is the analysis of belief?" or 
"What are the correct conditions for applying 'believes'?" or even 
"How can we characterize the concept of belief?" are too vague without 
explanation, and often far too restrictive when they have been 
explained.
There is one other matter that is worth 
discussing briefly. It sometimes happens that discussion of a word 
reveals that there is more than (me legitimate way of using it. It 
is then that we begin to feel the need to select one of these uses as 
in some way particularly important to philosophy. Then we begin to 
talk of the "logically primary" use of a word, or of the "paradigm" 
or "core" of the word, or of its "logical origin." The difficulty 
is that there does not seem to be any very clear-cut criterion for 
making this choice in any of these terms.
Being "primary" has nothing to do with being 
first in tiiee, but with being most important for philosophy. It is 
sometimes taken to be related to the way in which the relevant 
conc^ts must be learned. But this is not a question that can be 
settled by observing people and children learning languages.
Questions of this kind, about how some use of a %#ord could be learned, 
may be important. But it is very far from clear that answering such 
questions will answer all, or even many, philosophical questions.
For example, we may agree that the number words must be learned by 
learning to recite them in the appropriate sequence, and (what is not 
the same thing) learning to cxxmt. But this does not do anything to 
resolve philosophical problems about numbers. These considerations
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have a use, though a limited one. For it is clearly true that any 
philosophical theory that does not allow for the learning of numbers, 
or that makes it imqpossible to learn the nuB^ >ers, must be wrong.
The notion of "logical origin" is also 
peculiar. We may receive hints, but we do not receive ans%#ers, 
from etymology about philosophy. X think that there is a useful 
notion to be found here, though. And it links with gy earlier claim 
that in attempting to reach philosophical understanding of something 
we should look for a use of the word or words that is unique, that 
cannot be carried out by ai^ other words or phrases. we may, in 
considering the concept or word that interests us, identify 
conceptual pressures in the language such that, if the word did not 
exist, we would have to invent it. If we imagine that we have a 
language without some %#ord, we may find that the gap can be got 
round, without losing anything of importance. But we may find that, 
without that word, a whole way of talking becomes impossible.
For example, some colour-words are not 
essential; we can, I suppose, get by without "turquoise", 
"heliotrope", or "puce". But could we get by withcmt "red", or witdv- 
out "blue"? It depends, perhaps, on our way of life. we may be 
able to do without these distinctions. Even so, the other colour 
words would have to be stretched to fill the gap in the spectrum.
But when artists begin to make investigations into colour and begin 
to develop the notion of, or to discover about, primary colours, the 
pressure to invent "red" or "blue" will grow. And it is here that 
%#e may identify a, or the, logical role of these words, if not their 
origin. My account of belief fits this notion of "logical origin". 
Whether or not it is a notion that others have employed, I think it is 
clearly a worth -^while and even an important one.
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Thm distinctl— a between paradigm and non­
paradigm, typical and non-typical, central and peripheral uses will 
not, I think, be iaqx>rtant to me.
All these points need a good deal more by 
way of cuqplanation and perhaps justification. But the ^roof of 
the pudding is, after all, in the eating. The best justification 
and explanation lies in the application of these ideas in the body 
of the thesis. If the approach that I have adopted resolves 
difficulties and offers a way out of an impasse, that is one 
important factor in favour of it. so I now turn to my subject - 
"Belief."
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1* The dispositional account.
It appears that the disposition theory 
of belief %ms first put forward by Alexander Bain in "The 
EXotions and the will" in 1859. Charles Pierce, among the 
American pragmatists, also held sons fOrm of this theory. In 
this century and country it is to be found early in Braithwaite's 
article in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian society for 1932 - 
33. And we also find it in Ryle's "The Concept of Mind." In 
section 3 of chapter 5 he sayst-
"Belief might be said to be like knowledge and unlike trust in 
persons, seal for causes or addiction to smoking, in that it is 
"propositlonali" but this, though not far wrong, is too narrow. 
Certainly to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be 
unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in 
acquiescing in other people's assertions to that effect, in 
objecting to statements to the contrary, in drawing consequences 
from the original proposition, and so forth. But it is also to 
be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on 
possible disasters and to «mrn other skaters. It is a 
propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to 
make certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have 
certain feelings. But all these things hang together —  a 
common prepositional hook. The phrase 'thin ice' would occur in 
the description alike of the shudders, the warnings, the wary 
skating, the declarations, the inferences, the acquieseences and 
the objections."
The same theme is to be found in the 
passage quoted below. Ryle enq|)hasises the variety of goings-on 
that beliefs are involved ins belief is a "determinable" disposition - 
"Concept of Mind" cap 5 (2). For the time being I propose to 
concentrate on the executive moves, on the straight-forward actions 
like spraying roses, driving cars, reciting poems, shaking hands.
«12-
and so on* Much, though not all, of the argisaent about the 
disposition theory of belief has c— tred on these moves; and the 
theoretical and imaginative moves, and the feelings, present more 
problems to the philosopher than the straight-forward actions*
The discussion %d.ll not reveal any knock­
down arguments* In this Ohapter I will pursue objections of the 
kind that have been canvassed by other philosophers. It will 
become clear that the attempt to Caractérisé the disposition is 
beset with difficulties of principle. However I will not discuss 
the crucial objection until chapter 2, as it dees not centre on 
these difficulties in characterising the disposition.
The description of belief as a dispositi—  
to act must rely on a prior distinction between actions and events.
How is this distinction to be drawn? It is characteristic of 
actions, that we discuss what the agent wants and what he believes, 
in connection with them; it is a commonplace to hang the 
distinction between actions and events on this peg. Beliefs do go 
with %iants in this respect. Wh—  my heart beats or my leg jerks 
in response to the doctor's hammer, neither my beliefs nor my wishes 
are involved. Talk of my beliefs and wishes is in order wh—  I kick 
a goal, go fishing, or make a move in a game of chess. But if hoth 
these conc^ts are to be analysed in terms ofdispositions to act, 
how are «re to tell what counts as an action, and hence «rhich events 
satisfy the disposition? Of course, if we abandon the programme for 
one of the concf^ts, the day «rill be saved; but which — e? And if 
one, «fhy not the other? The only other alternative is to find some 
other peg fOr distinction. The snag is that there are no candi­
dates that are clearly not dependant —  either wishes or beliefs.
The reply to this, is that the objection is based on a misunderstanding
-13-
of what is being claimed. Ryle makes the necessary point in section 
3 of Chapter 5 of "Concept of Mind"»
"There is at our disposal an indefinitely wide range of dispositional 
terms for talking about things, living creatures and human beings. 
SOSM of these can be applied indifferently to all sorts of things | 
fOr example, some pieces of metal, some fishes and some human beings 
wei^ 140 lbs., are elastic and combustible, and all of them, if left 
unsupported, fall at the same rate of acceleration. Other disposi­
tional terms can be applied only to certain kinds of things; 
"hibernates," for example, can be i^lied with truth or falsity only 
to living creatures, and "Tory" can be applied with truth or falsity 
Only to non-idiotic, non-infantile, norv-barbarous human beings, 
our concern is with a restricted class of dispositional terms, namely 
thosé appr(M?riate only to the characterisation of human beings."
Beliefs and wishes will be dispositions that 
apply to a restricted class, that of actions. Even so, the question 
why this should be so is not an illegitimate one* In the case of 
"hibernates," we could point out that only living creatures can 
sleep or be awake, and that would be at least a first answer for this 
case. But what are we to say of beliefs and wishes? How are we to 
distinguish between human actions, to «filch these dispositions %*ill 
«pply, Mid hiB&an reactions, to which they do not apply? one ans«#er 
is that the complexity of the dispositions entitles us to distinguish 
between the events that satisfy them and those that do not; actions 
are enormously complicated. Another ans«#er is to characterise Idle 
dispositions in terms that can apply only to actions; and phrases 
like "Acting in a «my that is a{^roprlate to p" or "in a «my that is 
reasonable in the light of p" will do this.
Neither ans«mr is really satisfactory. It 
is facile to insist that human actions are enormously complicated.
Net all actions are complicated. And there are some events that are 
enormously complicated too. Indeed, any event can be represented as
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enormously complicated, both In categorical description and in the 
dispositions that it satisfies. The second way is unsatisfactory 
partly becavmé it does not do anything to resolve the original 
questions, and partly because it appears to be an ^  hoc evasion 
of the objection. Why should this restriction be placed on the 
characterisation? Merely to preserve the distinction between 
actions and events, so far as we can see. Moreover, this move 
means that the disposition is characterised not just in terms of 
vfhat does or would happen, but in terms of what should happen.
This may be worth following up. Ckie move like this will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter.
There are many phrases tdiat suggest them­
selves, - "acting as if p were true," "on p", "in a wcy that is 
appropriate to p", "in a way that is reasonable if p", "in the 
light of p." All seem to leave out something crucizdL, in that it
is possible to act in these ways without believing that p. One
aspect of the problem becomes clear. Any characterisation that 
can be applied only if p is true will not do, since people's beliefs 
may be false. But the characterisations that can be applied 
whether or not p is true will be false to the point that people 
believe that what they believe is true.
D.J. O'Connor, in P.A.S. 1968/69, writes as
follows t—
"The principle objection to introducing the concept of 'acting as if 
or 'being disposed to act as if  as an adequate analysis of belief is
simply this. On the theory we are considering, to be disposed to act
as if p were true must be not more than a necessary condition for 
believing p. If I do not act - or at least if I am not disposed to 
act - as if p were true, then I do not believe p. It cannot be a 
sufficient condition because there are many circumstances in which one 
might act as if p were true (or be disposed to do so) without believing
«•IS»
p* w* have now to distinguish between the following propositions i-
E) He is disposed to act as if p were true, but he does not believe p.
P) He is disposed to act as if p were true, and he does believe p.
Since these differ in meaning and have their fist clause in common,
the difference must lie in the second clause. But if this is so, 
then "X believes p** cannot be analysed without remainder in terms of 
acting-as-if and dispositions to do so# por if it could £) would be 
self-contradictory and F) a tautology (in the everyday sense of the 
term)."
This objection rests on too narrow an ai^roach 
to what is being claimed# It may be admitted that E) is not obviously 
self-contradictory. But the point that o*Comar misses is that if 
E) is the case, we can expect the agent’s true beliefs to show in 
some circisNstances or other, actual or potential# The classic anti­
dualist position is that they must show# It may be true that sir 
Humphrey acts as if ood will punish us fbr our sins, but that he does 
not believe it. we will claim this precisely because, for instance, 
he acts that way in public, but not in private; or if not for this 
reason, then for some similar one#
The analysis in terms of "acting as if p 
%#ere true" must be taken to mean not smrely that the agent does act in 
this or that way but that he would do so on other occasi«is, or that 
he will tend to do so# m  U%is respect, belief-dispositions are no 
different from other dispositions# If we tap the glass and it does 
not shatter, this does not of itself prove that it isn't brittle# 
whether we take the incident that way or not depends on a wide 
variety of circumstances# Again, consider "migratory#** this term 
is a semi-dispositional one# The dispositional element in it can be 
roughly explained as "tending to make long journeys to a different 
(but fixed) habitat at a certain season of the year#** Thus the 
swallow is a migratory bird because it tends to fly south in winter
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and return In spring* Nonetheless, not all its southward flights 
are migrations | nor are all its long flights# For a given flight 
to count as a migration we must consider a %dde variety of facts 
about Üie swallow, what it is doing now and what it would do in
other circumstances» And so with beliefs.
This objection, and others like it, fails
because they do not take into account the different kinds of
relationship that there may be between a disposition and its ev«its, 
and the flexibility of soste of those relationships. And the 
answer given hare will re-appear tdth monotonous regularity when 
more powerful objectless are raised.
Xn saying that a word "signifies a 
disposition," we say that the word signifies that certain evmits will 
happen in certain circimmtances. If belief is a disposition to act, 
then it %fill be a disposition to act in certain circumstances.
One of the circumstances to be specified is the agent's wishes, or 
what his purpose at the given time is. A gardener who believes 
that spraying roses keeps down greenfly may or may not be observed 
spraying the roses at the ai^rc^rlate time. If he wants good roses, 
he will presumably spray them. But if he prefers healthy green-fly, 
or doesn't care about the roses, then he will not. we can only 
determine what actions satisfy the determinable belief-disposltion 
if we know what the agent wants. We must also know something about 
the situation he is in. In this case, it would be no good to find
out what the gardwer does in the depth of winter. But each of these 
necessities gives rise to its own difficulties#
The necessity of disoovwing what the agent 
wants is a difficulty, at least for the thorwxgh-going dispositionalist. 
For wishes are not circumstances like the season of the year or the
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poor state of the roses. Many philosofA e^rs have accepted that part, 
at least, of the meaning of talk about a person's motives, intentions 
or desires is given by saying that they are "dii^ositions to do...." 
See for example Ryle "The Concept of Mind" chapter 4, section 2, and 
more recently Charles Taylor in "The Explanation of Brtiaviour”. p. 49. 
The position then is this. we are told that a man %iho believes that 
spraying the roses keeps do%m green-fly may or may not be seen 
spraying the roses. To discover what we can expect to see him do, 
we must look to his wishes, inter alia. But this is unhelpful.
For when we ask about a man's wishes, we are told that if a man wants 
good roses, he may or may not spray them. It all depends on his 
beliefs, inter alia. If we are given one or the other, we can say 
something about what he can be expected to do. But %#e are not told 
how to get either without first having the other. The situation is 
like the one reported of Or. Johnson's first dictionary, by those 
vague and anonymous sources that so often report apocryphal stories.
A deer %#as defined as the female of a stag and a stag was defined as 
the male of a deer.
The interdependence of beliefs and wishes 
can be clearly set out by using a model that Braithwaite provides, 
explicitly as a model for the relation between belief and brtiaviour. 
The quotations are from the Aristotelian Society supplement of 1964. « 
It is an application of what is variously called Theory of Games, or 
Decision Theory.
"To do this (sc. to apply this theory to belief), we need only 
consider the simplest possible abstract case, in Which the agent (call 
him Wee) has a choice between only two possible actions, L*, L",
%d%ere L* will yield an outcome "a" if a proposition p is true, and an 
outcome "b" if p is false (i.e. if not-p is the case, ) while L" will 
yield an outcome of "c" if p and "d" if not-f. This situation can 
bé represented by a square diagram with four cells, in which luke may
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be regarded am having to choose between the two rows in the diagram, 
while the outcome he will get from his chosen action d#q>ends on 
whether p or not-p is true, so that the outcome he will get will be 
found in the cell %diere his chosen row is intersected by the first 




Next we are introduced to the "domination
principle." The various outcomes, a, b, c, d, can be ranked by
Luke in different ways. Oivw this ranking the domination principle
prescribes the dx)iae of M%e horlaontal row or the other, as being
the action that will give Luke the greatest advantage.
"There are nine distinct cases, in three of which the domination 
principle will prescribe the choice of L*, and in three of which it 
will prescribe the choice of L". There are three cases in which the 
principle gives no prescription."
Now fbr belief.
"ky thesis is that to select the sub-situation consisting of the 
first (vertical) column is tantamount to being certain of p, to 
select the sUb-situaticm consisting of the second coluam is tanta­
mount to being certain of not-p, while to select the sub-situation 
which is the situation itself is tantamount to being uncertain 
between p and not-p."
Let us consider an example. On the next 
page, there are two squares on Braithwaite's pattern, but with the 
variables filled out to rarement a possible situation - even a 
common one. Xn the first case, if know which (horlaontal) row 
Luke chooses, that is, if we know what he does, we have no way of 
knowing which vertical column he has chosen, nor what raxk he gives to 
the outcome. If we knew one or the other, we could deduce the missing 
item. But unless there is a separate act of choice of the column, or
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of ranking outoones, we can get nowhere. In normal actions, there 
is no separate act of choice for these. Not all cases are so 
difficult. m  the second case, we can work out what we need if 
Wee takes his uad>rella. But if he does not, we are left without 
help. Moreover, if he does take his umbrella in a real situation, 
things are more complicated than we have allowed here. The possible 
outcomes are never So restricted as these examples assume. If we 





The neighbours do 
not like music.
Luke plays his The neighbours The neighbours
gramophone. will be happy. will not be happy.
Like does not neighbours The neighbours
play his will not be will be happy.
gramophone. happy.
Second exaaplei-
It will rain. It %d.ll not rain.
lAfee takes his Luke does not Luke does not
umbrella on get wet. get wet.
his walk.
Luke leaves his Luke gets Luke does not
umbrella behind. wet. get wet.
The dispoai tionalist ' s ans%#er to this 
quandary is basically the same as the answer to O'Connor's objection. 
Of course we cannot discover everything just by watching a man act on 
one occasion. We must see what he does on lots of differmnt 
occasions, and consider what he would do in yet other situations. 
There is no logical circularity here, for the dispositions are
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m>«cified in different way#. Wishes might be dispositions to do 
what will achieve the end wished for, or to do what one wishes to 
do. Beliefs might be dispositions to act as if p were true, for 
instance. The problem raised here is heuristic, not logical.
M ? - on€One one would claim that it is always easy to discover soiteone's 
wishes and beliefs.
Even so, the picture of dispositions inter­
acting in this way is a strange one. A possible parallel is from 
the science of mechanics. Here, one talks of forces acting on a 
body in different directions, and of the resultant fbrce moving this 
body. But tlwm there will be a dWaate whether these cases really 
are parallel, even if we do treat forces as dispositions to move.
Two forces are clearly dispositions of the same kind, just as two 
wishes are. There are more convincing exai^ ples. "He tends to 
stutter when he gets excited." "An angry man is usually careless."
"A heavy car tends to use more petrol than a light one."
There is another problem. The agent's 
wishes are not the only circumstance that must be specified before 
we can say what a given belief will lead the agent to do. The 
attempt to specify these other circumstances gives rise to an 
infinite hierarchy of dispositions.
In the Aristotelian society's si%>plement for 
1946, Braithwaite offered a second characterisation of belief. (By 
1964, he has moved away from this account. But this article brings 
out my point, and it was the one that Chisholm criticised in the 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian society for 1955 - 56.) Braithwaite's 
claim is that a man who believes p will act in a %my that is appropriate 
to p being true.
"To say that a man's action is appropriate to a proposition's being 
true is to say that the action is such that it tends to fulfil the
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•springs of action* if ths proposition is true but does not tend 
to fulfil them if the proposition is false."
He explains that a man alvwys acts in "suitable conditions."
"The suitable conditions are of two sorts - external, (%#hich I will 
call «occasions*) and internal, (which I will call the 'springs of 
action.•)......The internal conditions are the intentions, desires,
wants, motives, instinctive needs and drives of the believer at the 
time when the external occasion for the appropriate action arises."
Chisholm gives two counter-examples , which
illustrate the point that the supposed external conditions must be
believed to hold, as distinct from their actually holding. So %#e
conclude that external o>nditions are irrelevant, after all.
"Let us suppose that a driver, wishing to keep an appointment with 
a friend and believing, truly, that the friend is waiting along a 
certain road, acts on his belief by taking that road; and let us 
suppose further that he has an accident, with the consequence that 
many of his springs of action - including his desire to meet his 
friend - are frustrated. (we may say, if %#e choose, that his false 
belief that the road would be safe %#as the real source of his 
trouble..... .But this does not absolve his true belief. ) "
And again, to counter these being sufficient conditions.
"Let us suppose that someone en route to the bank, where he wants to 
get some money, finds a podcet-book which is fUll and that this find 
satisfies the relefant springs of action."
It might be argued that these are not really 
counter-examples. The definition refers to actions "tending to 
fulfill the springs of action." But if these examples are not 
satisfactory, others can be produced. For Chisholm's point is that 
the actions as described may not in fact tend to fulfill the springs 
of acticm, or that the springs may not in fact tmnd to be fulfilled by 
the action that the agent is carrying out.
Hie definition is wrong in two ways. A man 
does not always act in such a %#ay as to fulfill his springs of action.
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even if his beliefs are true* He always acts in the way that he 
believes will fulfil his springs of action, given his beliefs. He 
may always be mistaken about this, and so the qualification is needed. 
Indeed, on the disposition theory, his acting in a certain way is 
evidence that he has this belief. Besides this qualification, %#e 
need a similar one for the external occasions. may be right or
wrong about these as %#ell. so we must say only that they must be 
believed to hold. Again, the disposition theory requires this too.
Even if we could find some statement of 
external occasions such that "believes" was unnecessary, we should 
have proved too much. For we would then have a story to tell that 
%ms indistinguishable from a causal story. But it is one mark, at
least, of an event as opposed to an action, that an event occurs when
and only when certain (causal) conditions obtain. Beliefs and wishes
are not in question. But this is just vdiat a characterisation of a 
belief-disposition %#ould be if it was immune from this difficulty.
Chisholm claims that the re-appearance of 
beliefs in the definiens is circular. I do not see that this is 
strictly true. It is not that "believe" is defined in terms of 
"believe," but rather that "...believes that p" is defined in terms of 
"...believes that q." One could defend this. The primitive logical 
symbols are defined in terms of each other. But that case is 
different, since they can also be defined in other ways, notably by 
means of the truth-tables. A more persuasive point can be made if we 
look at the consequences of this move.
As the argument has gone so far, we can expand 
"Fred believes that spraying the roses keeps down green-fly" into the 
following complex statement:-
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If 1) Fred believes that certain circumstances obtain, 
and (ii) he wants good roses,
and (iii) he believes that, given i) and ii), it is appropriate 
to spray the roses,
and (iv) there is nothing else he thinks more important, 
then (v) Fred will spray the roses, (etc.)
m  fact, this is only one determinate of 
the determinable disposition. If one condition is changed, others 
may have to be revised as well. The difficulty is that all the 
clauses i) - iii) are themselves are dispositional, and so need to 
be rewritten in their eaqpanded forms. If they refer to Fred's 
spraying the roses, the definition is circular. But even if they 
do not, the word "believes" will re-appear in the new version, 
leading to yet more eaqpansion, ad infinitum.
Is this conclusive? The dispositionalist 
can retreat again to "what Fred will do on other occasions" as a way 
of finding out about these second-order dispositions. But this move 
now looks like a cloak for vacuity. Dispositions are tendencies for 
things to hapxm under certain circumstances. But no circumstances 
for the actions to happen under are, or can be, specified. I 
mentioned this piling up of dispositions as a difficulty earlier on, 
and suggested tdiat we could find harmless parallels for it. (See 
p.%) But there is a crucial difference that is now clear. In
those cases, the dispositions could readily be broken down to the 
events that satisfy them and the circumstances in idiich they are said 
to occur. But we cannot see how to do this in the case of belief.
There is one other move open to the 
dispositionalist. He can acknowledge the points made above, and say 
that any characterisation of the circumstances in which an agent acts
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must be qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. The agent, on this 
view, will act in a certain way, if otlmr things are equal. This 
is a qualification that must be written in to the story about other 
dispositions, and it must be added to many hypothetical statements. 
One example where this is true is "If you strike this match, it will 
light, " This is a true statement but there are many circumstances 
under vdiich the striking of the match will not be followed by its 
lighting. Not many matches will light if th^ are struck in a 
bucket of water, or in an atmosphere that contains no oxygen. The 
attempt to state all the exceptions would be an endless one. 3o
we qualify the hypothetical with "ceteris paribus."
The necessity of qualifying hypotheticals 
in this way is a complication of a different kind and a different
order from the quandary that the disposition theory creates. In
the case of hypotheticals, we can specify some circumstances in 
which we expect the relevant events to occur. On this account of 
belief, we cannot do that. We find in hypotheticals that we must 
bear in mind the many exceptions. we do not find the indefinitely 
ramifying structure of dispositions that we face if we accept the 
dispositions theory of belief. W.W. Mellor in "Knowing, Believing, 
Bfehaving" in Mind 1967 offers a version of the theory that might 
avoid some of these difficulties. Mellor*s strategy is to develop
a legitimate sense of "disposed to act appropriately to p." %
starts by talking of knowledge and of behaviour's being appropriate 
to the facts. Thwi he weakens what he says about knowledge to fit 
the case of belief. Knowledge is to be explicated by means of 
certain of the terms that we use to appraise action. "A knows that 
p" means that "A is disposed to act in some way in which in the light 
of the fact that p, together with other relevant factors, he would do 
well to act."
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The main other relevant factors are other 
facts known to A, his beliefs and his motives. Knowledge is an 
aW.lity to do what is recomnendable in the light of that knowledge.
The ability that knowledge brings is a "minimal" one. It is an 
ability in the sense that anyone is able to play chess, or make 
chess moves, as opposed to the abilities that a skilled chess­
player has. Any strong sense of "ability" will be vulnerable to 
counter-examples in «diich the agent fails to do What is appropriate 
either because of some strong emotion (e.g. panic) or because of a 
mistake or lapse due to stupidity or even made because of knowledge 
that he possesses.
Mellor emgdiasises two features of the 
appraisal vocabulary to which this account refers. First, it is 
purely permissive, and has no prescriptive words in it; the 
strongest words it has are "Justifiable" and "allowable." It 
applies to behaviour that is not deliberate as well as behaviour 
that is, as long as it is controllable. It is rich in excuse-words. 
Second, the basic question underlying these appraisals is "To what 
extent is the agent's behaviour warranted or justified by the 
situation which provokes it, or excusable or understandable in the 
light of that situation?"
Mellor avoids saying that "Knowledge is a 
capacity to adjust behaviour in some systematic way to the facts of 
one's environment." The difficulties that I have been discussing 
sprang from trying to do this or something very like it. Mellor gives 
two reasons. "Systematic," he says, implies that there are rules or 
laws relating situations, knowledge and behaviour. But if this were 
so, there would be no distinction between a causal story of action 
and a story in terms of knowledge. Second, mistakes and lack of 
knowledge will always invalidate any non-causal rules. It is at this
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stage that the crucial point is made. Mellor sayst-
"H%e point is that the concept of knowledge, in its relations to 
behaviour, cannot be explained without some normative concept of 
what it is proper, desirable, or at least permissible to do if such 
and such is the case. For without introducing the notion of a set 
of standards of some kind, %#e have no general way of saying what it 
is that knowledge enables us to do. It is perfectly right to say 
'knowledge is %#hat enables us to vary out behaviour systematically 
according to the facts'; but the system must be described as one 
which %#e ought to follow, not merely as one which we do in fact 
follow.
"By supplementing the notion of the 
recosmendable with that of the permissible, or, more idiomatically, 
that of 'b^iavlour for which man has good cause, ' we can broatei 
the relevant standards sufficiently to cover the difficult cases, 
idiile keeping within the same logical framework."
The analysis that comes out of all this isi-
"'A knows that p' implies that A is likely to behave in some %#ay 
which is either recowmendable, or at least permissible, in the 
light of the fact that p, and,
if A does in fact behave in some way of this kind, he probably 
would not have behaved in that particular way had it not been 
reoommendable or at least permissible in the light of the fact that 
p, unless there %Mre some other reason for doing so, and, 
this only applies if A holds no relevant beliefs which are both 
unreasonable and false."
"Believes" is accommodated by saying "that 
would be recommendable, or at least permissible, if p %#ere true."
At least one philosopher who opposes the 
dispositional view of belief has advanced a description of 
eiq>lanations of action that is reauudcably like this one. Dray first 
stated this view in "lews and Explanation in Histery.” and a later 
restatement is to be found in an article by him in "Philoswhy and 
History" edited by s. Hook.
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"Understanding is achieved when the historian can see the 
reasonableness of a man's doing what the ag#mt did, givwn the 
beliefs and purpose referred to; his action can then be 
explained as having been an 'appropriate' one*
"What it (sc. the action explanation) 
aims to show is that the sort of thing he did made perfectly 
good sense from his point of view."
Mellor started his article by saying that 
a belief was more like a set of possible dispositions than a 
disposition. He contrasts belief with motives, which are more 
like dispositions in ordinary language. They signify a positive 
likelihood that the events will occur, rather than the single fact 
that they will or would occur. This is an interesting, if slightly 
puss ling, remark. It is a pity that by the end of the article he 
is saying that a belief is like a policy, namely a policy of 
conducting oneself as if p were true. For this seems to me a 
return to the view that belief is a disposition simpliciter.
Another thing that is to be regretted in this analysis is the 
"likely to do..." in it. For in the early stages of the article, 
Mellor says that he does not think it an adequate characterisation 
of the belief-disposition if "probably occurs in it. For then the 
criterion of belief will give no guidance in those cases where the 
agwt does not act in the way the characterixaticxn specifies. His 
analysis is different in that it talks of "likelihood" in the 
'ordinary language' way, and in that the vord "ought" occurfin it. 
But I do not see that these differwiees evade the probl<m, that 
raises himself.
The difficulties that I have raised before 
can still be found here. Mellor has not avoided reference to what 
the kgent wants. For it is written in by the reference to "what is
recommendable or at least permissible. " The officer who is pinned
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down by snipers in a wood will find one sort of action recoswwndable, 
namely, destroying them, because of his desire to win the battle*
But one of his privates, with the same knowledg# of the situation, 
will find recommendable an action that is not even permissible from the 
officer's point of view, namely, a prompt retreat, if he wishes to 
preserve his skin* This example casts doubt on the suggestion that 
difficulties are avoided by the reference to "what is permissible."
Another objection that recurs from earlier 
discussion is that what the agent does is «hat seams to him to be 
reasonable rather than %hat is reasonable. one possible answer to 
this is to write in a ceteris paribus clause; "the agent is likely to 
do....ceteris paribus." Mellor might reply that the point that what 
the agent does is «hat seems to him to be reasonable is supplementary 
to his analysis, but does not invalidate it.
Ths fundamental objection to this story is 
that it puts the cart before the horse. It is both true and 
important that we have the ^praisal vocabulary to which Mellor 
appeals. But it cannot be made to serve Mellor's purpose. For the 
analysis requires us to posit belief and «mnts in the agents such that 
his actions will appear, or become, reasonable. But if this is how 
it works, how could we ever assess an action unfavourably? That is, 
how oould «#e ever say that what someone did was unreasonable or 
impermissible, even in the li^t of his beliefs and «#ants?
Only acticms can be reasonable or unreason­
able, permissible or impermissible in the required sense. At least,
actions are described in these «mys, but events are not. But it is
surely absurd to suppose that all actions are reasonable. One may 
carry out an action in the light of one's beliefs and «dshes, and still 
do something unreasonable. But if %#s accept the account offered here.
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this will not be possible* Ws %#ill construct beliefs end wants 
such that the action comas out reasonable*
The point can be explained in another 
way* The vocabulary and standards that we are calling into use 
are to do with the appraisal of actions from a certain point of 
view. But we ceinnot appredse the action in these terms until we 
know what the agent's beliefs and wishes are. When we say that 
an acticm is reasonable frcm the agent's point of view, we are 
assessing it in the lig^t of what we have already discovered about 
it. One thing that it is important to discover is what the agent 
believes and wants. So in assessing what he does as reasonable, 
we must already know about them. without beXefs and wishes, the 
action fails to be an action at all, and so not even a candidate 
for assessment in this %#ay. An action nay be reasonable or it may 
not; it d^>ends on the agent's beliefs and wishes. But Mellor 
assumes the result of the assessment in order to be able to work out 
one of the factors involved in making it. This is to put the cart 
before the horse. It is as if one were to say that an Alsation is 
to be defined as the kind of dog that wins prizes in the Alsation 
class in the dog show. To the itninformed enquirer this is no use, 
unless of course we tell him ind^pmndently %diich class is the 
Alsation class. The whole point of this appraisal vocabulary is 
that actions can be placed on a scale of assessment by the use of it. 
one of the things we must consider in placing them on the scale is the 
agent's beliefs and wishes. So we can hardly expect first to place 
it, then to discover what the relevant beliefs and wishes were. 
Statements about what the agent wants and believes are preliminaries, 
not postcripts. Mellor does discuss a difficulty closely related to 
this one on p. 335.
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"What, hoiMver, should we say If A, knowing that p, does something 
very stupid, yet does it because he knows that p?"
"The best answer seems to be that......the agent must by definition
have been trying to do something commendable... "
This may be acceptable in cases of lazi­
ness or panic. Mellor deals with this by weakening the sense in 
%#hich knowledge is an ability to do what is recommendable, and 
finally admits that any such assimilation must be pretty heavily 
qualified. For "a man may become dmaoralised, panic-strickw, 
enraged or %#ildly elated because he knows some fact." He addA that 
although one cannot recommend lan^ter, fear, anger, etc., they can 
be commanded as "appropriate."
But this does not meet my objection at 
all. For my objection is precisely that behaviour is net always 
assessed favourably, that is, that an agent is not by definition 
"trying'^ to do something coanendable." Mellor is considering eases 
where the agent's behaviour is not assessed favourably. And the 
assessment is made in the light of the agent's knowledge. How can 
this be, if the criterion of knowing depends on giving a favourable 
assessment of the behaviour?
It would be a mistake to press this 
objection too far. For it is true in general that explanations of 
actions aim to show that the action did make sense from the agent's 
point of view. m  cases of the kind that create difficulties for 
Mellor, we do demand a fuller story so that we can see that the 
stupidity or panic is comprOhensible, if not actually recoamendable. 
But there may not be a story that satisfies us. It is possible for
a mistake or a panic to be simply inexplicable. It may not be
possible to see it as making any kind of sense. we may in the end
give up the attempt. we start on the basis that what the agent did
-31-
nade some sort of sansa* Wh#m his behaviour does not make sense, 
when it is not warranted or justified by the situation, then ws 
start to ask questions#
I accept that "the basic question under­
lying these appraisals is 'TO what extent is the agent's behaviour 
warranted or justified by the situation vAiich provokes it?"* But 
it is forced and unnatural to insist that "knows" and "believes" 
apply to behaviour# It is natural and easy to see "knows" and 
"believes" as part of the language that we use to describe the 
situation whi^ provWces the bahaviour# After all, "he knows 
that#.#" and "he believes that.." are usually to be completed by a 
description of a situation rather than of an action. Contrast in 
this respect "wants" and "intends" etc. Only after we have a 
description of the situation that provc^ ees the action can we answer 
this basic question.
Mellor identifies the problem correctly.
It is to explain what the propositional hook is that Ryle mentions 
in "Concept of Kind" (p. 129, quoted on p. 11 of this thesis.)
But Mellor interprets the problem as giving a characterization of the 
sort of thing that one who holds a certain belief is prone to do.
What we need is an exploration of the complexities of describing the 
situation that provokes an action, not of actions. He has not really 
avoided amy of the difficulties in the dispositional approach. But 
then, why should we expect any such characterisation to be available? 
perhaps %#e should be prepared to say that there is not any particular 
sort of thing that one who holds a certain belief is prone to do* 




• Disposition words are special. But it is Qot 
easy to say exactly in what %#ay they are special# Ryle says in "Concept 
of M W . " p.125*-
"Dispositions are neither reports of observed or observable states of 
affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs. 
They narrate no incidents. But their are intimately connected with 
narratives of incidents, for, if they are true, they are satisfied by 
narrated incidents."
And on p.43:-
**To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, 
or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in 
a particular state or undergo a particular change."
One orthodox way of suamarising the special job 
of disposition %#ords is that their job is the licensing of inferences 
idxHit %d%at %#ill happen or what is likely to happen in certain circumstances, 
That is why a disposition word can be expanded into hypothetical form, and 
why they ere connected with laws, generalisations and predictions. "This 
glass is brittle" becomes "If this glass is struck sharply (etc.), it will 
shatter (ceteris paribus)." Categorical words, on the other hand simply 
report tdiat disposition words have licensed us to infer.
But this is not sufficiceit to mark disposition 
words off from categorical %#ords. "Oows are ruminants" and "He is a 
heavy smoker" look like good enough reports, we can form hypotheticals 
from categorical words. Indeed, the Phenoemnalist programme turned on 
the fact that %#e can do this. "This is round" gives rise to "If this is 
placed on a (sufficiently) smooth surface, it will roll down it," (and 
so on). "This is rubber" gives rise to "If this is dropped on to a 
suitable surface, it will bounce." It is true that disposition words 
license inferences. But so do categorical words. The distinction will
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not be saved by suggesting that %## can never paraphrase categorical 
words «dth hypothetical statesmnts "cospletely." We cannot do that 
for many dispositions either - for example, determinable ones. This 
distinction needs to be drawn in a rather different way.
Categorical words may licence inferences.
But this is not the same as being an inference-license. It is the 
fonction of disposition words to license inferences. It is not just 
something we snmetimea do with them. But it is just something we 
sometimes do %#ith categorical words. The hypothetical statements are 
implied, in a strict sense, by the disposition «fords. They give their 
meaning. But in the case categorical words, the hypothetical state­
ments do not give their meaning, but their consequences, which are to 
be discovered empirically (usually). This difference can be summarised 
by saying that the hypothetical statements are **built in to" disposition 
words, but not in to categorical %#ords. The difference in the roles can 
be brouç^ out in a general formula. Sometimes, case A, %we say of an 
object (or person) that, because it (he) has some property, it (he) 
will react to certain treatment in certain ways. Sometimes, case B, 
we say that soamthing has Uie property of reacting to certain treatment 
in certain ««ays. The first formula shows the role of the categorical 
«lords, and the second that of the disposition «lords.
The terms that Toulain introduces in "The Uses 
of Armmaent" to describe the lay#out of arguments allow the differences 
to be stated briefly and comparatively clearly. Disposition words 
function as warrants, licensing certain moves from circumstances to 
behaviour, or from data to conclusion. Categorical «lords provide the 
backing for these warrants. They justify using certain ««errants, but 
are not warrants.
There is no need to suppose that the distinction 
is a rigid one. A word may play both roles at once and so qualify as
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8«Bi-dispositional or "mongrel-categorical." It may also be that aome 
words are categorical relative to some other «fords, but dispositional 
relative to others. For example, this claim might be made by someone 
who accepted phenomenalism. "He is a smoker" could be explained as 
meaning "Uider certain circumstances, he smokes." While "He is smoking"
%#ould be eaqplained, on a phanomenalist account, as "Uhder certain 
circumstances, certain sense data will be available." A more neutral 
example, philosophically, is "hibernates." "Bears hibernate" can be 
explained as "During the ««inter, bears sleep." "The bears are asleep" 
can be explained as "The bears are not walking about, looking for food, 
etc. They are in caves ««d sheltered places, lying quietly. They ««ill 
not react to the outside world in the ««ays they usually do." "Sleep" is 
dispositional relative to the latter collection of ««ords, but categorical 
relative to "hibernates."
This does undermine the distinction. It ««ill 
now have to be drawn, not bet««een different groups of words, but bet««ecn 
different uses of ««ords* In one context, a word may be a ««arrant for some 
inference. In another, it may be backing for a different inference.
It is now possible to say ««here the quarrel 
«dth the disposition theory of belief lies. It can be agreed that we do have 
soeie expectations about the actions of a man ««ith a given belief. The quest­
ion is ««hether statements about a man's beliefs are backing for the particular 
inferences that they license, or whettter they are simply licences to infer.
In their use to explain actions, belief statements behave more like the 
categorical properties in case A above, than like the dispositional prop­
erties in case B.
Ryle points out that ««e must distinguish carefully 
bet««ecn explanations of the form "The glass shattered because it ««as hit 
««ith a hammer," <1), and explanations of the different form "The glass
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ahattared «dian It was hit %dth a haamar, because it %#ss brittle.** (2)
But it is not clear that (2) is an explanation at all. If %ie expand (2) 
to its overtly hypothetical form, it becomes (2a) "The glass shattered 
whan it was hit with a hammer, because it has a propensity to shatter 
%«hen struck by a hard object such as a hammer.*' The supposed explan­
ation is little more than a restatement of what is to be explained 
in a somewhat more general form.
The allegation that (2) is not really an 
explanation of anything can be backed up. A respectable answer to the 
question 'Idly did the glass shatter when it was hit with a hammer?" (3), 
is "Because it was molecular structure N." (4). But this is also a 
respectable answer to the question "Why is the glass brittle?" (5).
The expansion of the disposition to its hypothetical form, as in (2a), 
shows that this should be no surprise. In one good sense, questions
(3) and (9) are the same question. They have the same answer.
Genuine explanations must tell us something 
that we did not know, or at least readnd us of something that %#e are 
not told in the question. Either, like (1) they must offer the data, 
the initial condition^^ that "produce" what is to be explained. Or, 
like (4), they must offer the backing for an tnforance schema given in 
the question. (2) and (2a) merely offer the warrant for a move that 
has already bean made, and so do not tell us anything we did not already 
know. If soawone knows enough to ask (3), he knows enough to ask (5) - 
provided he kno%m what the word "brittle" means.
Statements about what someone believes, on the 
other hand, are perfectly respectable answers to the question "%*hy...?" 
"Why is he spraying the roses?" "Because he believes that spraying the 
roses keeps down green-fly (etc.)" And this rather question-begging 
appeal to intuition can be backed up. Consider the following:-
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(1) "Why is he running a%«ey from the bull?"
(ii) "Because he is afraid of it."
(iii) "Why is he afraid of it?"
(iv) "Because he believes that it will attacJc him."
(iv) can be an answer to either (iii) or (i) in exactly the same way that
(4) could answer either (3) or (5) above. Furthermore, if one knows 
enough to ask (i), one knows enough to ask (iii), - provided one knows 
the meaning of the word "afraid." So the parallel is close. The 
questions and answers in the "bull" case are inter-related in the same 
way as the questions and answers in the "glass" case. But the statement 
about what the man believes plays the role of the categorical statement, 
not that of the disposition statement. "Believes" does not play the role 
of a disposition word.
One might object to my example. It is only 
plausible if "afraid" is taken to mean simply "liable to run away or 
otherwise avoid the object of fear." But "afraid" is much more complicated 
than that. One may fear something and not r\m avmy or othervdse avoid it. 
One may be afraid of the bull but stand one's ground (which is really 
safer), or even advance towards it. We should say, not just doing it, 
but doing it, because the bull is dangerous, or at least because it is 
believed to be dangerous or liable to attack. But then the belief that 
the bull is liable to attack is built in to the notion of fear, and the 
distinction between ans%#ers (ii) and (iv) collapses.
An example that would back my claim would be 
an example that was clearly a disposition, but one that could be ex­
plained by a belief. Many dispositifs such as "being a smioker" mdght 
be explicable by reference to a belief, but often are not explicable in 
that way. An artificial example w<xild suffer just because it was 
artificial. In any case, my point can be made in termm of this example.
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It is just that w* need to go in to what is involved in the notion of 
fear a little further*
It is too simple to say that a belief that the 
bull is dangerous is built in to the notion of fear. Someone may believe 
that the bull is dangerous but not be afraid of it. He may not be afraid 
of it because he also believes that he can control the bull, or because 
he also believes that he can escape any danger, or because he had taken 
all possible steps to avoid the danger. And one may believe that there 
is no danger from the bull, that it is not dangerous (perhaps it is 
asleep) and yet fear it. So there are cases where boUi the belief and 
the actions that we expect to find associated fear are s^arated 
from it.
There is a third kind of consideration that is 
involved in saying that people are afraid or not afraid. There are 
various involuntary reactions that are associated with fear. A man 
««ho is afraid may have a pale face, sweat heavily, be tense and 
restless etc.
These three different kinds of consideration 
meet in the notion of fear. It is also plausible to say that, in one 
way or another these are the considerations that meet in description of 
emotions and moods. We do not al««ays give the same ««eight to them or 
even demand that they are all present. But they are distinct kinds of 
consideration. There is obviously a difference in kind between the 
actions, in a full blooded sense of "action" of a man ««ho is afraid, 
and his involuntary reactions. The difference lies In the possibility 
that one might show «q> «dthout the other. The difference in kind bst«men 
the relevant beliefs and the others sho%«a up in the see» ««ay. So these 
complications, far from ««eakening my claim, reinforce it.
Ny complaint about dispositions as explanations
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<of actions) has been isade elsewhere. P#T. Geach says in a brief passage 
in "Mental Acta" (p.5) that to say that belief is a disposition to behave 
puts belief stateoients, as eaqplanations of action, on a par with the 
statement that opium puts people to sleep because it had dormitive 
power, w. Drey in "Laws and Explanation in History" spends much time on 
closely related arguments. Especially in cheptmrs X - XV, he opposes 
vdiat he aptly calls, the "covering law" account of explanation. Dut 
he does allow that dispositions can have explanatory poww:, and in Vi7 
claims that dispositions can be said to be causes. (See also V:6)
It is too much to claim that dispositional words are 
of no value at all as explanations. But there is a question how disposit­
ional words are of value as explanations, and then whether they are of 
value for the saem reasons as categorical words, ««hether they carry their 
explanatory force in the same ««ay as categorical ««ords.
One answer *to the first question can be found 
in defending the "covering law" account of explanation against the 
objection that it devalues explanations by putting them on a par ««ith the 
explanation that appea&s to dormitive powmr. This objection arises 
because both dispositions and explanations on t)«e "covering law" account 
can be stated in the form of hypothetical generalisations or laws covering 
and connecting certain initial conditions with the event to be explained.
C.G. Hampel describes the theory in an article
^ 3 c l « c  In HUtocv." (rqarintad In "Philomophy of Scl«ya"
ed. P.H. Midditch. ) Hampel gives an example of explanation, and continues :-
"This explanatory account may be regarded as an argument to the effect that 
the event to be explained (let me call it the explanandum event) ««as to be 
expected by reason of certain esqplanstory facts. These may be divided into 
two groiqmi (i) particular facts mnd (ii) uniformities expressed by general 
laws#««.#...,.If ««e imagine these various presuppositioas explicitly spelled 
out, the idea suggests itself of construing the explanation as a deductive 




Here, are stetements deecrihlng the particular facte invoked;
are general law#; jointly, these statements «dll be said to 
fdrm the esplanana. The conclusion C is a statement describing the esplan- 
andum event.#..
"The kind of explanation thus characterised I «dll call deductive-nomolocdcal 
explanation;.....*"
The uniformities to be cited in the explanation 
are far more general than any uniformity given in the questions being asked. 
Hampel's example makes this clear. Glasses were taken out of hot soapy 
water after being ««ashed, and placed upside down to drain. It ««as observed 
that bubbles grew at the rim of the glasses, and then contracted and 
disappeared. This is to be explained by reference, ultimately, to the gas 
laws and to the la««s of thermodynamics. An explanation that said no more 
than that the events described al«*ay# or usually happened «#ould clearly 
be of no value. So an attack on the value of dispositions as explanations 
is not necessarily an attack on the "covering law" account of explanation.
But this suggests a ««ay in which disposition 
words may have value as explanations. The examples of disposition words 
that I have used have all been highly determinate. So they may be beyond 
rescue as explanations. It doesn't follow that determinable dispositions, 
more complicated and more general, ««ill be without explanatory force. If 
"A believes that p" is a disposition, it is a complicated, determinable 
one.
Dray gives an excellent example, q\x>tlng a 
passive from I.D. Jones' "The English Revolution" <p.85), in which he 
accounts for Cromwell's political decisions in U«e late 1640'st-
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NI# speech## and letters show his difficulty in reaching decisions end 
his reluctance to assume responsibility# he had not the mind that could 
plan ahead» but the genius that acted on impulse. He originated none 
of the many schemes of his party# he took fire from the ideas of others# 
such as Zreton# Harrison# and Lasbert. He %#eited# often in agonies of 
indecision# for guidance from **erovidences** « the hand of God revealed 
in events# he reed the omens like a Roman Consul. This alone and 
adequately explains his sudden adoption of the extremists in Nay 1647 
and December 1648# and his final decision on Charles* death
In this case# the question '*Why....?** about 
Uie particular actions does not loc4c nearly the smss as the question 
"Why..*.?" ^X3ut Cromwell*# tendencies to act. One might well know of 
the particular acts# without being a»mre that they are exasples of these 
tendencies of Q rosmell*#. fbr the tendencies cited here are far more 
general compared with the particular actions in question# than were the 
dispositions I considered earlier compared with the events they %#ere 
related to. The eiq>lanatiQn works in a way very similar to the way that 
the "covering laws" work in Hampel*# account.
There are other possibilities for rescuing
dispositions. In Analysis of December 1968# there is am article called
"Are dispositions causes?" by Roger Squires. The main purpose of this
article is to attadc D.N. Armstrong*# account of dispositions# of %#hich
more below. But he ends his article with these positive suggestions»*
"These explanations may help in various ways. First# they may point 
to the fact that certain events %#ere indeed causal factors# such as a 
small stone that hit the glass or a chance remark that inflamed the 
irascible person. This is to say that the small stone did break the 
glass and that the outburst was an angry reaction to the remark.
Second# the explanations indicate that the glass broke because it %ms 
of a certain kind# that the angry outburst was an angry reaction to the 
remark is to be explained by reference to the particular type of person 
involved. Mot all glasses would break so. Not all people would react 
so......
"Thus it %#ould be wiser to say# not that a dispositional explanation gives
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the cause of am event# as that it shows where the cause of an event is to 
be found. It is rather like saying that the weather %ras responsible fos 
the good crops. This rules out certain explanations# such as the richness 
of the soil# or the special breed of com. But it only indicates the area 
in %#hi<A to look for a cause....**
But there is nothing here to make the dis­
positional account of belief nore plausible. The first of Squires* 
suggestions runs up against the dllewrae about the antecedent of the 
hypothetical in expansion of a belief statement. Either these conditions 
must be, not true# but believed to be true# in which case we have in­
finitely regressing beliefs# or the resulting hypothetical %dLll be just 
a causal law# of the kind invoked in the "covering law** account of 
explanation.. Than we will have lost the distinction between actions 
and events. Even those who have claimed that explanations of action 
are causal have also allowed that there was something special about the 
causes# namely that they are beliefs and wants. But these notions dis­
appear on the dispositional analysis.
Squires* second suggestion also is implausible 
as applied to belief. A belief statement does not merely say that there 
is something special but unspecified about the person involved. Rather# 
it tells us what the something special is. An engry outburst might be 
explelned by saying that Jones gets like that when he has had one or two. 
The something specisl is# let us say, a physiological condition. But it 
might also be explained by reference to his belief that the immigrents 
are ruining the British Way of Life. If this is not describing what it 
is about him in particular# but merely saying that there is something 
special but unspecified about him# than I am at a loss to say what might 
count as saying what the something special is. Nor is it plausible to 
say that an appeal to what someone believes is merely exclusion of possible# 
as it is plausible in the explanation of Qromwell*s actions. The idea
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that the explanetlon works in the seme %my as "covering lew" expUnstions 
work is implausible as applied to belief statements for all these reasons 
exe^it the last. What is plausible is that what someone believes is like 
one of the initial conditions of action.
Disposition words may be accept^le as explan­
ations. But my claim is not that disposition words cannot be acceptable 
explanations at all, while belief statements can be. It is rather that 
disposition words and belief statemants carry their explanatory force in 
different ways. These arguments can only go part of the way to demon­
strating my claim. They cannot be conclusive without a clear explanation 
of the %#ay in idsich belief statements carry their explanatory force. And 
the explanation, when it comes, will have to avoid falling back on any 
appeal to occult cmrnes.
There is another approach to the notion of a 
disposition. This not only offers am answer to my question about the 
%#ey in %diich disposition %#ords carry their explanatory force. It is 
also a foundation for the rather different claim that beliefs are causes 
of actions. This is the "Realist" theory of dispositions. This theory 
is to be contrasted with the "phenomenalist" theory %d%ich, it seems, I 
have adopted. The "Realist" theory claims that dispositions are causes. 
It is propounded by D.M. Armstrong in "A Materialist Th#wry of ttm iOnd."
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3. rum "— alt— " MgQMBfe of <ilapo.ittoi«.
X Shall start this discussion by allowing 
Armstrong sn sxtsndsd opportunity to stats his visw# On p.86 of **A 
Hstsrlalist Theory of Hjnd." he says:-
"According to the Realist view, to speak of an object's having a 
dispositional property entails that the object is in soam non- 
dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists a 
'categorical basis') which is responsible for the object manifesting 
certain btfiaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations %diose nature 
makes the dispositional property the dispositional property it is. It is 
true that we may not know anything of the nature of the non-dlspositional 
state. But, the Realist view asserts, in asserting that a certain piece 
of glass is brittle, for instance, we are iPSo facto asserting that it is 
in a certain non-dispositional state which disposes it to shatter and fly 
apart in a wide variety of circumstances. Ignorance of the nature of the 
state does not affect the issue. The Realist view gains some support 
fkom ordinary language, where %#e often seam to identify a disposition and 
its 'categorical basis.' ('It has been found that brittleness is a 
certain sort of molecular pattern in the material'.}
"I will now present wi *a priori* argument 
which purports to prove the truth of the Realist account of dispositions. 
Let us consider the following case. Suppose that, on a number of occasions, 
a certain rubber has the same force, F, applied tsit, and that on each 
occasion it stretches one inch, we can then attribute a disposition to 
the band. It is disposed to stretch one inch under force F.
"Mow one essential thing about dispositions is 
that %*e can attribute them to objects even at times when the circumstances 
in which the object manifests its dispositions do not obtain. Suppose, 
now, that I say of the band that, if it had been subjected to force F at 
T', a time when it wes not so subjected, it %#ould have stretched one inch. 
What %#arrant have I for ay statement? Consider first the answer the a 
Realist about dispositions will give. He will say that there is every 
reason to believe that the categorical state of the band which is re­
sponsible for its stretching one inch under force F obtains at T'. Given 
that it does obtain at T', then, as a matter of physical necessity, the 
band must stretch one inch under force F*
"Dut %ihat answer can the Phaooawnalist about 
dispositions give? For him, a disposition does not entail the existence 
of a categorical state. The only reason he can give for saying that 
the band %#ould have stretched one inch under force F at T* is that 
numarically the same band behaved in this way on other occasions.
But now %#e may ask the Phenomenslist *Uhat is the magic in numerical 
Identity?* A thing can change its properties over a period of time.
Why sould it not change its dispositional properties? How does the 
Phennmenalist know what the band's dispositional properties are at T«?
He may reply 'We have every reason to think that the relevant categorical 
properties of the object are unchanged at T', so we have every reason to 
think that the dispositional properties are unchanged.' But since he has 
asserted that the connection between 'categorical basis' and dispositional 
property is a contingent, not a necessary one, he can only be arg^ iing that 
there is a contingent connection between categorical properties end the 
fact that the band has that dispositional property at T'. But how could 
one ever establish a contingent connection between categorical properties 
end unfWfilled possibilities? It is not as if one could observe the 
unfulfilled possibilities independently, in order to see how they mre 
cocrelated with the categorical properties! It seems that the Phennmen- 
alist about dispositions %#ill be reduced to utter scepticism about 
dispositions, except on occasions that they are actually manifested."
On this account, dispositions are causes, or 
causal factors. Bo they carry their explanatory force in the same %#ey 
as causes. But this answer won't help us. The difficulty wes that it 
is not an explanation of the behaviour of an object to say that it could 
be expected to behave in that %#ay under those circusstances. But it is 
no more of an explanation to be told that there is some (unspecified and 
perhaps unknown) state of the object, such that it could be expected to 
behave in that way under those circumstances. It isn't much of an 
explanation to say "That could be expected." It isn't any more helpful 
to be told "That was caused by some state of the object," unless we are 
told what state of the object.
I have already referred to Squires* criticism 
of this theory (p.4o). This was the first of a series of articles on the
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subject. The others eres-
2. "Are dispositions causes?" L. Stevenson, Analysis. June 1969.
3. "Some nisccnceptions about dispositions." D. Coder, Analysis. June 1969.
4. "Dispositions are causes." D.M. Armstrong, Analysis. October 1969.
5. "Are dispositions lost causes?" J.E.R. Squires, Analysis. December 1969.
I shall identify Squires' first article as no. 1. His main objection is
that the account gives rise to an infinite regress.
*'Since the object %#ould have the dispositional property and, hence, 
according to this account, the categorical basis, even if no manifestations 
occurred, Armstrong can only mean that the basis would cause the object to 
behave in the relevant %#ays in appropriate circumstances. In short, he is 
attributing a dispositional property to the categorical basis, suspiciously 
similar to that %dii^ wes originally attributed to the object itself.
"But we must then apply his analysis to this new 
dispositional property. It will entail that the categorical basis has 
itself a categorical basis with yet another dispositional property.
According to this view, then, in attributing a dispositional property to 
anything at all, we are committed to the outrageous thesis that there is 
an infinity of categorical bases waiting for scientists to suggest appro­
priate identifications, all sitting inside the object like Chinese boxes."
The essence of Armstrong's reply in 4 iss-
"If it is then asked 'Idiat constitutes the potentiality of that state to 
act as it is capable of acting?' can we not answer 'That same state 
itself.'?"
To %diich Squires replied in 5 that there seems 
no reason %dty we should not make this reply at the first stage# and the 
force of the regress argument is that like questions must be answered in 
like ways.
Armstrong's a priori argument comes under fire 
in 1., as well. Armstrong rebuffed the phenomenslist*s appeal to pest 
experience with the band, on the ground that the band might now behave 
differently. But %#s can only know that the band-state is responsible 
for the manifestations on the basis of correlations between it or similar
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state# end similar behaviour. But this is a contingent correlation, 
and %#e have no guarantee that it will continue. So he is open to the 
same kind of attack that he uses against the phenomenslist. Curiously 
enough, Armstrong sees this point himself, but does not regard it as a 
problem for him. But his ans%#er could also be used by the phenomenalist. 
He says on p.87 of his bookt-
**Z think we can imagine the possibility that the band should be acted 
upon by force F on different occasions, «id behave quite differently 
on these occasions, although there was no relevant difference in the 
categorical properties of the band...... But it is only to the extent
that we accept the Principle of Bufficient Reason that we can introduce 
the notion of disposition."
This last claim might explain idiy he argues 
in 4 that when a thing changes its dispositional properties, there must 
have been some change in its categorical properties. To say otherwise 
is to embrace an "ontology of potentialities,” which is absurd. If a 
potentiality were actual and so part of ontology, it would not be a 
potentiality. This is right, but only in a sense. Bit Armstrong's 
own theory commits him to this absurd position. For, if a disposition 
is a state, then vdiere the state is actual, so must the disposition be 
actual.
Squires argues in 5 that the distinction 
between conditional and categorical properties is suspect} and that 
actual does not mean categorical or exclude conditional. Things can 
have actual conditional properties. This is in reply to Armstrong in 4.
There is some unclarity about "actual" here.
Be need to be able to mark two contrasts, (kie is between what something 
can be supposed or imagined of wrongly said to have or be, and what it 
really has or is. This contrast, or one like it, is what Squires marks 
by the pair "actual" and "non-actual." Clearly we can now say that 
things can have actual conditional properties. Armstrong is relying on
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a different, philoeophleal, contrast* This contrast Is between the 
conditional properties, the dispositions, tendencies, potentialities, 
etc. of an object, and the manifestations of these things, the categorical, 
nan-conditional properties of the object. If we mark this by "actual" and
"non-actual" the conclusion that Armstrong claims to be absurd, can beasinterpretet^being absurd. A potentiality cannot be actual, in this use 
of the distinction. His own theory still commits him to the absurdity, 
so this is no help to him. Hore than Uiat, he now has no argument against 
the "phenomenslist position." In order to convict the "phenoewnalist" of 
this absurdity, he has to demonstrate that he is not using "actual" in the 
first sense, which marks the properties of all kinds that things have, as 
opposed to those they might be thought or imagined wrongly to have.
Armstrong's 2 Priori argument turns on the 
question "What warrant have I for my states&ent?" (sc# that a given 
rubber band, if it had been subjected to a force F at T', a time when 
it was not so subjected, would have stretched one inch.) But the question 
"What warrant do you have for your claim?" is not at all the same question 
as "What is the claim that you are making?" Even if it were true that the 
only warrant available for attributing the disposition to the band is a 
categorical state of the band, there would be no ground for concluding 
that the disposition the categorical basis. Ckusoe's %#arrant for 
concluding that there wes another man on the island was a footprint. It 
does not follow that Man Friday wes ever a footprint. Perhaps this is 
frivolous.
It is not frivolous to ask Armstrong his own 
question. "What warrant does the Realist have for saying that the band 
is in the relevant state?" Clearly, the results of certain tests in 
the case of the elasticity of a rubber band. If thoee tests are not 
’ being applied at T', then the %#arrant for saying that the band is in
—48—
m certain state must be that certain results %#ould be obtained if the 
tests were applied. So the warrant must be that the band has certain 
dispositions to behave, we put together the ans%#ers to the tMO 
questions abouHs imrrants, and conclude that a given disposition is a 
collection of different dispositions. And presumably all of them will 
be analysable in the same %#ey indefinitely.
The mistake is to ignore the function or point 
of these words, Armstrong confuses the function of giving the backing 
for inferences tidth that of licensing them. Mo doubt there is a reason 
why each object responds as it does to various conditions. If the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason is ^  priori true, then there is reason 
for taking it that, if the properties of an object change - whatever 
sort of pr<^ perties they may be - there must have bean a reason for the 
change. But when I license the move from conditions to b^iaviour, I do 
not ipso facto state that my vmrrant has backing at all, much less do I 
state what the backing is. Neither do I ipso facto license any inference- 
moves %dicn I attribute a categorical state to the object, evm though 
the categorical state may be the backing for some infmrence-moves that 
I have licensed.
Leslie Stevenson's article is a defence of the
spirit of Armstrong's account against Squires' attack.
"When such a connection (sc. between a causal and a dispositional 
property of an object) is discovered we are in a position to assert a 
contingent iteitity statement»- 'That state or property of b (the object) 
which is causally responsible for the dispositional property (1) (i.e.
If fb, then 8b)im (the same state or property as) Fb.*"
But ttdM is not the seme as the Realist account 
at all. The Realist account is that when such a connection is found %ne 
are in a position to assert that the dispositional property (the same 
state or property as) Pb. And that does not follow from what Stevenson
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says wa can asssrt. Cn th# contrary, «diat the Realist wants to assart 
is inconsistent wi^ what Stevenson wants to assert* The state or 
property causally responsible for a disposition cannot be identical 
with the disposition* Nothing can cause itself - exc^>t perhaps God*
CodttT attacks Squires* regress argument in 3*
"Finally, wa can say what is wrong with Squires* particular assumption, 
essential to his argument, that if the categorical basis would make x 
(the object) exhibit B (the behaviour) in C (the circumstances), that is 
a dispositional property of the categorical basis# For hvpothesi. 
that C obtains is sufficient to make the categorical basis do its stuff. 
And just as do not say 'Human beings are liable to get wet, if 
immersed in %#ater,' so we should not Bay 'Categorical bases are prone 
to exert their powers under the relevant circumstances,' For as %#eter 
is sufficient within its ehbit, relevant circumstances are enough to 
spur a categorical basis to act,”
Perhaps it is worth pointing out that there is 
a legitimate question %d»y human beings - or anything else - gets %#et if 
immersed in water. It is not legitimate if "getting wet" simply means 
"being lemersed in water." But it can be interpreted in such a way 
that not everything gets wet if iimaersed in water. "Getting %#et" here 
means roughly "absorbing water** or "retaining a film of water on its 
surface idien it is reanved from the water."
The explanation requires reference to rathmr 
esoteric points about surface tension. But it is available.
Squires* answer in 5 is:-
"Certainly, if the categorical basis is referred to in such a %my that it 
follows that it would spur the object to do its stuff, then it is silly to 
ask for a causal explanation why it would do so. It would be like asking 
why a bachelor is unmarried. However, such questions are sensible vAien 
there are alternative ways of picking out the same subjects which do not 
entail the application of the relevant properties. For example, we need 
to explain why a particular person is unmarried."
(But it is not just the phrase 'categorical
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besis" that needs to b# filled in if we are to get e sensible question 
from "Categorical bases are prone to exert their powers under the relevant 
circumstances." "State A is prone to exert its powers under the relevant 
circumstances*' is also empty. There can be no question "Why?" here either, 
we need to specify what the powers are powers to do, and what the relevant 
circumstances are.)
But Squires* reply, though valid against Coder, 
may seem to undermine his own regress argument. For it now seems that 
the only conditions under which the demand for further explanation of 
these connections is not pr<^ )er is when the subjects of enquiry are picked 
out in ways that entail the relevant dispositional properties or entail 
that the relevant events occur. But this opens all causal explanations 
to the same demand, and leads to an infinite regress. The force of 
coder's argument is that this is absurd, and so must be wrong. %diat is 
not clear is just how, on Coder's account, the regress of explanation is 
to be stopped. It is not satisfactory to appeal to some stage at which 
the connection between the state and the behaviour is analytic. For 
the vacuity at that stage then infects all the earlier stages.
The problem that Coder has raised is a different 
one. Whether there is an infinite regress of possible explanation or not,
and, if there is, whether it is vicious or benign, are questions that will
need to be answered whether Armstrong's account of dispositions is accepted 
or not. If Squires* regress argument is valid, then either there is a 
regress generated by Armstrong's account which is avoided by rejecting 
that account, or the regress of explanation is vicious if Armstrong's
account is accepted, and benign if it is not accepted. I shell argue
that the latter is the case.
On Armstrong's account, we make no progress with 
our questions. Each question in the regress is the same question as the last,
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Xt appears that no question can ever be answered. If we reject 
Armstrong's account, then at least each question is a new question.
It is "about" something different. So we do make some sort of progress.
The crucial move in Squires* argument is the 
creation of the new dispositional property. But (as he points out) the 
disposition of the state A to cause the abject to behave in the relevant 
%mys is "suspiciously similar" to the disposition to behave in the 
relevttit %#ays. Moreover, the state A that causes the behaviour the 
disposition to bidiave. So whan we ask why state A should be prone to 
cause the behaviour, we are asking %diy the disposition should cause the 
behaviour* But that is clearly an empty question. It is empty to ask 
why brittleness causes shattering# it is not even quite obvious that it 
makes sense. But it is clearly both significant and not empty to ask 
why state A causes shattering.
Armstrong may reply that it is not legitimate 
to substitute one description for another in this way. But then we must 
ask what his notion of identity amounts to. Certainly it cannot be the 
ordinary one.
I have argued that belief statements are more 
like categorical statements than disposition statements, at least in 
their role as eaqplanations# I have contrasted the roles of disposition 
and categorical words in explanations. There are ways in %nhich 
disposition statements may carry some explanatory force. But these are 
not the ways that belief statements carry their explanatory force. 
Armstrong's account of dispositions will not save the day. It is 
inadequate as an account of disposition words, even if it did give an 
answer to my question. But the argument cannot be quite complete without 
a clear explanation of the way in %diich belief statements carry their 
explanatory force, only then will the contrast stand out without a covert 
appeal to intuition.
-52-
4. » »  dlflPoriLUon .ccoMPt In owttcBct.
In spite of its deficiencies t disposition theory 
has a part, and an important part, of the truth. If it is set in its 
contesct, then we can begin to assess what truth it has. 2a this section 
I shall argue that disposition theory does have a role or a use. It will 
than be possible to state more clearly just what it fails to do.
The position can be outlined in the following 
%my. Disposition theory of belief seems to have two kinds of support.
One is by elimination.
1) Occurrence theories of the traditional kind cannot be right, 
ii) Disposition theory is the alternative.
So belief is a disposition to behave.
The other source of support is more direct.
i) There must be close logical connection between beliefs and actions.
ii) The only plausible connection is of a (semi-) hypothetical kind.
So beliefs must be disposlticns to act.
Thm arguments that 1 have presented do create 
difficulties for anyone who wishes to assert the conclusion. But Uiey do 
not show that there is any weakness in the reasons that were advanced in 
favour of it, in particular, they do not show that the statements (i) are 
false or unsowd. But the position cannot be left like that. I seem to 
be accepting the premise and rejecting the conclusion. I shall reject 
the statements (ii). But I accept that disposition theory does have a 
point.
The opposition takes it to be the case that 
they have proved that belief cannot be defined or analysed as a 
disposition to behave, on the grounds that one cannot infer from an 
action or collection of actions to a belief stateownt (and a wish
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statanont) or vice versa and on the related ground that tiie difficulties 
in the %fay of uoriting out the disposition that belief is, seen insupber- 
able. Hence belief is not a disposition to b^iave. However this is 
going too quickly. Onm must, X believe, agree that the two grounds are 
established# It is far from clear that the conclusion follows from then.
The arguments in chapter 1 show that the 
dispositional analysis of belief would have to be very complicated.
Yet they do not coof>el us to abandon it, since they do not attack the 
arguments that wiginally established it. To every complication the 
dispositionallst can a|^ >eal to other actions of the agent, or to what 
the agent %«ould do under other conditions. He cannot stop the coiqpli- 
eations multiplying. &»t nothing in the argument against him gives any 
ground for abandoning the point that the anti-Dualists w«re most concerned 
to make, namely Wiat beliefs cannot exist in a %#orld of their own, but 
must be discoverable in this, public world. Both sides seen to accept 
that there is a connection of some kind between belief and action. The 
quarrel is about what sort of connection it is. The opposition have a 
purely negative diesis, and the one great failing of attacks on the 
disposition theory has been the powmrty of proffered alternatives.
It is prima facie absurd to deny that, if the 
gardener in my earlier example sprays the roses, his beliefs about green­
fly and his idLshes about the roses are connected in some
way with his action. Equally, one must admit that actions provide evidence 
of some kind for assertions about what pec^le believe <«nd %#mnt). The 
debate hitherto has turned on the fact that conclusive evidence is i arely 
or never obtainable. The step from "spraying the roses" to "believes thus 
and so" is not like the step from "is unmarried" to "is a bachelor." But 
than, neither is the step from "shattmred" to "is brittle" like the logical 
move. (Nor will complicating the cases with more criteria make them into
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logical noveo of this porsdiga kind.) The arguments do give grounds f<sr 
saying that the step from "is spraying the roses'* to "believes thus and 
so** is not like the step frcxn "shattered" to "is brittle" either. The 
puzzle is, then, to explain how we can make steps of this kind, how belief 
statements are grounded.
In its assertion that belief is not a 
disposition to behave because it cannot be written out in dispositional 
form, the opposition has missed some important points about the theory.
It is taken for granted that the theory is given as the "meaning" or 
"analysis** of belief. But neither Ryle nor Wlttg^mstein claim to be 
explaining meanings or giving analyses. It is not surprising that the 
argument has not impressed holders of disposition theory. The pusale 
is to explain just what disposition theory does do.
The first step is to recall the philosophical 
circusstances in which disposition theory of belief was propounded. It 
is as much a denial as an assertion* It is concerned at least as much 
to exclude apparent alternatives as to assert anything in their place. 
These alternatives were, of course, the traditional Dualist theories.
The statements (i) on p.52 were derived in opposition to them, and 
seamed to yield the conclusion. The arguments backing the statements 
(i) relied heavily on problems about criteria for belief-statemants, 
and it is in this context that disposition theory finds its home. The 
difficulties about it arise because the second limb of explanation, of 
the point of the statements once you have got them, %#as neglected.
The question "How do we tell that...?" 
loomed large for those who propounded the disposition account of belief, 
consider the private language argument in "Philosophical Investigations." 
e.g. Pt.I sect 258 ff., 269, etc. Especially in section 293,Wittgenstein 
elaborates the "beetle-in-^the-box" analogy, and in 258 ff., he gives the
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"diary argument." Both of these involve an as^al to the question "How
could one tell?" that this or that was t M  same. H«re is one kind of
reason for the claim that belief is a disposition to behove. Wittgenstein 
did see this. He considers in Pt. U,
"This is how I think of itt believing is a state of mind. It has 
duration, and independently of the duration of its expression in a
sentence, for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing
person. This is shown me in the case of someone else by his behaviour
and by his words..."
His objections seem to centre on the difficulties 
raised for b^aviourism by the question "How do I discover what I believe?" 
As he says, "My own relation to my words is wholly differ«it from other 
people's." But he does not questlcsi tlie validity of the argument. A 
person's beliefs ore shown to me by his b«diaviour - including what he says. 
So belief is a disposition to bWiave. Aptrt from Wittgenstein's abjection 
we still do not have an account of what it is that is discovered. What is 
missing is an acceptable account of the point or use of the word when we 
can apply it. This is a crucial \feakness in the standard behaviourist 
position. And this point does not turn on the special features of first- 
person use.
I should like to introduce a doctrine from 
J. Ifovesi's bo(* "Moral Notions." He says on p.4:-
"Certain qualities must be present in a piece of furniture in order that 
should be able to call it a table, but there is no strict rule as to 
what these qualities must be. There are various %#ays of making tables, 
and we can use various materials. On the other hand, not just anything 
will qualify as a table. Our reasons for having tables constitute, as 
it %#ere, the guiding principle for deciding »4iet are tables and what are 
not, or what new constructions will be accepted as tables.
"I would like to introduce here two technical 
terms borrowed from Aristotle, form and matter....
"The very fact that the material elements are 
unspecified and may vary, calls for the introduction of the term form'.
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An answer to kiiA question why call a large variety of objects 'tables* 
end refuse the word to other objects gives idiat I %mnt to call the form 
of a table#
"I intend to use these terms not only wham t#e 
analyse our notions of objects but also in our analysis of human actions* 
we can commit murder in a great variety of ways* It is the material 
elemsmt of am act of murder that someone drives a knife into his victim's 
heart, or administers poison, or strangles him, or pushes him over a cliff. 
Human ingenuity may increase this list, and we may never be able to give 
a complete «lumcraticxi of the vnys one can murder someone* What makes 
these pieces of human b^iaviour into acts of murder is what I call the 
form of murder, i.e. that we intmntionally take the life of somaome who 
is innocent, with the aim of personal gain or satisfaction."
This distinction does not apply to all objects. 
In fact there must be some things that do not have formal elements. 
Otherwise there could be no specificatiw of material elements. There 
is no necessity that all words should be either simple «fords as colour- 
words, or words only one level above them. This applies particularly to 
action. "Murder" has a formal elemmat. % e  material element might be 
"driving a knife into his victim's heart." But this action too has both 
formal and material elements. All that is required is that at some point 
we should be able to specify material elements without reference to a 
formal element. Nor is it necessary that words should give only formal 
elements or material elements. Many terms are mixed. "Driving a knife 
into his victim's h^art" is one. "Ladder" is another. The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary defines "ladder" as»—
"Set of steps (called rungs) inserted usu. in two uprights of wood or 
metal or in two cords to sezve as (usu. portable) means of ascending 
building etc."
Ckie serious difficulty èbout this appears as 
soon as we ask just what our reasons for having thinç^ are# For some 
objects, it is comparatively easy to answer. A pedometer is "a device 
for estimating distance travelled on foot by recording the number of
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etapâ taken*" (C.O.D.) A boat, I presume, is intended to provide transport 
across stretches of water* And so on. But what are our reasons for 
having tables? Or crowbars? Our reasons for having things may well 
not be clear-cut. Or there may be many different reasons.
Another difficulty is raised when we ask how we 
are to dcxride what tlie reason for having something is. Suppose we say thu^ 
a ladder is a means of climbing up to places that we cannot reach without 
an aid of some sort. But now, is anything that is in fact used for such 
a purpose to be a ladder? A chair, or a rope? Would a screwdriver that 
we used (whether once or regularly) as a lever or crowbar, Utertâïy become 
a lever or croybar? Surely not. It is not easy to see how we are to 
distinguish the intended or proper use of something, or that use which 
gives us our reason for having it, fbom a temporary use or a misuse - 
a use uer accidens. so to speak.
Kovesi claims that all this has some relevance 
to what Wittgenstein had to say about family resemblances. See, for 
example, "Philosophical Investigations** Pt.I sect. 62 , 67. Sect. 62 
is some evidence that Wittgenstein did think of Kovesi's point, but 
was not very impressed.
On p.21 of "Moral Notions**. Kovesi says:-
"When X claim that we do not need to look for empirical similarities 
betwemi various Instances of the same thing or s«ae act In ordmr to 
explain vAiy they are instances of the same, X am suggesting something 
more radical than %diat I understand WittgenstWLn to be suggesting when 
he said that we find a 'family resemblance' among the various instances 
or tx&mplBB of the same thing. He is still looking for cnqilrical 
similarities between A and Z though it is not one thread that runs 
from A to Z. A, B and C are connected by one similarity, B, C and D 
by another and so A is linked to Z tliough they do not loc* alike at all. 
The similarities are connected like threads in a rope. The family 
resemblances between various games illustrate this picture %#ell. But I 
do not see any foundation for a claim that we call both football and chess
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gams# because football is played with a ball, and so is tenais, while 
tennis is played by two people, and so is chess* Hot only is this 
insufficient to eiq^ laiii that connection between football and chess 
lAiich makes both of them gaews but this way we could conneet everyttiing 
to everything else* He could turn off at a tangent at any similarity 
and what we would get in the end would not be a rope but a mesh* Balls - 
cannonballs - were used to bcsbard cities, and duelling is a matter fbr 
two people* What we need to understand the notion of a game is %diat X 
call the formal elsamnt*"
X do not disagree with the comment about gaaws# 
but this is no anre than the comamnt that "games do not have anything in 
coBBKn" - a comment that has been made before. Kovesi has not overthrown 
the family resemblance thesis. Xt re-appears after his distinction, and 
in two ways. Apparently, the formal eleawnt of an object is soma kind of 
(non empirical, non-observSble) similarity between things. But this is 
not obviously true. The distinction as originally drawn allows for formal 
elements not to be similarities. Our reasons for having things may well 
not be a similarity between Urna. For example, is it clear that an answer 
to the question why we call a large variety of objects "tables** - an 
answer of the kind Kovesi suggests - will give a similarity between the 
objects, or even that there will be just one answer? The application of 
the family resemhlwnre thesis to empirical similarities does not seem to 
be in question. But the distinction between empirical and non-espirical 
similarities is not very clear. X doubt whether it can be made clear.
But even if it were made clear, the family resemblance thesis would ^ iply 
to both kinds of similarity. Wittgenstein was concerned with similarities 
in general. Xf he discussed mainly empirical similarities, it was these 
that mainly concerned his exponents.
Movesi's claim to have evaded the family 
rememhi more thesis is further weakened by his allowing on p.5 that the 
fdrmal element is not always final, clear-cut and definable. Xt is not
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only that our reasons for having the relevant kinds of object are as 
vague and manifold as the material elements that go to make them up*
Are tables really only to be used sitting? Not in a workshop.
What height is a table? Coffee-table height? Dining-table height?
Nor are tables the only flat surfaces at convenient heights.
Counters in shops, shelves, desks are as well. m  fact, Kovesi 
picked a rather poor example to Introduce his distinction. An 
instrument or tool with a narrower rar^e of uses would have served 
better.
Nor does Kovesi evade the thesis by appealing 
to the notions of "same" and "following a rule." Wittgenstein 
rejected the idea that %#e could find here some firm ground for explain­
ing what universels are. This was part of the argument for the family 
resemblance thesis.
Finally, Kovesi objects that, if the family 
resemblance thesis is accepted, we could extend distinctions and 
classifications in different ways and connect anything with anything 
else. But this is not really an objection at all. One of 
Wittgenstein's points here is precisely that we have to learn how %#e 
do in fact extend them, and there is nothing that determines in 
advance what we do. Certainly there is no kind of a priori compulsion, 
open to specifically philosophical investigati<Mtu Knowing how to use 
a word and being able to extend and ad«pt it is a matter of being au 
fait with a way of life, and with the relevant practices and activities, 
not of following some rule that determines everything in advance.
How does this throw light on philosophical 
questions about belief 7 It enables us to see clearly both that there 
are two distinct questions and how they are related. But the application 
to belief is not straightforward. First, belief is not an artefact,
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and does not obviously have a function* Second, belief is not an 
object* Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some rather 
illuminating analogies.
The first difficulty can be met by talking 
of the functions or points or soles of words instead of the functions 
of Objects. We cannot ask what the function or point of a poison 
is. we can ask what the function or point of the word "poison" is. 
The answer is given by eiqplaining why the distinction that we draw 
between poisonous and non-poisonous substances is of such vital 
interest to us. This explanation is analogous to the explanation 
of the function of an artefact.
A rather different example is that of a 
goal. what counts as a goal is not determined simply by the events 
that constitute it, but also by the rules of the game. An 
explwiation of the point of scoring a goal is clearly distinct from 
an explanation of the criteria for saying whether a goal has been 
scored. one could know the one wittiout knowing the other. This 
distinction is closely analogous to the distinction between the 
function of an object and its "material elements." There is a 
difference in that one might be able to answer one question about 
goals without being able to answer the other. But, as Kovesi says, 
understanding our reasons for having tables is essential even to being 
able to identify them. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental 
difference between the criteria for saying when a goal has been scored 
and the point of scoring a goal. Although it is the rules that give 
the criteria, they have been drawn up with an eye to the consequences 
of scoring a goal and the effect they will have on the game, and the 
way it is played. It is fairly clear what the constituents or 
material elements of poisons and goals are to be, how and why the
■chMM But Mincm it im not elneur what could b# mmmt by
asking for tbs ccostituants or natarial (I) elewnts of bsllsf, it 
is not clnar how th# scdMM oould b# applimd#
Th# SKSspl# of goals c m  h#lp. Goals oust 
b# oxplainsd within thair context* Th# id#a that ”%## play ganas 
with words*^  suggssts that bsllsf « too, should b# asplainad in tha 
sans sort of way* But thare is a glaring differane#* In axplaining 
goals vm ask about goals, not about th# word "goals*" But WLs 
diffarane# should not put us off* For it is thm words thsnaalvaa Wmt 
w# ar# playing viXtk in tha cas# of baliaf* Football is not playad wi#% 
words* So th# quasticn "What is th# point, th# rol# of th# word '*b#liaras?" 
if parallel to th# quasticn "What is th# point of goals (in football)?"
The question is answarad by axplaining th# way(s) in Which goals antar 
into football, or th# part ttiay play in it* Explaining this will involv# 
idiowing how th# gan# would b# différant without goals* Ms can treat th# 
question about "baliavas" in a similar way*
Thar# ar# thr## points behind ay extension of 
this arhama to philosophical questions about balief* First, th# notion 
of a formal alemant n##d not b# simply tha notion of a function or a 
purpose, or even of a reason for having something* At its widest, 
it can be taken to cower any explanation of tha part that something 
plays in our lives* Second, th# schema can b# applied to things that 
we do not choose to have, like poisons* But th# question needs to be 
changed somewhat into a question about words «# which w# do in some sans# 
choc## to have* Third, th# change in th# question does not destroy th# 
usefulness of th# achame* Th# point remains essentially th# same as it
Th# suggestion that this distinction between
material and formal elements is of wide application does have more 
support* Sentences with a function suspiciously like that of 
giving the material elements of objects have been independently 
isolated. I refer to the distinction between "is" of meaning and 
"is** of constitution, which is %ddely, if not universally drawn.
**Is** of constitution is exemplified by such sentences as **His table 
was an old packing case,** and **Herrlng boxes without topses sandals 
%#ere for Clementine,** and **A cloud is a mass of water droplets or 
other particles in suspension.** This swise of **is** can be identi­
fied by the fact that it is replaceable by such phrases as **is made 
up of** or 'consists of.** It is not important to the argument that 
the difference betwew this sense of **is** and any other senses be 
dhsracterised in any particular way. These may hot be distinct 
senses of **is**, taut rather different uses. What is important to 
the argument is simply that sentences of this sort io make sense.
The distinction is drawn, e.g., by Place in **Is Consciousness a 
Brain Process?** and discussed by him thare.
On the assumption that sentences of this 
sort are reasonably clear - though I do not pretend that there are 
no problems about them - I can make my point about the disposition 
theory of belief. for the statement **Beliefs are dispositions to 
brtiave'* shares many peculiarities with constitutional **is** or 
sentences giving material elements. The resemblances are close 
enough to Justify asserting that **Beliefs are dispositions to behave** 
is a kind of s«ntence expressing material elements.
The similarities are the following. 
Material elements are left unspecified. They may vary from case to 
case. There is no general way of saying what they are. There is 
no general way of saying what actions may and vihat actions may not
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count as assassinating the President. Zn the same way. different 
people may act on the same belief in different ways. But, Just as 
we may expect that an assassination will be a violent act - though 
we may be wrong - so we do form expectations about tdwt people will 
do in the light of a given belief. Again, in a given case, we have 
no dcnibt which acticm it was that counted as assassinating the 
Fresidtfit, or which action showed someone's belief that p. There 
is no logically guaranteed stq> between "He assassinated the 
President" and other possible descriptions of the action, such as 
"He fired a gun, "in either direction. Yet firing a gun and 
assassinating the President may be one and the same action. Some 
other description surely must apply to a man idx> has assassinated 
the President. He must have done something to kill him. The 
position is the same between belief and behaviour. That a man's 
beliefs must mWce some difference to what he has done under some 
possible circumstances is the %#eokest conclusion from the anti- 
Dualist arguments. The opposition's arguments show that particular 
moves between belief statements and behaviour statesmnts cannot be 
logically guaranteed. But, if we keep the points about material 
eles&ant statements in mind, the conclusions do not seem incompatible.
Of course, all this raises a number of 
problems. Clearly the resemblance is not thorough-going. A belief 
is not the same sort of thing as an assassination or a table; and it 
is at least odd to talk of the material elements of belief. To put 
the matter at it «#eakest, the relation between sentences describing 
material elements of objects and sentences giving the formal element 
looks much the same vdiether they are used to identify (objects) or 
to ground (belief) statements. For material element statements also 
give grounds for applying terms. They do so only via the formal
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element. our reajKxie for having tables do not enable ua to look at 
furniture and classify it. There is no rule yet for identifying 
tables. What the formal element does give us is a way of assessing 
possible material elements. Thus, if we are told that a piece of 
furniture does not have a flat surface, we can conclude that it is 
not a table, by considering whether or not something with a flat 
surface would be such as to satisfy our reasons for having tables*
So the reason for refusing to classify such an object as a table is 
in fact its lack of a flat surface. This should not be surprising, 
since identification must be carried out by considering the object 
itself. It is, after all, the object that is to be classified.
But the lack of a flat surface is a reason only in virtue of some­
thing else, namely our reasons for having tables. What I wish to 
insist on here is that the material elements are ground for classi­
fication, but are so only indirectly. In the case of belief, 
behavior statements do provide evidence for belief statements, but 
do so indirectly. The pussle is, how they can do so. What is the 
further information in the light of which we can make the move from 
evidence to conclusion, that is the analogy with formal elements?
The precise role of "Beliefs are dispositions to behave" is not clear 
as yet. Material element statements, as so far considered, have 
been singular, and particular. It is not to be expected that general 
statements of this kind should be possible except by coincidence, or 
in virtue of esgpirical facts about tha world. There is no necessity 
for objects to share any material elements in this way. But this is 
not altogether true. It seems very unlikely, to say the least of it, 
that anything could be a table unless it had a flat, or nearly flat, 
horisontal surface. If that is true, we could say "Tables have flat 
surfaces." TO put the point in a general way, there are some material
element statements that are general in font they will serve the 
pucpose of directing our attention to those material elements that 
are relevant to the objectas character as table or Whatever - though 
this relevance is again indirect, and depends on the formal element*
And this, I suggest, is the function of "Beliefs are dispositions to 
behave* ** Nonetheless, there is a distinction to be drawn here*
For the brain processes that constitute consciousness, according to 
Place and others, do not play any part in identifying consciousness, 
and cannot be amongst the criteria f6r our applying the relevant 
words* It could be claimed that they might under some circumstances; 
but the fact remains that they do not now* On the other hand, the 
"material elements" that go to make up a table can and do play a sole 
in our identifying something as a table*
In the introduction I pointed out that 
someone might be able to identify and even use a sextant without 
knowing how sextants are made, or what they are made of* Yet it 
seems one must know something of what they consist of if one is to 
be able to identify them at all* Understanding the formal eleswmt is 
not enough on its own* The relation between formal and material 
elements is some%diat complicated* But it is clear that not every 
constituent of x can play a role in identifying x, even When a 
particular constituent is important in allowing x to satisfy the function 
or formal element* The intricate works of a television are important 
to its functicming as a television* But we do not need to understand 
them to identify and use televisions, even though they are important 
to it*
It is odd to apply the word "material" to 
dispositions, and odd to say that belief has material elements in any­
thing like the way that an object does* But this is not what I am
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after* The point is that the role or point of saying that "Beliefs 
are dispositions to behave" can be correctly understood as like the 
role or point of general statements about the material elements of 
objects with functions* If we understand the theory in this way, 
then it is adequate, but limited* The virtues of the theory are, 
first, that it is a rejection of certain possibilities* Second, 
the theory gives some answer to the question "What kind of grounds 
can we give for claims about v^at pe^le believe?" or "How do we 
tell %#hat people believe?" There is a very close connection 
between these questions and an account of the material elensmts of 
an object. This cwnection is what gives rise to the similarities 
that I am pointing out* But the inadequacy of the disposition 
theory of belief is that if offers no account of the "formal element" 
of belief* It does not tell us what is the point or role of state­
ments about vdiat people believe. It does not ans%#er the question 
"What can we do with belief statements when we have got them?"
This inadequacy means that the theory is ultimately inadequate even 
as an answer to the question "How do we tell***?" or "What are the 
grounds for*,*?"
If disposition theory can fruitfully be 
seen as at least analogous to statements giving the material elements 
of objects, my enterprise can be sewi as giving the "formal element" 
of belief* I am concerned to explain the point or role of belief, 
to e)q>lain the reasons for havir^ r the word in the language* The 
comparisons and analogies that I am making here are not perfect*
But they do serve to clarify the various questions and pussies*
One may ask whether there is not also some 
similar way of "rescuing" theories of the traditional kind. Is there 
some question about belief which can be correctly answered by appealing
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to some "mental act" such as "entertaining and accepting a 
proposition?" X do not think so. Theories of this kind must be 
interpreted as attempts to give "material elements" of belief, or 
to give the "constituents" of belief. This would amount to taking 
them as attempts to ans%#er questions of the kind X identified third 
in my introduction. There I distinguished first knowing what a 
sextant is qua object, by being shown examples, second, knowing what 
a sextant is as knowing how to take a sight, knowing how to work out 
a position, and third knowing what a sextant is as knowing how it is 
made, what it consists of. if we take it that it was the third 
question that traditional theories set out to answer, we can say why 
the attempts failed. For not all x*s are made xsp of anything, in 
the requir^ sense. A mistaken general account of the mind led to 
the idea that questions that could sensibly be adced about objects 
like sextants could also sensibly be asked about beliefs. But that 
does not follow, of course. In the second part of this thesis, I 
think it will become clear that is possible to give some sense to the 
traditional vocabulary.
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5. Belief# mm cmumal state#.
One way of answering my question about 
beliefs - why it is (part of) an explanation of an action to say 
that the agent believed this or that - is to say that beliefs, 
together with wants, caisie acticms. This idea is part of the 
traditional account ofWwants or %#ishes. It seems likely that this 
answer would have been given about beliefs as well. At present 
there are t%o important varieties of this position. Some pec^le 
would claim that beliefs cause actions, and that they are linked 
with, or identical with, physiological states of the believer.
This seems to offer a way round many of the argumsnts levelled 
against the traditional accounts. But there are may difficulties 
in this move to physiology. Other philosophers have simply 
attacked the anti-traditional arguments, without linking mental 
states to physiological states in any very clear-cut way.
Asmstrong*# position is of the first 
kind. But his route to this position first passes through the 
disposition theory, and relies on his account of dispositions.
So I shall not discuss i£ further.
One example of the second kind of
approach is D. Davidson*# article, "Actions# Reasons and causes"
in Journal of Philosophy# 1963# He is quite explicit;-
"In this paper I went to defend the ancient - and common-sense - 
position that rationalisation is a species of causal explanation."
Davidson uses "rationalisation" to cover 
all reason-giving explanations of actions - not just bad ones. He 
does not give a positive account of beliefs or wants# His tactics 
are two. He distinguishes carefully betwew explaining and justifying 
actions. Thant-
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"If, as Malden claims causal explanations are 'wholly irrelevant 
to the understanding we seek* of human actions then we are without 
an analysis of 'because* in 'He did it because...* where we go on 
to name a reason.....Failing a satisfactory alternative the best 
argument for a scheme like Aristotle's (sc. introducing %«anting as 
a causal factor) is that it alone promises to give an account of the 
'mysterious connection* between reasons and actions." (end of 
section III).
Davidson's other tactic is simply to 
show that various well-Jcnown lines of attack do not succeed. In the 
course of this he sayst-
"The laws whose existence is required if reasons are causes of actions 
do not, we may be sure, deal in the concepts in which rationalisations 
must deal. If the causes of a class of events (actions) fall in a 
certain class (reasons) and there is a law to back each singular 
causal statement, it does not follow that there is any Im# connecting 
events classified as reasons with events classified as actions - the 
classifications may even be neurological, chemical or physical." 
(Section IV).
David Pears in his lecture to the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, "Desires as Causes of Action" in 1966/7 refers 
to neurology in a similarly «Cliqua way. (See "The Human Agent.")
And it is indeed difficult to envisage a plausible account that does 
not ultimately rely on neurology, chemistry, etc. we would hardly be 
willing to grant the title of "cause" to something that was not in 
some way amenable to scientific investigation, and that could not some 
how be reconciled «dth the corpus of knowledge of physics and chemistry, 
we might be driven to extend or change the concepts we are willing to 
employ in these fields. But that does not affect my point. All this 
means that there is reason for preferring an account that does make a 
link with physiology to one that does not.
Davidson defends his claim that beliefs are 
causes of actions simply on the grounds that there is no satisfactory
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sehame of oxplanation that might giv# an account of tha way in which 
boliafa explain actions, other than a causal one. Ha aAeits that 
there is much that'we do not know, but presumably the idea is that 
belief will become clearer %#ith further ampiricel research. I do 
not propose to criticise in detail his attacks on the anti-causal 
argisments. His points are sidbtle and relevant; some of thmm are right. 
But he does end \tp saying some very strange things. For example, he 
points out, quite rightlyt-
"Xgnorance of competent predictive laws does not inhibit valid causal 
explanation, or few causal explanations could be made." (Section IV).
Me admits also, later in the article, that 
the concepts that the laws %*ill employ are unknown to us. All we can 
be sure of is that they are not the ones we employ at present to 
explain actions.
He cites in illustration the example of a 
window breaking %dien struck by a stone. common sense may be ignorant 
of many of the concepts relevant to explaining why things like this 
happen. But there is no doubt that the connaction between stone and 
window is a causal one. There is doubt in the case of actions.
Davidson seems to be claiming tha^ in womm 
way the eiqplanations of action that we now give fit the schemes of
causal eaqplanaticms. If they did, surely we could not know in advance
that any new concepts would be needed. vfe did not know that in the 
case of the stone and the window.
even if we ignare this, Davicteon cannot 
appeal to the as yet unknown physiological la%#s and theories to explain
tdiy an appeal to beliefs and wants has explanatory power for us now.
m  the example of the stone and the window, ws understand a great deal 
about the causal relations between the two in advance of scientific
-71-
theory and Investigation. It isn't difficult to see why an appeal 
to the stone being thrown answers the layman's question about the 
window breaking. But the appeal to beliefs and %#ants to explain 
actions is not parallel.
Davidson has not even answered the central 
question here. He has merely moved it. According to him 
"rationalisations" of actions have two strands, one of e9q>lanation 
and one justification. The strand of explanation is causal. The 
strand of justification is separate. But now the question rm- 
appears. Why is it that some (causal) explanations include a strand 
of justification while others do not? m  fact the question is not 
quite right in this form. Sometimes people do things for bad 
reasons. The explanation does not then justify the action even 
though it is of the relevant kind. we should ask, "Why is is that 
some (causal) explanations either justify or fail to justify what 
they explain, and some do not allow the question of justification to 
be sonsibly raised?" Why is it that "Because I wanted to turn on 
the light?" may justify flipping the switch? Why is it that "Because 
it was %#et," neither justifies nor fails to justify the match's failure 
to light? Yet the very same fact may justify my throwing the match 
away.
We started with a pussle about two kinds 
of explanation, one causal, the other not. Davidson leaves us with 
a pussle about two kinds of causal explanation. Is this really an 
advance?
Davidson appeals to "the scheme of causal 
explanation," as if there was one. He does not specify further what 
he means. But the words "cause" and "causal" do not have a meaning 
clear enough for us to grasp just «hat Davidson means. This
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difficulty infects any attempt to resolve, or even to state clearly, 
these issues. Even without the oos^lexities surrounding the notion 
of action, %ie do not have a clear and atoceptmd account of causes to 
distinguish other kinds of explanation from. Arguwmnts that turn 
on a particular doctrine of causality, or oh exact criteria for 
causal explanations are always vulnerable to this difficulty.
Indeed, many of Davidson's moves turn on the fact that this is so.
This much is clear, however. We are not 
entitled to conclude from the fact tiiat we can explain actions by 
appealing to the agent's beliefs and wants that the "because" is 
causal. Nor can we argue that there is no clear alternative to the 
causal scheme of explanation, so that any occurrence of "because" 
must be causal. Both moves fall fOul of the fact that there is a 
sense of "because" which is not causal. This is the sense of 
"because" employed in logic and s&athematics. "The square root of 2 
must be an irrational number, because....." "There can be no largest
prism mnber, because......" These cannot be causal explanations.
No-one tdLll claim that our explanations of action are just like 
explanations of logical and mathematical facts. But thisyoes 
weaken Davidson's line. There are two lines of thought about this 
that are very tempting. They both turn on analogies. One leads to 
what I shall call the disease theory of belief - and of other mental 
states. The other leads to what can be called the computer theory 
of belief. The names give the analogies on «diich the theories d4x>end,
m  the disease theory of belief, we could 
start from the presd.se that beliefs are dispositions to behave. But 
it is not necessary. It is possible to start from the premise that 
beliefs are not dispositions to bWw&ve. Even though belief is not a 
disposition to bWiave, it must be conceded that what someone says and
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does im evidence for his beliefs. But we can and do put together
things that someone says and does and draw conclusions about what
he believes, even though the conclusions are always open to
revision. Now this is not very different from what a doctor does
in diagnosing a disease. There is a collection of symptoms which
he puts together and from which he draws conclusions. But, as in
the case of belief, there is no simple deductive relation between
symptoms and diseases. But neither is the relation straightforwardly
empirical. Where the organism of* whatever causes the disease is not
known, the job of grouping symptoms together into a syndrome is
difficult and may be contentious. It is not often done by dis-#covering what symptoms a m  caused by a given organism or chemical 
or vdiatever. Yet underlying this process is the idea that there is
soBiething that causes the syndrome. Perhaps there is here an 
analogy to be drawn %d.th belief, and we can say What the role of 
physiological research here is.
There are powerful objections to identi­
fying diseases either «dth the relevant syndrome or «dth the cause of 
the syndrome. s\q>pose we identify the disease «dth the cause of the 
syndrome. We do not say "Polio is the organism that causes...."
We say "Polio is caused by the organism XTZ..." we cannot hold ty 
a test-tube and say "Here is (me milligram of the common cold." We
can say "Here is one milligram of what causes the common <%)ld."
Someone who tried to sell an ounce of arthritis or a pound of 
rheumatism would not just be facing a certain market resistance.
He would be facing a conceptual absurdity. Doctors, looking for the 
cause of a certain syndrome would not be able to say that thiey viere 
looking for the cause of leukamnia, Ixit had little idea what it «#as. 
They would have to say that they «fere looking for leukaemia, but had
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little idea %#hat it was. Their aeardi ia difficult enough, but it 
ia not that difficult. Suppose we follow these linguistic forms 
and identify the disease with its syndrome* Then it would be no 
longer possible to oomg>lain of a doctor that he was merely treating 
the symptoms and not the disease. Treating the symptoms would be 
treating the disease. How could we explain what is wrong with 
merely treating the symptoms? We <k> not say "Polio is paralysis, 
etc." or "the common cold is a running nose and mild fever." We 
say that the diseases cause the symptoms.
Yet there is not a deep philos<x>hical 
problem about diseases, «blether they cause their symptoms, or are 
caused by the relevant organisms. There is no clear answer to the 
philosopher's question "What aure diseases identical with?" But 
that does not mean that there is any real obscurity here. No «more, 
then, do we really need an answer to the analogous question about 
belief. If diseases can float conc^tually between symptoms and 
their causes, so can beliefs and the other mental states.
Moreover, this analogy will support only 
a weak correlation between belief and physiological state. The 
causes of disease and symptoms and syndromes are only sometime a 
correlated Che to one. sometimes one kind of disease organism can 
cause many different syndromes. amasHmas many kinds of disease 
organisms cause one syndrome. The common cold is an example of the 
latter case. And it may well turn out that cancer is an example of 
the former.
The analogy provides a tempting answer to 
questions about the conceptual role of fA f^siological research. But 
it will not provide an answer to my question why it is now, in advance 
of research, an explanati(xi of action to cite the relevant beliefs of
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the agent» Nor does it support the claim that beliefs cause 
actions. Even this weak correlation is not plain sailing. At 
least one difficulty that came in my discussion of the disposition 
theory appears here as well. To explain an ^tion we must appeal 
to the relevant belief and the relevant want. Suppose we know that 
two physiological states A and B will cause «whatever movements will 
turn on the light. Which is the belief and which the want? But 
even that is too sinq>le. Any one action can be described in a 
multitude of ways. Certain of these descriptions can be organised 
in a hierarchy by reference to the agent's beliefs and wants. So 
there will be a parallel multitude of physiological states to be 
identified in any one action by the poor researcher.
The other line of thought and the other 
analogy connects beliefs and physiological states, not via actions, 
but via the objects of belief. The analogy is between the brain 
and computers. Information can be recorded in a computer. Any 
givwitem of information that is recorded in a computer memory can 
be correlated with physical states of the machine, which are caused 
or produced by feeding that item of information in to the machine.
The information that a person has must be recorded, presumably in his 
brain, in some analogous way. The notion of belief covers misin­
formation as well as information. But computers can have misin­
formation stored in them just as well as information.
But consider how the correlation would go. 
When it is raining, a chain of events may cause certain changes in A's 
brain which we might be inclined to accept as correlateable with the 
belief or knowledge that it is raining. That is, a state of affairs, 
may cause a state that we would correlate with the belief that p. 
But this state may be caused by Indefinitely many other states of
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CO, u-S<-<iaffairs. The belief that p may be cawse by *p* or by 'q* or *r* or 
*s*. This must happen when A believes wrongly that it is raining.
And so it follows that the state of affairs, *p*, may cause wrong 
beliefs, that q or r or s, and not produce the right one. Yet we 
could not proceed by picdcing out just that link between *p* and the 
belief that p, rejecting all the others. *q* may be evidence for p, 
or at least A may be entitled to take 'q* as evidence for p. And 
•p* may be itself evidence fOr something, say #r*.
It will not be enough to establish causal 
chains within the brain. We must be able to single out some of them 
as correct or appropriate. But there is nothing in the notion of a 
causal chain to base this on. Statistical correlation cannot be of 
help. Perhaps there are aamm things that people get wrong more often 
than they get them right. Illusions and tridc pictures offer examples 
of eases «Aere this seems to be true. Nor will it do to wtablish a 
correlation by examining "normal" or "healthy" people. General good 
health is neither necessary nor sufficient for acquiring true beliefs, 
although some kinds of ill-health are relevant. In this context, 
being healthy is mainly a matter of getting things right.
we can make these correlations in the case 
of comgmters. Axt we have a «my of distinguishing those states that 
are correct from those that are incorrect. The softvmre that goes 
with the conqniter provides a "translation" and the criterion «#e need.
But we do not have the "software" of the brain. We are in the position 
of an archsologist facing an unknown script, not even sure what is 
script and «diat is decoration. Unknown scripts have been deciphered, 
but only «dth the aid of a translation of a sample passage, as in the 
Rosetta stone, or with the aid of pictures, as in the case of Linear B 
script. Nor is it easy to see how turning to v4iat the subject does or
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•ays cx3Uld help with this problem#
Indeed, in one area where some progress 
has been made in bringing to light the physiological mechanisms 
tsderlying our mental life - that of the emotions - the relations 
between emotions and physiological states do turn out to be extremely 
complex# It is not a case of correlating emotion «dth physiological 
state* There is more than one system involved# And they react on 
each other in all sorts of %#ays#
Physiological studies of the emotions do 
tell against any whole-hearted rejection of physiological studies.
It is surely clear that «re do seek this understanding of the «notions* 
There are good reasons fOr doing so. But «re find here another 
difficulty in the programme. Physiologists employ a set of concepts 
and classifications which are not those of everyday talk about the 
emotions. This may explain why there is not any satisfactory 
correlation to be found. It may be, indeed it a^ qpears to be the case 
that the two sets of concepts do not "match." What I mean by "match" 
here can be illustrated. There is a match between "notes" and 
"frequencies of sound «raves." We can define the note A as having a 
frequency of 440 c.p.s. - or Whatever. We can discover how many 
Cep.s. C is. But this kind of matching is not guaranteed. It turns 
out, for example, that there is no comparable match in the case of 
colours and light waves. So there Is no guarantee that there «dll be 
any match when we come to beliefs and brain states. The coiiq>lications 
involved in the attempt to discover one give some ground for supposing 
that «re will not find one.
Still, there does not seem to be any purely 
logical ban on a research programme to produce a "translation" between 
physiological states and beliefs, following the computer analogy.
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But there vrould be # conceptual absurdity in 
trying to give to physiological states the conceptual role of belief.
It would be absurd to try to substitute for our present explanations 
of actions an explanation of the relevant physiological states. The 
two kinds of statement have different roles in our language. Our 
present explanations are involved in justifying actions, both on the 
score of rationality and as blameworthy or not, and in describing 
mistakes and errors# The language of physiology is not adapted to 
these roles but to very different roles. We might adapt our language, 
or a part of it, to play different or additional roles. But the basic 
distinction of roles would still be there.
The fundamental point against any view that 
attributes to belief a causal role in explaining action is this. There 
is a conceptual absurdity in supposing that the belief that p is a 
state conceptually independent of the state of affairs, p. There are 
certain occasions when we are talking about actions «fhen belief has no 
role to play, although we might have expected it to have a role if it 
»#are a state conceptually independent of the relevant state of affairs. 
In particular, explanations of action that appeal to»bellef8 are only 
comprehensible to someone who already understands the relation between 
the relevant state of affairs and action. "He A-ed because he believed 
that p" can only be understood by someone «d%o understands "He A-ed 
because p." This claim needs explaining.
The first consideration is that belief has a 
feature that I call "transparency," fdllovdng Roy Edgeley. In his book 
"Reason in Theory and Practice" he explains %-
"I call this feature the 'transparency' of one's own thinking; my own 
present thinking, in contrast to the thinking of others, is transparent 
in the sense that I cannot distinguish the question 'Do I think that p?' 
from a question in «diich there is no essential reference to myself or my
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belief, namely *Xs it the case that p7*« This does not mean that the 
correct answers to these two questions must be the same: only that I
cannot distinguish them, for in giving my answer to the question 'Do 
X think that p7' I also give ay answer, more or less tentative, toIf it tht ccuse. tiyjxt p ? ’ " uthe question 'Pe-1 tMnk that r?' If I decide that p is
the case, there is no further evidence, no further process, no additional 
decision that X need in order to satisfy myself that I believe that p is 
the case. For me, the question whether I believe that p is the case is 
not a question over and above the question «whether p is the case. For 
anyone else it is a separate question, but not for me." (p.91)
This needs some qualification. X may believe 
something unconsciously, fresumebly I would have to discover that in the 
same sort of way that I discover what other people believe. The point 
would stand even so in relation to many important and central cases of 
belief.
However, A. MacIntyre in 'The Unconscious"
(p. 56/57) has the following to say about the relation bet«#een unconscious 
intentions and avowals s-
"Fteud argues that certain types of neurotic behaviour are the result of 
\«consciou8 motivation. The neurotic has purposes and intentions of which 
he is waware. Since he is unaware of them he cannot avow them. Areudf 
would seem to be using 'intention' here to refer to a pattern of behaviour. 
Ikit an essential feature of psychoanalysis is the way In tdiich the neurotic 
comes to recognise and to acknowledge the purpose of his acts ..... And
unless the patient will in ttie end avow his intention, the analyst's 
interpretation of his behaviour is held to be mistaken ...... But the
psychoanalyst means by a correct interpretation of an action that the 
patient would avow if only certain conditions were to be fulfilled."
Fresumably the sane could be said of unconscious 
beliefs. I am not well acquainted with the writings of FTeud or of psy­
choanalysts. Perhaps $Aat MacIntyre says here is not universally acceptable. 
At the least there is a good deal more to be said, and Nacintyre does say 
some of it in his boc*. But if "avowals-in-the-end" are important to the 
concepts of unconscious intentions and beliefs, then what Edgeley says
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about the • transparency* of belief is strengthened.
The transparency of belief has consequences 
v4ien we turn to the relaticxi betwecm belief and action. Xf p is a 
sufficient reasŒi for me to A, and I have to decide vdwthwr to A, it 
nakee no difference whether I ask "la p the case?” or "Do I believe 
that p7" For I answer both questions in the same way and at the same 
time, namely by deciding whether p. In that swse, the question "Is p 
the case?" is primary. There is a similar relation between the questions 
"Is p a (good or sufficient) reason for me to A?" and "Is my belief that 
p is tlie case a (good or sufficient) reason for me to A?"
If the questions were distinct, X would be 
unwise to answer the questicm "Do I believe that p7" and act csi that 
answer. In general, it is the truth of p end not of "I believe that p"
that bears on the success or appropriateness of my ecticns. The fact 
that I believe that p does not give me sufficient reason for deciding 
that p is true. It can give me no reason over end above «dietever 
evidence thmre may be for p. Again, If the questions "Is p a (good) 
reason for A?" and "Is my belief that p a (good) reason for A?" were 
distinct questions, then my answer to the lattwr must be "In general. 
No." My belies may be false. At least, even though the belief that 
p might be some reesw, p is always a better reason.
When I say that my beliefs are never good
reasons for actions, I mean the fact that I believe that such-and-such
is never a good reason. What I believe (i.e. such-and-such) may or 
may not be a good reason. But I act on what I believe, not on the 
fact that I believe it. My reasons for doing something are the 
relevant p*s and q*s, not my beliefs.
There is a second, distinct argument for 
ay claim. To accept the idea that the belief that p is a state 
conceptually distinct frost the state of affairs, p, is to
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OMdce nonsense of our practice in relation to orders, recosesndatione and 
the like. If this story were true, we could not make sense of a recom­
mandation like "Whan the bullets start flying, duck.** As it stands, this 
is perfectly comprehensible. Nothing is added by saying "Whan you believe 
that the bullets have started flying, duck.** Whichever version I follow,
I tdll behave in the same %my. This naturally stems from the transparency 
of belief.
If the two recommandations were distinct, it is 
difficult to see how we could make sense of "Duck wham you believe that 
the bullets have started flying." Wouldn't there then be a further 
question about what to do when the bullets really are flying? How 
could I tell %diich of these recoanandations I should be following in a 
real live case?
Equally, if I ware told to "Duck whan the bullets 
start flying," wouldn't there be a further question about what to do when 
I only believe that the bullets have started flying? We could interpret 
that as a question about what to do idien I am not certain whether or not 
the b%illets have started flying. But that is not the question we started 
«dth. I am often quite certain about what I believe, or about what is the
When I give orders or make recommendations about 
what to do in certain circumstances, I specify the appropriate circumstances, 
not the appropriate beliefs# Beliefs are not circumstances that can be 
appreciate or inappropriate independently of the relevant states of affairs. 
When I give advice about «hen to duck, I specify the circumstances, namely 
when the bullets start flying. I do not need to refer to any beliefs about 
when the bullets have started flying. The belief that the bullets have 
started flying is not a circumstance that needs to be, or can be mentioned 
separately. More than that, if I do give a recommandation that specifies
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certain beliefs as appropriate to some action, that can only be interpreted 
as an indirect way of specifying the appropriate circuamtances for the 
action* Xf Z say "Duck when you believe that the bullets have started 
flying,** this can only be obeyed if it is taken to mean *'Duck when the 
bullets start flying." Srmettmea, an order specifying beliefs can be 
given and treated independently of the ordmr specifying the circumstances 
for the action. But only if it is taken to be an order about what to do 
in doubtful cases.
There is a clear relation between orders, 
reeoamendatiops, and actions, and the reason for actions. Someone vho 
ducks when and because the bullets have started flying has obeyed the 
order. Both conjunctions are needed. Someone who ducks «hen the bullets 
start flying, but does so because his shoelace has come undone, has not 
obeyed the order. Or he has obeyed it only in some Pickwickian sense.
One obeys orders like this one if (and only if) one performs the 
appropriate action for the reason that (because) the specified circumstances 
obtain.
Someone who ducks because be believes that the 
bullets are flying and someone «ho ducks because the bullets are flying 
have both obeyed the order "IXjck when the bullets start flying.*' It might 
be claimed that the man who ducks because he believes («rongly) that the 
bullets have started flying, has not (really) obeyed the order. He might 
be criticized, particularly if he had no good reason for his belief. But 
he has certainly not disobeyed the order. If he had good reason for his 
belief, criticism would not be in order* So the fact that the bullets 
are flying, and the belief that the bullets are flying are not independent 
as reasons for action.
But "Duck «when the bullets are flying" is primary 
for giving orders. "Ikick when you believe that ....** must be taken as if
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it wore "IXKdc when***" This gives us another reason for concluding that, 
as explanations of action, the form "Because the bullets are flying" must 
be primary. The form "Because he believes that the bullets are flying" 
must be dependent and parasitic. My next step is to explain this point.
The concept of a "defensive posture" shows the 
pattern of formal element aaé material element. Defensive postures are 
not any particular arrangement of any particular elements, any mere than 
tables are. What counts as a defensive posture is determined by reference 
to the reasons for adopting then, i.e. the formal eleemnt. What counts as 
a defensive posture varies with circunstences. It is different in boxing, 
in chess, in football and on U%e battle-field. It varies also within each 
activity. The boxer's (tensive posture will vary between a very general 
all-purpose one, and particular postures adopted to meet the threat of a 
left hook, an uppercut end so forth. The general will dispose his troops, 
depending on the terrain and on the kind of attack he is expecting. But 
this kind of explanation of the concept could not function unless vm can 
talk about What is appropriate to different situations. If %#e are to 
explain ««hat a defensive posture Is, we must be able to show %diat is 
appropriate in all these variations in circumstances. Once we have done 
that, it is not necessary to go on and show separately %#hat is appropriate 
to that belief that one will be attacked in these «rnys. It %xxild be mars 
r^*etition. After the initial explanation, we must go on to explain about 
training situations, precautionary situations, etc. we can explain later 
that someone may for a variety of reasons adopt a defensive posture when 
no attack is impending, and that someone may not adopt the appropriate 
defensive posture vfhen an attack is impending. But these additional 
explanations ere qualifications and elaborations of the initial explanations. 
In that «my, they are parasitic on it.
There is no separate question about belief. (MLven
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a description of the posture appropriate to some attack, there is not o 
further question about the posture appropriate to the belief that there 
is an attack of that kind impending. We must %#ork by talking at first 
about actual situations, not beliefs about situations. Qualifications, 
about beliefs amongst other things, may be added on later.
Various things can count as evidence that 
someone believes that he is about to be attacked. But one piece of 
evidence that is specially important is whether or not he adopts a 
defensive posture. It follows that we must be able to say what a
defensive posture is without having to mention the relevant belief
amongst the circumstances to be taken in to consideration in deciding 
«whether or not a given posture is a defensive one or not. If we had 
to introduce the notion of a defensive posture by reference to the beliefs 
of the defender, we could not use the taking up of a defensive postiare as 
evidence for his belief that he was about to be attacked. We could not 
know whether something vrns a defensive posture or not vntil we knew what 
the defender's beliefs %mre.
These points apply to all similar explanations 
of actions. First, explanations that use "Because he believes that p" 
are only comprehensible if the explanation "Because p" is coiqprehensible. 
If someone does not see the explanatory force of "He believes that p" v  
trauld have to elucidate by talking about what p is a reason for. If he 
understands this, he will not need a separate explanation of what the 
belief that p is a reason for. It is a reason for just those things 
that p is a reason for - if it is a reason for anything. Second, we can
only appeal to what someone does as evidence for what he believes if %#a
can introduce and ssq^ Iain descriptions of what people do «d.thout appeal­
ing to any beliefs. If it were otherwise, %#ould be in a circle. 
Descriptions of what people do could not be introduced without appealing
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to their beliefs, but their beliefs could not be identified without 
appeal to descriptions of what they do.
There is a difference between introducing and 
explaining concepts and descriptions of a certain kind and using or 
applying the# in particular cases. These arguments 60 not apply to 
particular cases when we employ the relevant concepts, but to the ways 
in which the^ ' might be explained to scmeone vAx> did not have them. The 
force of the argument is that if these action-conc^ts are to be 
introduced or explained at all, they must be applicable at least 
sometimes without reference to anyone's beliefs, but by reference to 
the relevant situations.
This leaves the cormecticn between the belief 
that p and the fact, p, rather mysterious. There is clearly a close 
dependence between the two in certain ways. But in other ways they are 
clearly quite ind^endent of each other, "p" mid "He believes that p*’ 
may well have different truttV'Values. They have different truth- 
conditions. The same is true of the explanations "He A-ed because p" 
and "He A-ed because he believed that p." It might be claimed that 
He A-ed because he believed that p" is the real, expanded form of 
"He A-ed because p" «which is shorthand. The fact that it is raining is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for staying und«r cover even if «#e add 
the appreciate want. But neither is the belief that it is raining 
either necessary or sufficimit for staying under cover, even given the 
appropriate want. There are alvmys indefinitely many other relevant 
beliefs and «mnts. This argument turns on a particular doctrine about 
explanation. And that doctrine is open to question.
Explaining something, according to this doctrine, 
is a matter of giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of what is to be explained. Anything that purports to be an
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explanation that does not do this is either a shorthand form, or an 
incomplete explanation. But this will not <k>. It leads straight to 
the regress of explanation that I discussed earlier, in connection 
with Coder's article in chapter 3.
&tt, with this account of explanation, the 
regress ia vicious, because It will never be possible to satisfy the 
criterion for complete explanation. The doctrine is also Implausible 
in other ways. Any esgdxical, causal, general lew needs to add a 
"ceteris paribus" clause. It is true that whm a match is struck, it 
will light, l&it there are other conditions that must be satisfied.
For example there must be oxygen in the atmosphere, the match must not 
be damp, etc. We can never draw a line and guarantee that we will find 
no more conditions that may invalidate the law. If the exceptions are 
too many and too serious, we may have to give the law tqp. But there is 
no point at which we are logically forced to do so. All this applies 
both to the explanation "He A-ed because p" end to the explanation "He 
Ai^ because he believed that p."
The reason for saying that "He A-ed because p" 
wes unsatisfactory as an explanation applies equally to "He A-ed because 
he believed that p." The move to the form that refers to belief resolves 
no problem, and may lead to a regress of beliefs. But the vdiole problem 
is fowded on a particular view of explanaticm that is not obviously 
correct.
Some of the mystery of the connection between 
the belief that p and the fact that p can be removed by an analogy.
The relationship between these two can be compared to the relation between 
"That locks like X" and 'That ^  X.” But these points only hold for some 
uses of "looks like." See "Sense and Swsibilia" by J.L. Austin, Lecture 
IV. If sosmone comes into the room and I say "That looks like Fked," I
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make a qualification that ia withdrawn when X conclude "It is Fred." The 
t«x> claimm are independent of each other in many ways. They have different 
truth-values and different truth-conditions. But ay ability to claim that 
that person looks like Fred rests on my ability to claim correctly that it 
is Fked* In the same «my my ability to claim that Fked A-ed because he 
believed that p rests on my ability to claim that Ared A-ed because p.
Again, the relation can be compared to the role
of "real" as explained in "Sense and Sensibilia" VII:-
"A definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real 
such-and-such, only in the light of a specific %my in which it mi^t be,
or might have been, not real. A real duck* differs from the simple *a
duck* only in that it is used to exclude various ways of being not a real 
duck - but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, etc..."
My claim about belief is in soma «mys parallel 
to Austin's claim about "real." A definite sense attaches to the claim 
that A A-ed because he believed that p only in the light of the possibil­
ity that he did get it wrong, or might have got it wrong. But before this
is anywhere near clear, a good deal of explanation is needed.
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#. Action» and beliefs.
Some things are classified, not by the shape or 
appearance or other features that they have, but by the part they play 
in our lives - by their "fomal elesent." This seems especially true of 
things that have functions, particularly artefacts and tools. It is not 
so much that these things necessarily have any one clearly defined function, 
or do any particular job, as that there are a range of purposes that they 
fulfil, and activities that they enter into. And this is not an accidental 
or contingent feature of them, but a necessary one. Some things are more 
closely defined in this way than others. Some things have only a limited 
function, «Aile others have an indefinitely «tide range of thmm. There is 
some problem about how we are to decide exactly what the function of a 
given object is. For these reasons, it is best to regard talk of formal 
and material elements as a schema that can be applied to our talk about 
these objects rather than an accurate representation of it.
There is no theoretical limit to the material 
elements that may satisfy a given formal element. Yet we do have 
expectations of some sort about tha matsrial elements that a table, say, 
or a spark plug «d.11 possess. For the material elements (sise, shape, 
colo%ar, constitution) are essential is an object is to perform a part­
icular function.
Though there may be no limits in theory (at 
least in philosophical theory) to the material elements that may go to 
make up a spark plug, there are limits in practice. We can say quite a 
lot about what they are. Equally, given a spmk plug, we can say a good 
deal about «f^ f it counts as a spark plug (and not as a nut). In both 
cases, we should have to eiqplain how the object in front of us is adapted 
to doing the job(s) of a spark plug, and why it is not possible for it to
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fulfil other functions. Xt is in this connection that wa talk of tha 
design of an object. Zn virtue of the empirical facts about electricity, 
metal, porcelain, the construction of engines (and another range of facts 
that govern that) we can specify what material elements an object must have 
if it is to perform the given function. We need not specify every detail 
but soma specification must be possible.
Identifying such objects as tables and spark plugs 
depends on there being some relationship between formal and material elements, 
This relationship is established by the relevant empirical facts. These, 
together with the function, yield the design of the object. The design is 
simply a spscification of the material elements that an object must have if 
it is to perform its function, as well as the way in %Aich they are to be 
arranged together. The design will not specify everything about any given 
spark plug. It specifies only the important features of it, that is, those 
features that it must possess In order to count as a spark plug at all.
"Design" may be applied at different levels. For 
clearly there can be many different designs of a ciq> or a record-player, 
in the use of "design" that is conmonest in every-day use. Yet certain 
things must remain constant, since they are governed by the requirement 
that the object has certain properties or constituents, namely those 
necessary to its performing its function. It is these that constitute 
the design in my use of the term here.
We can say how the object must bWmve, or give 
its functions, in greater or lesser detail. This constitutes (one kind of) 
formal eleemnt. we than have a large collection of statements, not clearly 
marked off, which together with tha specification of formal element, place 
limits on «Aat can (empirically) perform that function, or satisfy that 
facwel «1— nt. Ih— # I call tha — i— ^ — 4 luatlflcatlcp».
since we appeal to this collection of statements in order to justify our
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choice of design* (But I can see no criterion ter asricing off the 
collection of statements in advance. ) The design of the object specifies 
both %fiat material allants an object must have# if it is to count as an 
X# and how they must be organised* Of course# the design may specify 
ttie material elamsnts only sketchily or in great and careful detail*
But the formal elamsnt never determines every­
thing* There is al%#ays a range of choices* This is a more complicated 
development of Kovesi s schema* I do not know whether he would accept it*
But it is inherent in %#hat he says* Some account of the relationship 
between formal and material elements does seem to be necessary* JUst as 
the original scAema could be applied to actions# so this development can 
be* Actions are events that display a conceptual complexity like the one 
displayed by tools and other artefacts# t#e may want to say*
It is characteristic of actions that they have 
a point* When I do something# there is an aim a want# wish# desire# purpose# 
goal or object inherent in the action* X cover all these words# %d,thout 
equating them# by saying that actions have a point* The statements giving 
the point of an action have ^ e  same role in relation to actions that 
statements of functions have for objects* It is not that every action 
has a further point ad infinitum# or to the Final End* The point of action 
is given in its description* It is not informative to state the point 
separately when the relevant description has been given* If I em shooting 
the President# and tell my co-conspirators what I am doing# it is empty to 
say in addition that the point of what I am doing is shooting the President* 
It is informative if they know only that I an loading my gun or aiming it* 
The parallel with objects is less obvious here# since giving their functions 
is not verbally repetitious* Kevertheless# insofar as a spark plug is 
defined by its function it is esqpty to say "A spark plug has the function 
of ifpiiting the petrol/air mixture by means of a spark*** The function of a
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spark plug la given in its description as a spark plug. (Of course# 
such empty statements may have uses. Straightforward definitions have 
uses sometimes.)
The point of an action plays a role like that 
of the formal element of an object. More strongly# the formal element 
of an action is given by its point.
If# on a particular occasion# know what a 
person wonts# we do not know what he will do (at a lower level of 
description). This denial of narrowly Interpreted behaviourism is 
supported by exactly the same sorts of consideration that led to the 
original distinction of formal and materiel elmaents# But# insofar as 
scemanne %d%o %#ants aommWiing is and must be prone to do something about 
it under some set of circumstances# we do know sommthing about how sosw 
of his actions will be planned and organised# Wiat the formal element 
will be# or may be# when he acts. That does not mean that we know the 
kind of thing that he will do. We have to work that out using knowledge 
that is available to us from other sources. In the same way and for 
the sane reasons when we know %<rhat a screwdriver is for# we do not know 
what shape# etc. it may be. But we are given information that is essential 
in working that out from other things that we know.
The material elements of actions are given by the 
various lower-level descriptions of the action. This account pres»vposes 
that there are some things that are not defined in the same way. It 
presupposes the existence oi material elements that are not defined by 
reference to a function# a purpose or a point. So if we use this model# 
vm must eaqpect to find some events associated %dth actions that are not 
themselves actions. And we do find them in direct or basic actions. These 
will be discussed properly in the next ^ lapter.
The descriptions build up in two ways. For one can
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perform motion A |r^  doing B# or one can do B doing A. One starts the 
engine by turning the key# but one raises one's arm in signalling a left 
turn. Zn giving the material elements of an action# we may give **lower- 
level** actions that are causally related to the action that is carried out*
Z kill a man by shooting him# I shoot him by pulling the trigger 
I trim the sails by adjusting the sheets .*,**# I turn on the li^it by 
pressing the switch ..###. Or we may redescribe the actions that **constitute** 
the action under a hi^ i^er-level description. Thus I raise my arm and thereby 
signal a left turn# or vote# or volunteer. All these ^ langes in description 
exhibit the conceptual features that concern me. So the distinction is not 
important here. Nor is it important that there are others to be drawn.
For belief sentences the story is a little more 
complicated. So far# I have done little more than repeat and amplify %#hat 
Kovesi says. For my purposes# ho%#ever# it is necessary to go in to the %#ay 
in which this schema applies to actions in more detail than Kovesi does.
The first part of the story is simple enough. An action is like a functional 
object. It has formal and material elements. Ih the case of a functional 
object# I argued that the two kinds of element must be related to each other 
by means of a design end the relevant limitations and justifications. This 
«applies also to action. Actions have purposes and plans. The plans are 
related to their purpomes by relevant considerations# which rule certain 
actions out as irrelevant to a given purpose# (limitations) and rule others 
(and ultimately one) appropriate to that purpose ( justifications). These 
limitations and justifications are the reasons for the action. Typically# 
reasons are given by "because" sentences but we need to qualify these with 
"believes" becmme people make mistakes. As they are generally used in 
eaqplaining actions# belief sentences give the limitations and justifications 
within %d)ich a person acts. There is more to it than that# but this is the 
beginning.
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Zn ordinary language, we aak for the material 
elemmta of an action by asking *Uow was it done?** The possibility of 
asking this question of any action is very revealing# What it reveals 
is how little we know vihen we know that a certain action has been 
performed. A question like "How did you get help?** is only possible if 
one can know tfiat you got help without knowing what you did in order to 
get it. That amounts to the point that one may not know what lower- 
level descriptions applied %#hen you got help. Clearly, if % had to know 
those in order to know that you got help, the question wexild be super- 
fuous# But there are all sorts of possible answers. **% signalled to 
shore**, *1 let off a rocket**, and so on. The question **ldiy?** can have 
two sorts of answer. They are related in that they both require some 
account of the formal element of the action. "Why did you A?** may be 
answered by giving the point or purpose of the action - stating What 
the formal element of the action is. This often ammounts to giving 
another description of the seme action at a hippier level# The other 
kind of answer to the question **Why?" is an explanation of the way in 
which the formal element yields the material elements of the action - 
what I call the plan of the action or the design of the object - and/or 
the limitations and justifications that are relevant. If I fire a rocket 
in order to get help, the precise course of the rodcet does not matter, 
but its colour does - %dLthin limits. I can be asked, and can explain 
why, given that I (want to) get help, I am firing a rocket, by explaining 
khat it is about firing a rocket that makes it likely that I shall get help 
by doing that, or that enables me to get help by doing that. This is the 
plan of the action, in my use of the term. Gne may also need to explain 
why one chose to fire a ro^cet, as cyposed to using the radio, %#aving a 
inihite flag or using one of the other %#ays of suamoning halp. Gna may need 
to justify a plan of action. And it is here that %#e find belief statements 
necessary, sinca it is here Uiat the mistakes of the relevant kind appear.
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Z explained in the introduction that there are 
two questions that may be asked about a philosophically puzsling %mrd.
One question is about the criteria of application of a %#ord* The 
arguments that I have been considering have centred on this question#
But the other question is about the point# force or use of a word# This 
is the question that I phrase as "What can we do %#ith belief statements 
when we have got them?" (In the end these questions turn out to be 
interdependent# at least in the cases that I consider# and especially 
in the case of belief#) %  concern now is the second question# and not 
the first.
I also explained that I found the analogy between 
words and tools a useful one# in the light of the doctrine (if it is 
sufficiently formalised to be called a doctrine) of meaning as use. But 
this analogy needs to be taken further than it usually is. If we want to 
understand the use of a particular tool# we should lo<k for that job that 
cannot be done by any other tool# rather than the jobs that can be done 
by other tools. It is not difficult to find such a job in the case of 
"believes" and so to give an account of the "logical origin" of the vford. 
This amounts to identifying conceptual pressures such that if %#e did not 
have a word like "believes#" %#e should have to invent it. Briefly# this 
job is that of explaining actions. Consequently# it is a serious difficulty 
for disposition theory# and for causal theory# that it does not adequately 
represent the %ny in tdiich belief statements explain actions.
The account of the logical origin of the word 
"believes" is sisyly that vm need it in order to explain actions t^t 
involve mistakes of a certain sort. To put the same point in another 
%#ay# %#ithout the concept of belief and its allies it would be impossible 
to describe mistakes of some kinds. For if we did not have the word 
"believes#" %ra should only be able to explain actions by "because" 
unvarnished.
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Consider some examples# A man is walking in 
the country# Instead of walking directly towards his destination# he 
%mlks all the way round a particular wood# We might explain this quite 
satisfactorily by saying that "He walked round the wood because it was 
muddy." And we do offer explanations like this one very often# where 
the wood actually is muddy. But now siypose the same situation# with 
the difference that the wood is as dry as a bone# The seme explanation 
will not do# It would be "He walked round the wood because it is muddy; 
and it is not muddy.” This amounts to self-contradiction, since one of 
the requirements of explanation is that %diat is offered as an explanation 
should be true. But %#e can avoid this problem nicely by "He %mlked round 
the %#ood because he believed it was muddy."
Again# suppose that Fred is afraid of bulls# 
but not afraid of cow#. If he displays fear of a certain animal on some 
particular occasion# and it is in fact a bull# then "He is running away 
because there is a bull in the field" is a suitable beginning to an 
explanation. &Jt if the animal he is naming away from is a cow# %#e are 
in a quandary. We cannot say that "He is running away beceiwe there is 
a cow in the field; you see# he is frightened of bulls." But neither 
can we say that he is running away because there is a bull in the field. 
Once again# if we insert **He believes that..." the problem is resolved.
He is running away because he believes that there is a bull.
This turns on the familiar property of belief 
statcswnts# that the proposition believed need not be true. An obvious 
question %fiether the sasm kind of account can be given for "knows" %*hich 
does not have this property has the ens%*r# Tes.
Suppose a men at King's Qross station who Intends 
to go to St. Andrews. We see him getting on the wrong train# say to 
Cambridge. Why is he getting on that train? A possibility would be that
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he believe# that St. Andrews is near Cambridge. But let us suppose that 
he does know where St. Andrews is and that his mistake is in supposing 
that the train he is getting on is the train to St. Andrews. If he kanew 
it was the Cambridge train# he would not be getting on it. It is inad­
equate to explain that he believes that he is getting on the train to 
St. Andrews - though it is true of course. For that mistake could be the 
result of several other mistakes. "Khows" excludes the mistakes he has 
not made.
More important here is "He does not know that...,"
If %#e return to the man walking to# say# the post office# and suppose that
he must pass through a wood# this can be illustrated. He will avoid the
wood when it is wet# because it gets middy whan there has been rain. But
we might find that as %mll as avoiding the short cut through the wood whan 
it is dry# because he believes it is muddy# he takes the path through the 
wood when it is wet end muddy. The ocplanation of this bizarre behaviour 
is that he does not know that the path is muddy. Wé could say "He does not 
believe that the path is muddy#" or "He believes the path is dry." Bht 
these are too %#eak# since in saying these the speWcer remains uncoanltted 
on the question whether the path is muddy. If we really did not know 
whether the path was muxWy# there would be no problem. "Because that is 
the shortest %my" or "Because he believes that the path is dry" %#ouId be 
satisfactory.
Of course# both words c&sn be used in contexts %diere 
no actual mistake has been made. I need only claim that the use of them %diere 
a mistake has been made is fundanantal to them. But I shall claim that mis­
takes are always in the offing %dien we use "believes" in preference to an 
unvarnished statement.
My treatment of "knows..." is perhaps unorthodox.
But the idea that there is a close connection between the two is not
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unortliodoac. This account is coaq>atible with the doctrine that knowledge 
is justified true belief, although it does not depend on it.
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7. somm question» about the schema.
m  this section I shall discuss three 
questions about the schema. First, the question what cole the 
schema plays. Second, how accurate the schema is. Third, how it 
is to be applied in the ease of direct or basic actions. Finally,
I will discuss an objection.
I give here a quotation from an article 
L.W. Forguson, "Austin's Philosophy of Action." first published 
in Archives de Philosophie, and reprinted in "Symposium on J.L. Austin" 
ed. K.T. Fann. This quotation gives a more complicated description 
of actions, and shows how elaborate the vocabulary that we use here 
really is:-
"There is the initial stage of the 'receipt of intelligence.* Action 
takes place in an envirmsment, against a background of events and 
actions of other people. we generally act in response to some 
information (true or false) that we have got about this environment. 
Breakdowns often have their source here, as a result of faulty 
intelligence.
"Having received some information one must 
always put soma interpretation on it, see it for what it is, or in 
short 'appreciate the situation. ' we act as %#e do because we construe
our information in a certain way. But things can go wrong here^—
'We can know the facts and yet look at them 
mistakenly or perversely, or not fully realise or appreciate something, 
or even be under a total misoonc^tlon.« (from MA Plea for Excuses.")
"Usually, when Z act, I will do so in terms 
of certain principles %#hich I think are applicable to the situation. 
These may be either standards of right and wrong conduct or mu^ more 
mundane principles. Zn any case, it is evident that merely having 
certain information and having 'appreciated* it, can't lead directly 
to action or even to the decision to act. There must be %fiat Austin 
called an 'invocation of principles. '
"Closely associated with the 'invocation of 
principles' is 'deliberation.* I need not always deliberate before I
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«et, but whenever I weigh the 'pros and eons' of the situation - end 
Austin was careful to say that these need not be moral pros and cons - 
this stage in the machinery of action comes into play.
"Making our way to the top floors of the 
corporation, there is a stage where the decision must be taken whether 
to do it or not. And decision, of course, is influenced by the 
results of the other stages. The soundness of the decision will 
reflect the workings of the lower orders of the machinery.
"Having decided, however, we realise that 
there is more than one way to acoomqplish something in the light of the 
consideration thus far# Thus there is usually to be gone through 
sosrn consideration of 'ways and means, * which is a planning of how and 
when to actually carry the action through. There must be some thoughf, 
no matter how minimal or even habitual, given to the practical matter 
of avoiding difficulties and choosing the appropriate time and means 
for execution*
"Finally, we move in to action. Actually, 
doing the thing - the most outward stage of the machinery - Austin 
called the 'emeeutive stage. ' Most of the verbs that 'name' actions 
are used in connection with this stage, and, of course, many of the 
possible 'breakdowns' occur here as %#ell. In the executive stage, we 
must exercise sufficient control over the necessary bodily movements 
and %#e must take sufficient care to avoid possible impingements and 
dangers, realising that the action is performed against a background 
of circumstances, including the actions of other agents, so that we 
successfully complete the eoGscution."
First there are certain more detailed 
comments that I would like to make on this, and then there is a more 
general point.
The stages that are identified in this seem 
plausible enough. But the suggestion that they are to be found in all 
actions is wrong. For example, it is difficult to see why we should 
accept the suggestion that action always takes place in response to 
information about the environment. It is not always a case of 
information first, activity second. For example, B.F. Skinner allowm 
that some actions are not produced by the "organism" in response to
— 100—
the environment - "operant behaviour." Moreover, on a common sense 
level, it surely makes sense to say of somsone that he wanted some­
thing and then set about reconciling it with his principles, and 
getting the information necessary to achieving it and so forth. 
Certainly, writers on "Management" sudh as I. Ansoff and P. orucker, 
who discuss planning extensively, believe that the setting of aims 
and objectives does and should cxme first in the process. one can 
argue in support that, without some idea of what one wants, there is 
no criterion by %d\ich to select which infbxmation demands a response 
and which does not. Again, the suggestion that consideration of 
%#ays and means is separate from the weighing of 'pros and cons' that 
precedes a decision to act cannot be right. For very often acc^ting 
an objective means accepting also the costs and disadvantages (the 
cons) of achieving that objective. The famous "The end justifies the 
means" is making just this point. Sometimes the costs and penalties 
may outweigh the advantages and benefits of attaining the objective.
But these are perhaps points of detail.
One might c^ject that if we really went through all these stages before 
every action we would get very little done. One might also object 
that people do not often notice or betray their going through these 
stages. perhaps we should say that %d%at we have here is an account 
of a Mfull-dress" action, and that many, even most, actions show only 
an attenuated or simplified version of this.
But there is a fundamental misunderstanding 
in these objections. The account may look as if it %#sre a history, 
as if the various stages could be separately identified. Certainly, 
there is sometimes a history to give, but not always. what we can 
always do is to ask the relevant questions. ws can ask "What 
principles applied to this action?" whether or not the invocation of
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principles wee a ##q)arate stage or one that the agent was aware of.
I do not suppose that Forguson - or Austin - fell into any of the 
well-charted Dualist traps. For one thing, Forguson explicit^ says 
"I need not always deliberate.** But it is not easy to avoid 
conveying the impression that this is a bit of history. The 
reference to "the initial stage,** and **the other stages," the mention 
of "machinery" are examples of the way that this impression may ba 
given.
It will not <%> to say that this is a 
descripticm of a "full-dress" action and that it is not necessary that 
all these stages should actually be gone through. we are left with 
the problem of understanding how an action can be decided on without 
going through all these stages and without thereby being more or less 
thoughtless or irrational. Then we notice that the questions can be 
asked and the enswars given even where the relevant stage has not been 
separately gone through. The conclusion that it must have been gone 
through separately, but unobservably, becomes almost irresistible.
So %ie must insist from the start that a description of this kind is not 
a bit of history, but a way of ordering the questions and justifications
that may be asked for and given for an action. This may seero
mysterious.
It is instructive to go bade to the parallel 
with functional objects. In discussing these, I pointed out that the 
notion of a design had a crucial part to play in our talk about these, 
in relating the formal element to the material elements of the object.
To think that an account of the planning process of actions must be a 
bit of history is to make the same mistake as thinking that the design 
of an object must be an object on all fours with what it is a design
of. But the design of an axe - at least in my sense of "design" - is
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not an object that la conceptually distinct from an axe. We do 
sometimes produce designs, blueprints, plans and strategies which 
are objects separate from the things that they are designs of.
But this is a convenience, not a necessity. The relation between 
design or plan and its realisation is not accidental, empirical or 
causal.
If a design or blueprint does not appear 
in the form of an actual car, then the sp-called design was not a 
design of a car but of something else. If it appears nowhere and 
if nothing could count as the realisation of that design, then 
surely it is not a design of anything. Equally, if we follow the 
design and the object fails to satisfy as a car - if the design does 
not specify material elements and their relations in such a way that 
the object that results is a car, - then the design %ms not a design 
of a car, but either of something else or not a design at all. The 
design is an essential part of the car, taut not at all in the seme 
%#ay as the valves or the distributor. It is not a s^ qparate part 
that could be left out or changed independently of the rest.
Designs of objects and plans of action are essentially involved in 
explaining, criticising, and assessing both. But they are not 
independent items on all fours with %diat they are designs or plans of.
There is one obvious objection to ay cltdm 
that this schema reveals something important about the notion of an 
action. There are in the language certain descriptions that are 
description of actions and never of (mare) events. The descriptions 
"He committed murder, insulted the mayor, borrowed money," can apply 
only to people and to their actiohs. But there are very many verbs 
that can equally %mll be applied to actions and to events, or can 
indifferently have people or things as subjects. "Hit", "Support,"
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"Move", "Wave", "Pall" are all examples. It vion't do to turn to 
verbs that can only have people as subjects. Hot only would that 
exclude some cases of dMcrlptlons of actions, such as those in the 
last list, but it would also include some cases that are not actions. 
Blinking, coughing, turning on the light may be actions, but may well 
not be. If my view is that there is a distinct linguistic class 
"action-description", then it is wrong.
There is no simple syntactic criterion.
We might be tempted to say that the schema applies where we find an 
'event* whose many descriptions can be ordered in a hierarchy.
Thus, John illuminated the room, turned on the light, pressed the 
switch, moved his finger. But this will not do. Descriptions of 
events can also be ordered in a hierarchy. we can work down from 
"The river inundated the farm," to "The water rushed through the 
buildings" to a description of water flowing, walls and roofs 
collapsing and so forth.
What distinguishes actions is not the 
possibility of ordering the descriptions but the principle that 
governs the ordering of one set of the descriptions. John moved his 
finger in order to turn on the light in order to illuminate the room. 
The schema is a more detailed and complicated e3g>lanation of the 
relation that is marked by that kind of phrase. It is this kind of 
relaticm betwewi the relevant descriptions that makes a given 
description a description of an action.
The importance of purposes and intentions 
to the notion of an action suggests that there is here a criterion for 
distinguishing actions from non-actions. The way in which the 
descriptiwis are ordered is the fundamental difference between actions 
and events. The schema explains exactly %#hat this difference is.
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A very tempting formulation of this kind of view is offered by
D. Davidson in a paper called "Agency" in "Agent. Action and Reason."
edited by Brinkley, Bsonaugh and Marras. Davidson saysi-
"A person is the agent of an event if and only if there is a descrip­
tion of what he did that makes true a sentence that says he did it 
intentionally." (p.7)
One difficulty with any attempt to draw a 
line between actions and events is that the language does not help us. 
"Being an agent of an event" is not clear. Wo can say that the 
bleacdüng agent in the case of the bleached curtains before us was the 
sunlight. "what he did" is no better. (Ejects are also said to do
things. Not everything that people are said to have done is what we
would want to call an action. "Being responsible for..." would not 
help. We can say that objects are responsible for things. Uses like 
these may be dissdssed as personification or otherwise ncm-genuine.
But we also hold people responsible for things that they did not do.
I unknowingly drop a bottle out of my padc while «miking in the 
forest. % e  bottle focuses the sunlight cm dry leaves and twigs.
A fire starts. I can be held responsible. I should have been more
careful. But we cxmild not say that I burnt down the forest. If I
had carefully positioned the bottle, this is exactly vdiat we would 
say. I did bum down the 6rest.
This case may seem to be a counter-example 
to Davidson's criterion. our holding Fred responsible for the fire 
implies that he did it, or that it «ras an action of his, something of 
which he was the agent. But there is no description of «rhat he did 
that makes true a sentence that says he did it intentionally. But the 
implication does not hold. Our holding Fred responsible need not be 
taken to imply more than our believing that Fred could have avoidec 
the fire happening. so James Corhnan's use of this kind of case
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•gainst Davidson fails* (Saa his cn— isnt on Davidson's paper in the book 
•’Aowt. Action and R— oo.**)
But Davidson's criterion is impossible tov work.
The fundamental idea seems clear enough. For any action there is a 
multitude of different descriptions. There will be some that carry the 
implication that %d%at they describe was an intentional action. Others 
%rill imply that it was not intentional. Yet others will describe it as 
an event. If there is just one description of the right kind, then the 
s%Aject was the agent.
There are three problems «rith this. Pirst,in 
Davidson's quoted criterion there are three places that will need to be 
filled out if t#s are to apply the criterion. We need to specify which
event some person might be the agent of, and what he did, end to fix the
reference of "it” in "he did it intentionally.” Suppose we ask if Jbhn 
was the agent of the event of the light going on. Then %#e must turn to 
descriptions of %diat he did. It would be pedantic to object that we do 
not yet lotiow if he did anything, and that consequently "description of 
what he did" begs the question. Ifiat did he do? Well, he pressed the 
switch, amongst other things. Does this "make true" a sei^ence that says 
he did it intentionally? Did what intentionally? The description "pressed 
the switch" is so far the only description of what happened which allows 
the question whether he did it intentionally. If he pressed the switch
intentionally, we might accept that he turned on the light. If that implies
that he %#as the agent of the event of the light's going on, then we have an 
answer. But it does not tell us whether he turned on the light intentionally, 
so it is of limited interest. (He may have meant to summon the lift, not 
to turn on the light %dien he pressed the switch.) In any case, "He pressed 
the switch" does not "make true" "He pressed the s%dtch intentionally" - not 
by itself at least.
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P#rhapm w# should be asking about the santencs 
"Ha tumad on tha light intanticmally" avan though that dascription is 
a XMM ona, and so ona that "it" cannot refar to. But that %#ould not halp. 
"Ha prassad tha s%d.tch" doas not (by itself ) "maka trua" "Ha tumad on tha 
light intantionally, " avan if "Ha prassad tha switch" wara to imply that 
ha did so intantionally. Tha critarion is un%#orkabla.
Moraovar, it is a ragrass. Wa %»ant a critarion 
for saying whan a parson is tha agant of an avant bacausa %#a want to 
distinguish batwam %«hat ha did and vAiat ha did not do. But in order to 
work Davidson's critarion wa sust already ba able to distinguish batwaan 
descriptions of what ha did and descriptions of what ha did not do. In 
applying tha criterion to John's turning on tha light wa must know whath«r 
John's pressing tha switch %#as something that ha did. %#a must apply tha 
critarion to tha avant of tha stdLtch being prassad. Wa have than taken 
tha first step in an infinite ragrass.
Perhaps these difficulties are finicky and 
pedantic. After all, tha idea is clear enough. But is it? What is tha 
critarion by which all tha relevant descriptions Sf^ly to tha same happen­
ing? How do wa know of any dascription whether it is ona of the relevant 
ones or not? I pass over tha difficulty that there is no word that is 
neutral between action and event, which is what wa need here. "Happening" 
id.ll serve. Thera is a more serious problem. Tha descriptions do not 
have tha same truth-conditions at all. Sometimes, as in tha case of 
"turning on tha light" there are additional events that must have happened 
before wa can apply tha descriptions higher up tha hierarchy. Somatiaws, 
as in tha case of "making tha winning move," it is not so much additional 
events that wa require as more of tha context, in particular tha social 
context, of tha action. Davidson's idea %dll collaqpsa unless there is 
such a criterion.
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It Mty seam that there must ba such a criterion*
In the case of "making the winning move," it is intuitively clear that
there is only one happening in question* But it is not so clear in the
case of "turning on tha light*" Wa want to agree that %*%en John turned
on tha light, illuminated tha room, pressed tha switch, SKsvad his finger,
etc*, he has performed one action, done one thing, not many* Yet o%sr
intuitions are not always clear* Is %dnning a case in court to count as
one action? Surely not* One might suggest ona reason for saying that
whan John turned on tha light, ha did ona thing not many* The descriptions
can be ordered in a hierarchy in tha familiar %#sy* But this is not a strong
criterion* It %dll give a counter-intuitive ans%#er in tha exaiq>la of
"winning tha case*" In any case, this will not help Davidson* At beet
this could only give a criterion for "same action*" But Davidson needs a
criterion for "same h^^paning*"
The truth is that tha distinction between action
and event is not just one distinction, but many related and different
distinctions* To insist on just one distinction, on a strict either/or,
blurs these distinctions* It isn't just that there may be half-way
houses, as there may be in very many perfectly satisfactory distinctions*
It may not be clear %#han I start at the face at ttia window whether sy
starting %ms an action of mine or not, as Anscosba points out in
"Intention*" J*L* Austin well illustrates some of the subtle variations
that %#a may encounter in "A Plea for Excuses*" Ha sayss-
"A different way of going about it (sc* defending someone's conduct) is to 
admit that it vmsn't a good thing to have done, but to argue that it is not 
quite fair or correct to say baldly 'X did A*' We may say it isn't fair 
just to say X did it; perhaps ha was under someone's influence, or was 
nudged* Or, it isn't fair to say baldly that he did A; it may have bean 
partly accidental or an imintentional slip* Or, it isn't fair to say that 
he did simply Jl - he was really doing sommthing quite different and A %#as 
only incidental, or he %#as looking at the whole thing quite differently*
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Naturally, thaaa argumenta can be combined or overlap or run into each 
other*"
There ie no criterion or mark or teat here* But 
to look for one (or many) much mark# ie a mistake* The difference between 
actions and events is not like the difference between cows and horses or 
voters and non-^ voters* The difference is the difference between two 
language games, Tha term "action" is ona of a battery of inter-related 
terms that are used in a particular language-game* Tha term "event" is 
part of a different, though related game* The %Aole structure of tha two 
gmoaa is different* And it is these structures that are really important*
Anscombe says of her notion of a hierar^y of 
descriptions that it cannot be more than "a deviro to reveal order" in the 
%#elter of descriptions that can be applied to a particular action* Wa 
cannot say more for the schema* We apply descriptions in a particular 
way and employ some different terms when we apply them as descriptions 
of actions as opposed to events* We play a different language-game with 
them. Tha game of describing actions involves some new pieces that are 
not involved in tha game of describing events* Not that they do not have 
much in comsmn*
The schema is incosplete as an explanation of tha 
%my that the hier achy of descriptions is built up* As well as tha relation 
of "in order to***" each step must be justified by success in achieving tha 
purpose* It is not enough to justify moving from "I prassad the switch" 
to "I turned on the ll^it" Uiat I press tha switch in order to turn on 
the light* Tha light must go on and go on as a result of my pressing the 
switch* There are other complicated conditions as %#ell* fbr example, 
suppose that I press the switch, %diich unknown to me is not working* But 
someone'Observes me press the switch and operates another s%#itch which does 
turn the light on* I did not turn on the light* The observer did* Yet the
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light ««eut on am m result of my pressing the switch. And most descriptions 
of actions are "mixed," See the discussion of direct or basic actions below.
Many descriptions ajqply indifferently to full- 
blooded actions, their weaker brethren and events. But this should not 
surprise us. One thing in common between my shutting the door on purpose, 
by accident, incidentally, by mistake, etc. and the wind's shutting it, 
is that the door %#as shut. This thing in common may be an isportant 
point about the incident.
But there is more to it than that. The ability 
to distinguish between actions and events is an ability to classify 
"h^xpenings" or rather to choose the correct way of treating the relevant 
descriptions. If there were no descriptions that applied to both, this 
more basic ability to describe "happenings" could not be acquired. We 
can only learn to play these two different games %dth the same pieces if 
there are some moves that we can make %#lth them that are neutral between 
the two games - or rather, that are correct BKives in both gasms. A child 
could only learn to distinguish between those happenings that he is held 
responsible for and those that he is not held responsible for against the 
background ability to distinguish haj^ xenings. Ha/she can only distinguish 
between what he is able to do and what he is not able to do if he/she can 
distinguish one thing that has happened from another.
One thing that distinguishes actions, whether 
intentional or not, accidental or not, from events is that mistakes and 
failure are possible idien someone acts. These words can have no application 
in the case of an event. It is my contention that this is fundasmntal to 
the notion of an action. So it should not be surprising that there is in 
the language a way of giving the point of an action that allows for the 
possibility of not attaining the point, of failing. The phrase "in order 
to.." is one such way.
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What 1# important about tha achama is not that 
it off arm a way of drawing tha distinction clearly. There is no reason 
to suppose that it needs to be drawn clearly, or that there is just one 
distinction. What the sches&a does is to display clearly an important 
pert of the game that we play inith descriptions idien we ^xply them as 
descriptions of actions.
Direct or basic actions are actions for which 
there are no "lower-level" descriptions that are action-descriptions. A 
classic discussion of these is A. Danto's article "Basic Actions." in the 
gir«n mUo«ortUol Qawterly of 1965. I do mot p— form dtroct actioaa 
by doing anyttiing else. X just do thesu There is no answer to the cjuestion 
"How?" asked of a direct action. X can say how I murdered my aunt but not 
how I raised my arm. But I can say what caused my arm to rise %dien X raised 
it - various events in my eyscles and nerves. So it is not that there are 
no "lower-level" descriptions of ey raising sy arm. These lower-level 
descriptions are not action-descriptions. They are descriptions of events 
or happenings.
The existence of these descriptions is built in 
to the schema of formal and material elements. There is no objection to 
a description of material elements having a formal element built in to it.
Thus "I illimdnated the room" may have as material element description "I 
switched on the light." And "X switched on the light" itself fits the 
schema. But there must coe#e a point at which the description would be 
something like "My finger moved, pressed the switch and caused the light 
to go on, thus illuminating the room." If there is no stage at %dUch we 
change gear from descriptions of actions to descriptions of events, then 
we will be landed %#ith an infinite regress of descriptions.
But this presents two problems. One is the question 
what the material elements are of the direct action of, say, moving my arm.
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There ere problems about candidates for this role, which raise the question 
vihether the schema of formal and material elements really applies in this 
specially interesting case of direct actions.
There is a fundamental difficulty in even 
attempting to answer the first question. Clearly the answer cannot be 
given by descriptions that are action-descriptions. That has already 
been ruled out. There is also an objection to giving the answer by 
means of descriptions that are descriptions of events. The distincticvi 
between actions end events was originally drawn by pointing out that 
certain things can be said of actions that cannot be said of events. A 
description of events in "purely physical" terms is ther^y barred from 
playing a role in the hierarchy of descriptions of action. What we need, 
and do not have, is a way of describing the material elmaents of actions 
that is not an action-description end not a description of events either.
The pr^lem does not become pressing exc^xt in the case of direct actions.
For it is then that we need to change gear.
But our language does not allow us to remain 
imrremitted on the question whether we are describing an action or an 
event. We may be forced to mekm clear vAather we are describing actions 
or events in the end, or in scam particular context. Of course, ttiere 
are very many cases where the line remains blurred, as I have pointed 
out. There is hope yet.
One way in wAich the line remains blurred concerns 
the status of the lowar^level descriptions of actions. In some cases it is 
clearly ri(#%t to say that they are intentional or done on purpose, etc. For 
example, X press tha switch on purpose, intentionally, and turn on the light 
on purpose, intentionally. I %mnt to press the switch because I want to turn 
on the light. But this is not always so. A man playing the "Moonlinht" 
sonata on the piano plays certain notes by pressing keys by moving fingers.
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But It Is very odd to affirm or to dsny that he wanted to move his fingers, 
that he moved them intentionally or on purpose# We may not know %Aat 
movements his fingers are making# He will almost certainly not be aware of 
them# He will be concentrating on other aspects of his performance# He 
may be unable to make just those particular movements except in the context 
of playing that particular piece on the piuio# So wa cannot classify the 
movements of his fingers as full-blooded actions# Yet they are under his 
control# They are not mere twitches or incidentals in what he is doing# 
They are essentially part of his performance# So they are not full- 
blooded events either#
So the dilemma about describing the material 
elements of actions is a false one# It is based on a rigid aM)lication 
of the distinction that is not apprqpriate# It is legitimate to use the 
forms of description of events to give the material elements of actions 
at least in the present context and for present purposes#
The natural answer to the question is that the 
material elements of the action of raising my arm are the relevant events 
in my muscles and nerves and their result, my arm's lifting* I include 
both because to leave out either one or the other creates prbblems in 
applying the scheme#
To explain the events in sy muscles and nerves 
does answer thm question "Mow?" It is not an answer like the answers 
given to questions about the action under hlg i^er-level descriptions#
But it is an answer like the answers given by physiologists to other 
questions# Many explanations given by physiologists are not simply causal 
explanations# They are explanations of mechanisms that have functions# 
Examples are explanations of the movement of the iris in the eye or of 
the (Circulation of the blood# The physiologist's explanation of how the 
muscles and nerves in my arm %#wrk should be seen in the context of these 
other explanations# The operation of my iris or my heart has a function#
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There are explanations in terns of reasons for %#hat they do* The 
movement of my iris and the beating of my heart are not actions* I 
do not contract my iris or beat my heart* But they are controlled 
even though they are not under my control* They are controlled by 
the autonomic nervous system* The question that these explanations 
answer is not **How do I do it?** but "How does it work?" or "How is 
this function achieved?" or "What function does this perform?" 
Explanatiws of the mechanisms involved in snaesing, coughing, blinking 
are closer to the case of movements of the limbs* I do these things,
and Z can perform them as actions* They are under my control to soma
extent*
The events in my muscles and nerves %Aen I
move my arm are candidates for the role of material elements* But it
would be a mistake to leave out the movement of my arm* we do know 
when somebody «moves his arm, without physiological research or special 
equipment* The movement of my arm is clearly one of the conditions 
of the truth of "X moved my arsu"
Indeed, it is not obvious that the events in 
my muscles and nerves have any place in the schema as applied to direct 
actions*
"X moved my arm" is true if certain things 
happened and if those things were the material elesmnt of an action 
«Aose formal element or point is given by the description* Sometimes 
my moving my arm is an indirect action* I may move my arm by lifting 
it with the other hand, for example* But when it is a direct action, 
the relation between the material and formal elements is too close*
The distinction between them seems vacuous* In any case, it is 
precisely the relation between my wanting to move my arm and my arm's 
movement that is mysterious* The schema appears to otfmr no help with
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this. The alternative is to count the events in my muscles and nerves 
as material elements of the action* Then the distinction does not 
seem vacuous# The relation between my wanting to move my arm and 
these events is like that between my wanting to turn on the light and my 
finger's pressing the s%fitch* But what is the special magic about 
these events in my muscles and nerves that cause my arm's movements?
One way of expressing the important difference is this# My arm's 
movement when I move it is organised and controlled, but it is the same 
as my arm's movement when it twitches or is pushed or jolted# The 
difference between a brick and a brick-shaped stone lies in the fact 
that one just happens to be that shape, while it is not an accident 
that the other is the shape that it is. The one may fit where we want 
it# But the other is constructed and organised to fit where we went it* 
Closer to home are the similarities and differences between a retreat 
and a rout, or between a march and a migration# There is little 
difference in the end result in either of these pairs# The difference 
is that one is an organised and controlled version of the other# When 
I move my arm the movement that occurs is controlled* For example, it 
will not produce undesirable side-effects, such as knocking over the 
gravy - unless something goes wrong* Ait a twitch or a jolt is not 
controlled* If my arm twitches something has already gone wrong, just 
because the movement was not under my control* It is a mistake to 
equate the movement of my arm when I a*ove it with a twitch*
Control of our movements is not so much a 
matter of course as one might think* m  many cases of indirect action, 
we have to control our movements very accurately# This has to be 
learned* The control of a musician over his fingers was painfully 
acquired* Nor is it the case that we can make the movements involved 
in a given action outside the context of actually doing it# This is why
m mimic ha# to practice pretending to carry a pane of glau when there 
i#n*t one or pretending to ehake hande, or play the piano. Both of
these points are obscured if we concentrate only on examples like my 
moving my arm (any old how) or my turning on the light. These examples 
are too simple to be illuainating.
It is not really quite right to talk of
’’controlling'* my own limbs or my own movements. My relation to these
is quite unlike my relation to the car I drive or ^ e  clay I mould into 
a pot. But there is no simple alternative phrase. The point I want 
to make is that it is not a matter of course that my limbs move in the 
way that I went them to move, that their movements are %#xder control.
AS an action, my snving my arm any old how is so sia^le that it 
constitutes a limiting, special, case.
Direct actions are iemune from certain sorts 
of failure. They are immune from the kind of failure that is catered 
for by ’believes." If I do something wrong that is a direct action, 
my mistake %#ill not be about the relevant limitations and Justifications
that apply to this action. But yet given that I went to move my arm,
these will be relevant limitations and justifications that allow us to 
work out what is required - if we wish to. This immunity makes direct 
actions special. This is (part of) what it means to say that my 
relation to my own limbs is quite unlike my relation to anything else.
But there are cases apart from this one where the schema has to be 
applied in the same way - namely in the explanaticm of other autonoedc 
systems of control within the body.
The role of the physiologist * s research is now 
clearer. Physiologists e9q>lain what (contingently) controls the move­
ments of my limbs, in the same way as they explain what the other systems 
of my body are and how they are controlled. So picking out certain
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cauaos of my arm*s aovamant as spsclal is not arbitrary* Whan my 
muscles and nerves cause ay arm*# movement# and they are functioning 
properly# my arm is under control* I do not say that this is a 
conceptual truth* The world might have been different in that the 
mechanism of control might have been different*
There is one objection that should be dealt 
vdth* It is easy to grant that the agent's beliefs and/or knowledge 
explain his actions# and even that they es^laln his actions in the way 
that I have outlined* But one may still baulk at the idea that this 
is essential to "believes" and "knows*" Couldn't a passive spectator 
have beliefs and knowledge of %diat he %#as watching? Couldn't some 
belief be held# but never play a part in action? surely we can imagine 
sonathing like this.
It may be that this is an (dejection to the 
disposition theory. The dispositionalist * a answer is roughly this.
A spectator may well be passive and yet believe something# But the 
account is that belief is a disposition# so this is not really a diffi­
culty. For a disposition may well not manifest itself. The point is 
that there are some circumstances under ifiich it would manifest itself.
I am coBBTdtted to the view that there is a 
close connection that is not merely empirical between belief and 
behaviour. My objection to the dispositional account was that it 
misrepresented the nature of this connection. so it is open to me to 
use the same defence here.
But there is more to he said. First# any 
account that claims an essential connection between belief and b^iaviour 
must surely include speech# including silent speech in the head# as 
behaviour. Saying something is not like non-verbal "executive" 
behaviour of the kind that I have concentrated on. But it is behaviour.
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It counts as svidcnca for or against claims that somaona baliavas a 
particular thing. Now# a spectator may be passive in the sense that 
he is not performing any "executive" actions# and yet be saying things# 
whether to himself or to somecme else. Indeed# a belief may never be 
acted on# but yet it may be discussed. My claim is that "believes" 
is involved with action# but not just with "execùtlve" actions.
"Believes" is one of the battery of words that we use to describe
thinking. I shall discuss the use of "believes" in this rather
different context in Part H. Now# a spectator may be passive in one 
sense; he may even be silent. But if he is a spectator# he must be 
thinking# and in that sense# he cannot be completely passive. To be
spectating is at least to be watching# to be awake# to pay attention#
to concentrate. And so it rules out being passive.
It may be as well to try to state exactly 
vdiat my claim is. "Believes** has a certain role in giving explanations 
for actions. (It has the same role in our descriptions of thinking.
But that view will be defended in Part II.) %»ughly# "believes"
allows us to explain why an agent did something# or rather the limits- 
tions and justificatifs that relate the material elements of an action 
with the formal element# while also allowing for the possibility that 
the agent may be mistaken.
This possibility# that the agent is mistaken# 
is central both to the notion of an action and to the notion of a reason. 
It is impossible to avoid presenting the aooowt as if "believes" %#ere 
a complication or sophistication added on to a more basic use of "reason" 
and "action". It looks as if we have first the "language-game" or our
talk about actions and the reasons for then and then add "believes** to
cope with certain deviant actions. Elut that could not be right. Tor 
we could not recognise that deviant actions of the right sort existed
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without "believes* " Without mistakes of the right sort# there is no 
need for "believes*** But without "believes" there is no possibility 
of picking up mistakes of the right sort* And the possibility of 
mistakes of this sort is an important part of the difference in use of 
"because" when it explains an action and when it gives a cause* m  
talking about causes# we do not allow fbr tbiB possibility - that 
soBwone or something has made a mistake*
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8. On wanting and intending*
"Believes" is only one of the battery of 
terms that have a special use in e)q;>laining actions* "He took his 
umbrella because he believed it was going to rain»" is only / 
adequate if we can take it that he wanted to avoid getting wet# that 
he took it in order to avoid getting wet# and so fdrth#
What I have said so far goes some way 
towards explaining how some of these terms are inter-related* But 
it is clearly incomplete as it stands* It would also be nscesseury 
to work out a similar account of "he %#ants"# "he intends" etc* Such 
an account would also involve showing that both causal and dispositional 
accounts %#ere not sktisfactory* That would be a long project in its
own right* so I shall not attempt it here*
Nevertheless# it does seem necessary to 
consider briefly whether certain accounts of "wants" etc* are compatible 
with my account of "believes" or not* I shall look briefly at the 
suggestion that wants or desires are causes of actif# and that %#ants 
are dispositions to act in certain ways* I shall offer some 
cfsideratifs that may serve to show that the way that X have approached 
"believes" may also be fruitful in the case of "wants" and "intends*"
It is not easy to expand "wants" to an overtly hypothetical form* But
since "he wants***" is often to be completed by a descriptif of an 
actif# giving %d%at the subject %#ants to do# it is not implausible to 
talk of a dispositif to act in the ease of "wants*" It may well be 
that^he w f  ts*#*" always isq^ lied that there is something that he w f  ts 
to do* In that case the plausibility of the dispositional account will 
be sc maich the greater*
But it is not obvious that my account of
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"believea*' i# incompatible with a dispoaitional accowt of wanting* 
mieady my account of "bolievos** allows us to say that wanting is a 
datarminabls disposition and to say something about how to detomins 
what at a lower level of description» the subject can be expected to 
do.
One might say the same of the causal 
account of wanting. But it would be necwsary to interpret "cause" 
in a very liberal way. It may become so diluted that it loses its 
force. Certainly» it would present serious pn^lems for an identity 
theorist. fcr my account turns on the idea that something that is 
not the case may yet be part of explaining action» and that "believes" 
is crucial in allo««lng this to be a conceptual possibility. Some­
thing that is not the case cannot be a cause or a factor in a causally 
detensinad situation.
Of course» the fact that a sample of water 
is not boiling may be a cause or a causal factor. But that is not 
What I mean. Suppose that if the water were boiling it would cause 
the lid of the kettle to rise. we may explain the fact that the lid 
does not rise by pointing out that the water is not boiling. But we 
cannot appeal to the boiling water to explain why the lid is rising if 
the water is not boiling. This is what %#e do in the casé of actions 
by means of "believes." Perhaps sense can be made of this in a causal 
framework without diluting the word causes" too much. But I find it 
difficult to see how.
Difficulties for both acooixits are raised 
when we ask the questions that were crucial for "he believes..." about 
"he wants.." and "he intends..." These difficulties are not» perhaps» 
insuperable. But they do suggest that the same approach might be 
fruitful if it were applied to these terms as well. The questions 
ware "What is the unique and unparaphraseable contribution of these
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terms to our language?" or "What conceptual pressures would impel us 
to invent these terms if vie did not have thm?" or "Why is it an 
explanation to cite the agent*s wants and/or his intentions?"
Of course we could say simply that the 
e3q>Ianatl(xn gives what 2 call the formal element or the point of the 
action. But this is too easy. That does not give a distinct use 
for each of "he wants.."» "he intends.." and "he has the purpose of.."
By implication» I have already provided a 
basis for answering this question about "in order to..." and "..with 
the purpose of.." We need a special locution here» as well as the 
straightfon#ard descriptions for two reasons. The straightforward 
descriptions also have uses in describing events» and accidents and 
so forth. And the agent may fail. So there is a need for a way of 
identifying the formal element of the action without committing the 
speaker in certain ways. The speaker may not be claiming that the 
action is or will be a success or even that «diat actually happened 
(as opposed to vdiat was meant to happen) had a formal element or a 
point at all.
So far» we might get by with "he is trying 
to..." But it is possible to plan or debate or consider actions vdth- 
out performing them. so there is a need for a v#ay of giving the 
formal element of an action that not only allows the speaker to remain 
uncommitted on the question of success or failure but also allows him 
to discuss the action even v^en nobody is performing it or trying to 
perfbrm it.
No doubt my sdhamatic picture does not yet 
do justice to the cosq>lexities of our language here. there are many
other phrases and turns of speech to be considered. "He did it in
anger/obedience» " and "He did it as a gesture/ritual»" and "He did it
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out of habit/malice»** are but a few examples. There are differences 
between "trying" as in "trying to do.." and as in "trying out." 
"purpose" occurs in many different phrases. "In order to" is not the 
same as "in order that" or "so that. " But a sketch along these lines 
does emerge naturally from the earlier discussion. The general 
approach does offer some hope of introducing a kind of order into the 
welter of differences and similarities here. The approach to "he 
intends.." and "he wants.." would develop along these lines.
I do not think that "intends" is very often 
used in every-day colloquial speech. It seems to occur most often 
in pompous and technical contexts. There are two phrases that are 
used in ordinary speech instead. One is "I am going to.." as in 
"2 an going to write a book" or "...visit John" and the other is "I 
mean to.." or more commonly "I meant to.," as in "2 meant to turn on 
the light." (X shall ignore the fact that the verb "means" is also 
used in talking about language.)
One striking difference between these two 
is that "2 am going to.*" clearly refers to something (2 am going to 
do) in the future» while "I mean to.." may not. Another is that 
there seems to be some iiylicit contrast between what 2 mean to do» 
or %diat 2 meant to do» and vdiat actually happens. This is not so 
«fhen we say "I am going to.."
Anscombe says in section 1 of "Intention" 
that intentions need not refer to the future. 2 think that what she 
means to say here is that the piuqpobe of point of an action need not 
be something in the future although it may be. She makes her point 
about "intentionally»" which can sometimes be paraphrased by "in order 
to.." or "with the purpose of.." But there is a fecial interest in 
cases where "intends" and its kin do refer to the future» simply
-123-
because these viords can be used to refer to the future# but "in order.." 
etc. cannot readily be used in that way* In this use# there is no 
paraphrase for "intends", which suggests that it is this use that is 
crucial. Out there are two areas of obscurity about this. Whan I 
signal intentionally, my intention may be said to be to signal, to warn 
other drivesf,get help or to turn right, get out of there and so on.
When I press the light switch intentionally, my intention nay be said 
to be to turn on the light or to press the switch, or to find the 
telephone. It isn't clear that one of tivese intentions has any special 
place. we might say sometimes one ttiing and sometimes another, or to 
refuse to single out just one intention. Sosm of these intentions are 
in the future and some are not. And yet, "turning on the light" or 
"finding the telephone" may be what I am said to be doing in the present
tense, when I press the switch. the classes of present and future are
not fixed in a way that encourages us to hc^ for any clear lines to be
drawn. the other area of obscurity is recognised in see. 26 of
"intention." there are the intentions embodied in "higher-level" 
description of the action, and those embodied in "lower-level" descrip­
tions. Anscombe says that "higher-level" descriptions give the 
intention of the action, and "lower-level" descriptions give the 
intention in the action. so there is little hope of finding a distinc­
tive use for "intends" in this way. But another approach does prove 
rewarding.
There are a miil>er of activities that depend 
for their point on some future event, action or activity. Taking one's 
coat because it is going to rain ("and X intend to avoid getting wet.") 
sowing crops that one intends to harvest, and so on. often the point 
of the activity will be some action that will be performed by the agent 
himself; aoamtimas it %#ill not be, as one could argue in the two
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examples I have given* But signalling a right turn is one clear 
example. Here the point of the actions is given by the agent's 
intwtlon to turn right, and the desirability of 'displaying' this 
intention to warn other people. Another example is surveying or 
exploring a piece of ground. Here the future activities are multi­
farious. It may be nap-#a)cing that is the relevant point; and map- 
making itself looks forward to the multifarious uses of maps. Or it 
may be building or constructing something, or taxing the population* 
"Practising" provides another exasyple, whether it is a piece of music 
or a judo-throw* In suitable circumstances, filling the car with 
petrol, clearing one's throat, getting certain equipment cut, 
sharpening knives or blades, can all be cases of "pr^arlng", and be 
dependent in the sase way on some future activity. In all these 
cases, the point of the action can only be explained by reference to 
scxsething that the agent is not now doing, but something that he will 
do - subject to certain qualifications. It %fill be apparent that what 
I ms after here is the same, or at least owes much to, Ryle's identi­
fication of "intention-parasitic" verbs in "Thinking and Reflecting."
In this kind of case, we cannot give the 
point of the activity by redescribing it. Clearing one's throat is not 
speaking, signalling is not turning right, practising is not performing. 
Nor yet will a straightforward prediction do. The agent may never get 
around to performing the relevant future action, for one reason or 
another. But we need to be able to say what the point of his actions 
is all the same. Another use of "intends," related to this one, is what 
Austin, in "Three ways of Spilling Ink." refers to as a "bracketing 
effect."
"When the till-dipper claims that he intended all alooQ to put the money 
back, what he is cledxing is that his action - the action that he %#as 
«kgaged upon is to be judged as a whole, not just a part of it carved out 
of the %Aole."
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Austln's point is right, hut I would not have 
put it in Just the that he does. I would say, not that the claim la 
that the action is to be judged in its proper context. Putting the 
money back cannot be part of what he is now doing, since he is not put­
ting it back, and has not put it back, but Is doing, or has done, 
something incompatible with that, namely taken it out. What he is 
claiming is that the action of taking it out must be judged in the 
context of another, future, action of his, namely putting it back. It 
is this context that allows him and, he hopes, us - to redescrlbe his 
taking the money as borrowing it. (Putting the money back is not part 
of borrowing the money either. Putting the money back, would, in the 
right circumstances, be redesdribed as repaying it.)
Here we find a différent kind of case where 
it is necessary for us to be able to refer to future actions of the 
agent, though for different reasons. In this case, the future action 
gives not the point, but circumstances relevant to the moral assessment 
of #hat the agent is now doing.
Both these kinds of case d^>end on the use 
of "intends" in which "is going to..** can be substituted for it. The 
other use (in Which "means to.." can be substituted for it) is more 
closely related to the very wide use in which intentions and purposes 
can become conflated. But there is still a difference between them 
which I have already mentioned. There is a contrast implicit in 
"intends" or "means" which is absent when we say "in order to." Thera 
is a contrast between what I meant to do and what I actually did, or 
what actually happened. "ivhen I got out the car, I meant to check the 
oil" suggests that I didn't for some reason. "I got out of the car to 
check the oil" does not suggest that I didn't check it. It is neither 
one or the other. "I meant to call the lift When I pressed the button"
— 126—
suggests that something went wcong. Maybe I turned out the lights.
But "X pressed the button to call the lift" is neutral.
the uses of "he wants.." are far more 
varied, complicated and contentious than either "he believes.." or "he 
intends.." I shall restrict ayself to discussing the link between 
wanting something and trying to get it, or wanting to do something and 
trying to do it.
Both causal and dispositional accounts 
recognise and require a link between wanting to do something and doing 
it. They differ Wxwt the nature of the link, which must be st^ that 
someone may %*ant to do soa*ething and yet not do it. On either account 
the possibility can be allowed. But neither account really clarifies 
these cases. And yet it is here that we find "he wants.." making a 
unique and laiparanrturaseable contributi<m. It isn't just that there 
is no necessary connection between wanting and trying to get, or wanting 
to do and doing. Sometimes, it is even part of what is wanted, that 
the wanter should need to do nothing to bring about what is wanted.
The neglected wife may weat her husband to come home soon, and bring 
some present, such as a bottle of plonk. But she may well specifically 
want that this should happen without her trying to get it, arrange it, 
or bring it about. If she has to ask or pressure him to do these 
things, they have lost their point or meaning. Again, John's desire 
for a fortune might be satisfied by a long-lost uncle leaving him the 
money, without his having to lift a finger to acquire it. It may also 
be that this would not satisfy him. What he %#ants is not just a 
fortune, but to make his own fortune.
There is another kind of case. A man might 
want to go to Tahiti to paint. He is married, he has children and ishat 
he sees as an important job. He cannot even afford to visit Tahiti as
.127-
« tourist* So although he wants to go, he does not go, nor even try to 
go* We expect him to go, but only under some circumstances* And we 
are usually pretty unclear about just what the circumstances would be*
If he is offered a free ticket and a grant for a year to do it, we would 
probably take a refusal as evidence that he didn't want to go,not really*
But he might offer an explanation* He dare not give up his j^, his 
family might suffer* It is not that there are certain circumstances under 
%diich vre expect him to go* Rather, under certain circumstances, we expect 
him to explain why he doesn't go, if he dowi't* If this explanation is 
weak or not forthcosdng then we begin to take his not going as evidence 
that he does not want to go* We begin to suspect that there are no 
circumstances under which he would go, and that he doesn't want to go*
There is other behaviour that is evidence that 
%#e accept that he wants to go, and that is to be explained by his wanting 
to go* Reading and talking about Tahiti, learning to paint, buying maps 
and pictures, collecting timetables and so forth do not count as trying 
to get What he %#ants* But they are to be explained by reference to this 
particular want* Or think of the behaviour of a child vAo wants the pupçY 
in the window* Gasing at the puppy, tears and excitement can all be 
evidence that the child wants the puppy, but need not count as trying to 
get it*
Wanting something is connected only loosely with 
actually trying to get it* This is supported by considering what we vrould 
be prepared to say of the vrould-be painter %dien he is actually preparing 
to go to Tahiti* we can now say, not just that he wants to go, but that 
he intends to jn ha iiftinti %r He may have to go* It is "intends" 
that is the anre closely connected with actually preparing to go*
What is called dlsplacemsnt behaviour provides 
another range of cases %#here the connection between "%MOits and "tries to get"
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does not hold* Displacement tx^mviour is the term used to describe tdiat 
animal or person does when he/she cannot achieve what is vfanted* It is 
bWiavlow that relieves frustration* Thus a stay will "attack" a nearby 
tree Whan he dare not attack his mating rival*
Wants can be offered as explanations for things 
that are not actions or even events* We might, for example, explain 
Fred's belief that Pygmalion will win the 3*30 by pointing out that he 
very much wants that particular horse to %rin* We might «(plain John's 
restlessness and bad temper by seyii^ that he very much wanted to go to 
a concert this evening but could not get tickets* We might explain the 
fast pulse and sweating of an interviewee or an examinee by saying that 
he very much wmats the job, or to do well in the «lamination.
Cases of this lest kind might be used as grounds 
for claiming that wants are causes or that "wanting something" is a causal 
explanation at least in these cases* If explanation is causal in these 
cases, why should it not be causal in all cases? X shall discuss Fred's 
case later in connection %d.th belief and the will in chapter 9 of Part H *  
What I say about that case applies also to the other two* But the explan­
ation here turns on the subject's %«nts as well as on his beliefs* If 
belief is involved, the explanation cannot be purely causal* If "believes" 
%forks in the way I claim, than it cannot give causal explanations*
These examples show that the range of actions 
and non-actions to be explained by reference to wanting something is quite 
varied* These cases could not arise, much less be explained, without the 
terms "wants*"
There is one important use of "he wants***" where 
no failure of the link between wanting and doing is involved* Both "%«nts" 
and "intends" are essential if we are to be able to plan actions, decide 
%dhat to do in advance* For %#e could not draw conclusions about this, or
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rather we could not accept them, %«ithout ways of identifying actions that 
were not (yet) being performed. We could not design an dbject as a process 
separate from building it, without a way of representing the object when 
it dow not (yet) exist, and may never exist. We have blue-prints, 
diagrams, models. We could not reason about actions or plan them as 
distinct from performing them without a way of identifying actions that 
are rwst being performed and may never be performed, but yet are being 
(xmsidered for perforssnce.
This use and the use in the "Tahiti" case turn 
on "wanting to do A". But we can also speak of "wonting X" where X may 
be an object (a painting, or a pair of scissors) or a state of affairs.
It is usual in discussing wants to neglect the latter. It can be argued 
that "%#anting )C" really reduces to "wimting to do A" where doing A requires 
X. This is often so. I may %fant a pair of scissors to cut the string. So 
I %mnt to cut the string with a pair of scissors. But it is not always so. 
The case of the neglected wife show this* Someone may want a particular 
painting, to take another example. This could mean a lot of very different 
things that getting it or having it might consist in. Suppose he slaq)ly 
wants to o%m it* Oieiing something is not doing anything with it or to it*
He may simply want to o%m the picture, not to locde at it* He may not mind 
where it is hung or how it is cared for* Simply being the owmer may be 
enough* The fact that he does want it need never show until something 
threatens his o%mership* If he makes no effort to keep it even then, 
we have grounds for saying that he does not (really) want it. It may be 
objected that he wants to own the painting* That fits the case into the 
category of "wanting to do A" only verbally* Owilng something is not 
yet doing anything*
Perhaps this is an extreme case* But these cases 
do suggest that to speak of "%#anting X" need not be mere shorthand. This too
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would need explaining in an acceptable account of "he wants.*" It is not 
something that either a causal or a dispositional account can explain 
very readily.
It is tempting to try to go on to fill out these 
hints. But it is not possible to develop them in a satisfactory way without 
abandoning the subject of belief. And I have yet to discuss the role of 
"he believes" in the important context of our description of thinking.





1. The tradltio^l approach to belief
The traditional approach to belief does not 
involve discussion of the straightforward "executive actions" that X 
have been concerned with so far. It centres on problems about thinking.
In this second part, I shall examine the role 
of "believes" in our talk about thinking. I hope that it will become 
qpparent that traditional philosophers wmre not wrong to discuss belief 
in this context. H.H. Price in his I960 Gifford lectures, (published 
as "Belief" in 1969) is similarly sympathetic to the traditional approach.
In lecture 3 of series H  (pg. 299) he says:-
"The traditional Occurrence Analysis of belief was certainly mistaken 
when it described belief as an introspectible mental event or mental 
act. Nevertheless, the mental events or acts which its exponents refer 
to do occur, and they are relevant to the analysis of belief. Only, it 
is a mistake to say that these mental events or acts are beliefs or 
believings. X suggest, therefore, that %#e ou^it to be more indulgent 
to the traditional Occurrence Analysis than we are. If \m %*re %dlling 
to be very indulgent indeed, we might even say that its mistake was 
mainly a mistake of idiom......
"Hitherto, I have been emphasising the 
differences between the traditional Occurrence Analysis and the modem 
Bispoeitional Analysis, as if we had to choose between the two. The 
situation is not quite so bad as that. The differences are there, and 
if we do have to choose, we must prefer the Dispositional Analysis.
But still, up to a point, %#e may have it both ways."
In lecture 8 of series I, he gives what %#e may 
regard as an outline of the traditional views—
"Assenting to s proposition is of course something more than just enterw 
tsining it. But entertaining it is an essential precondition for assenting 
to it - or for rejecting it either, or for questioning it or for taking up 
any other smntal attitude about it. The 'priority* here involved is logical, 
not tesqporalt ..... The important point is that in assenting to it one must 
also be entertaining it, whether assent comes at once, as soon as the
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entertaining begins or only comes later %*en one has already been 
entertaining the proposition for some time."
Price is certainly aware of the difficulties in 
the traditional analysis, ^it he is burking the issue. We can certainly 
say of people that they are '«ttertaining the propositim that p." (p.203) 
And %#e can also say that they assent to, agree to or accept the proposition 
that p. There is no obvious reason why these facts cannot be accommodated 
in a Dispositional Analysis. But this does not isolate the fundamental 
points at issue. What do these mental acts consist in? Where do they take 
place? How do vre know about them? Does this pattern always happen? The 
two sides vdll give different ans%#ers; and it is here that the real dis- 
agreemsnt lies.
Price does not make it very clear Just %d%ere he 
stands on these issues. The first quotaticxi above leads us to suppose 
that Price has rejected Dualism. But the second raises doubts, since - 
presumably - Arice is expounding the view with some measure of approval.
There is a curious oscillation between the view 
that entertaining is logically prior, but not (necessarily) temporally 
prior, to assent and that it is temporally prior. In the next lecture 
(9, on p. 205) Price gives a description of the process of entertaining 
that indicates that entertaining a proposition must take time. But he 
does seem to accept that entertaining and assenting always happen. And 
that is a view which a dispositionalist must reject.
Nor is his rejection of introspection quite
whole-hearted. On p. 275 he refers to "introspective evidence".
"So if a person's hopes and fears throw some light on his beliefs, A's 
own introspective evidence is not, after all, quite irrelevant to the 
question 'Does A believe that p?' If we wish to answer that question 
vre may have to considmr what goes on in A's own inner life."
(Compare also what he says about the "inner life
on p. 295.)
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Th# fundaoMntal objections to the treditioneX* 
let epproach ere not just egeinet the vocebuXary of "entertelning" «id 
**amenting*** They are XeveXXed againmt the OuaXist theory of the mind 
which underXies the vocabulary* Price gives a fuXX and sympathetic 
account of the traditionaX idiom, but does not explain how it is to be 
separated from Dualism. This is not the pXace for a general discussion 
of the objections to Dualism# But it is appropriate to outline some of 
the more powerfuX objections to the Dualist account of montai acts and 
of "believes." One example of the attack is to be found in RyXe*s 
"The Concept of Mind." chapter XX.
The first objection to consider is that the 
relevant acts or actions are not like other actions in crucial respects.
Zt seems absurd to ask just when X mate this or Uiat judgement or how many 
judgements he mate before breakfast, whether he enjoyed it or was inter­
rupted and so forth. See pp.275, 280, 262 of "Concent of Mind." Similar 
points are mate against the notion of volitions on p. 63ff •
This is not in itself an objection. In everyday 
talk it makes perfectly good sense to ask %dien I came to soew conclusion, 
or to say that I realised that p just before Xunch. There is nothing 
wrong with saying that I convinced you of two things this morning or that 
there is one thing that I cannot accept in your article. Oeach concludes 
that although judgement-emking acts are *XooseXy* tied in time, they are 
nevertheless tied. (See p. XOS/6 of "Mental Acts.") In everyday usage, 
he is right.
The actual word "judge" or "judgement" is not 
common in everyday speech outside the law. We say "In my judgement this
is wrong" or "He judged the distance correctly. in this
to be an implied contrast judging the distance and measuring it
and my judgement that the thing is wrong and my demonstration or
-134-
proof that it is wrong. "Judge" end "judgement" in philosophical liter­
ature must be taken as portmanteau words covering "realise", "conclude", 
"decide" and so forth.
There is no objection to %#hat we say every day. 
There is an objection to a philosophical claim that all beliefs must arrive 
like dateable realisations and that beliefs must be acquired in order, like 
possessions, houses, etc. We often go through a process like the one that 
Price describes. The objection is to the claim that acquiring a belief
must al%#ays be like that; and to the claim that these stages do not happentKein^every-day %#orld, but in a separate, mantel world.
But the objection is still not made out. There 
are many actions that cannot be clearly located in time or space. Just 
when did X sit down? JUst where did X s%#itch on the light# How can I 
be interrupted in winning a race?
But in the case of executive actions, questions 
like these can be answered or rejected in the light of further specification 
end description in a given context. Xn the case of volitions any further 
specification end description is parasitic on and parallel to the spec­
ifications and description of the relevant executive actions. This and 
other considerations led Ryle correctly to the conclusion that "their 
existence is y t  asserted on empirical grounds."
Xn the everyday use of "judge", %#han these 
questions may be legitimate, the further specification is available. Ny 
realisation may be marked by my saying "Ahat" or snapping my fingers. But 
this is no help to the traditional theories. There may be no such mark.
Fked is driving along the road, towards a crossing with traffic lights.
The lights change to red, and he moves his foot from accelerator to brake 
and stops the car at the lights. He realised that the lights had changed 
and took appropriate action. Again, Fked may be turning into a road, and
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remllme a# ha comaa romd the comer that someone is crossing the road on 
foot. He takes no action since he also realises that the person crossing 
%dLll be off the road before he gets that far. Here the realisation is 
not separately marked. Indeed, if it is marked at all in the latter case, 
it is marked by his not doing anything.
Gne might claim that in these cases there is a 
mark of the realisation. And it is part of the anti-JXialist position that 
there must be something, «fiether actual or potential. The objection is to 
the claim that realising, concluding etc., must al%#ays be separable from 
the relevant actions. But the central point is that marks of this kind 
are beside the (philosophical) point. See caps 4 and 5, of Part ZZ.
Zn the philosophical use of **believe" or "judge", 
any further specification is parasitic on and parallel to acts of assertion - 
or sentences - or propositions - or facts - or ideas, concepts, etc. Beliefs 
and judgements are in an even weaker position than volitions. FOr at least 
in the case of volitions it is clear %diare we are to look for the further 
specification. But %#here are we to look for further specification or a 
belief or a judgement? Me could look to actions, or to "propositions" or 
sentences. These give different results. Each is isisatisfactory in 
different %mys. And there is little reason for choosing one over the others.
These mental acts are not empirically discovered, 
any more than volitions «fare. But the fundamental difficulty here is this. 
Zn the case of public actions, the further specification comes to saying 
what the actions consisted in# the difficulty with mental acts is that 
ttmn aMxasrs to be no reat^ answer to the question "What do mental acts 
consist in?"
Ryle goes on to object that ghostly acts of this 
kind do not even do the job that they Mere invented to do. Vblitions do 
not explain the difference between voluntary and involuntary acts (p. 66)#
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and they don't explain the difference between saying soemthing and 
making noises either. (See p. 278, 279.)
An objection that points particularly clearly 
in the direction of my own account %#as raised by G.E. Moore in ”Somm 
Main Problems of Phlloeophy." Here we are led to the conclusion that 
believing something cannot be a relation between the believer and some 
object - a proposition. This argument is to be found on p. 263 of Moore's 
book.
"It is an objection to the supposition that there are such things as 
propositions at all, and that belief consists merely in an attitude of 
mind to these supposed entities..... It is that if you consider idiat 
happens when a man entertains a false belief, it does not seem as if 
his belief consisted merely in his having a relation to some object 
which certainly It seems rather as if the thing he %#as believing, 
the object of his belief, %#ere just the fact which certainly is not - 
which certainly is not, because his belief is false... .. . ..........
"And though you may reply: «Yes there is
such a thing# there i^ the proposition that vm are now hearing that 
noise# this is %diat we conceive# and this most certainly jgj the 
only thing vAiich not is the fact idiich %#ould ^ e, if the proposition 
%<ere true* - though you may make this reply and may thus recur to the 
theory that there may be two different things having the sasw name, 
and that though only one of them Js in the present case, yet that 
one most undoubtedly is; yet surely this reply is not perfectly 
satisfactory. In merely making it, in distinguishing between the 
proposition which and the fact, having the sane name, %#hich you 
admit, in this case, JU not, you are surely conceiving both; you 
could not even say that the fact is not, without conceiving it. And 
hence the conclusion remains...."
(What Moore says here is surprising. For in 
this passage he concludes that there are no such things as propositions, 
tihile he is quite certain that there are such things on p. 56. In his 
introduction to the book, written in 1953, 43 years after he gave the 
lectures, Moore eaq;>lains that he was possibly using the %Kard "proposition"
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in two different senses* It seems to me that it may just be possible 
for him to say this# but I am not here concerned to dispute the move*)
His argument is making the point that there 
must be m of expressing a 'relation* between me and a «fact* which 
paradoxically not* And ««ithout a vocabulary of this sort, it would 
be impossible to have the conceptual network that we are concerned with 
here at all*
Bernard Itayo, in his article "Belief and
Constraint" (ffcoceedincts of thm Aristotelian Society. 1963/4,) presents
the following argument against the traditional approach
"It is, to begin %d.th, clearly necessary that any proposition %<hich 
someone is to believe Aould be, at least at some tine and in some 
guise, present to his consciousness; it must, as the jargon had it, 
be entertained* Mow a dilemma appears. Either the proposition is 
entertained without coamdtment to belief in its truth - i.e. is 
entertained as only possibly true - or it is entertained as true.
If the former, than the problem on our hands is how %#e advance from 
entertainment to belief# if the latter, this problem is merely idielved, 
for we still want to know what distinguishes entertaining as true - 
which is now just a rephrasal of 'believing' - from entertaining as 
mmwrely possibly true."
It is difficult to know just what to make of 
this argument. It does seam to make its destructive point. Yet there 
is something wrong with the question "How do we advance Arom or dist­
inguish «entertaining* and «believing*7" Bor this question locks as if 
it can be asked again whatever account we may give of belief. If so, 
the argument will prove too much# for it will prove that %#e cannot 
arrive at conclusions.
Is the argument valid against the traditional 
accowt? I think it is. In terms of the traditional account, I do not 
see how Mayo's dilemma can be sho%m to be false, or how his question is 
to be tuTMd. But I believe that sy account can allow an explanation of
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what is wrong with the question.
My last point against the traditional approach 
fastens on the notion of introspection. Traditional theories are consdtted 
to introspection: belief is, after all, a state of the believer's mind;
I discover what my states of mind are by introspection. This aspect of 
Dualist or traditional theories of the mind has been severely and rightly 
criticised. But even if there %#ere something that could be called intro­
spection of some mental states, it would not eoq^ lain how Z know %d%at Z 
believe. It would not explain it because I anmgar the questions vfwther p 
and whether I believe Wiat p in exactly the same %#ay, namely by consider­
ing whether p. For me, the questions whether p and whether I believe that 
p have the same answer. If I have decided that p, a separate process of 
trying to decide whether I believe that p is superfluous. It is difficult 
to see %diat such a process might consist in. From A's point of view, the 
question "Does A think that p?" is indistinguishable from the questions 
"Is it right to think that p?" and "Is it the case that p7" I have 
already discussed this point, in Part I, chapter 5. I argued there that 
believing that p and *p' could not be conceptually distinct states of 
affairs. The point about introspection follows from that, and so I shall 
not repeat the arguments here.
The traditional approach to belief will not do. 
We do cogitate, ponder, reject, accept, conclude, %#onder, suppose, hope, 
prove, fear, decide, realise, agree that .... Rfsn though we reject 
traditional accounts of these acts, we may still ask %dwit they consist 
in, and vfiether alternative accounts are satisfactory. In %#hat follo»#s,
I shall be concwmed to develop at least an outline account of mental 
acts, without relying on dualist theories of the mind. I shall try to 
show that my account of the logical role or point of "believes" is 
adequate for the context of our talk about thinking. And a similar
account of othar word# in th# mama vocabulary will aawurga*
Ryle davalops one plauaibl# account in a long 
maria# of article#, beginning %#ith Thinking and Lanauaoe**. These are 
umefully collected togeUwr in his Collected Paper#■ %#ith one or two 
eocception#* X shall start %iith them.
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2. Rvl* on Thiokinc
Ryle*# account consimt# of an approach to the 
problem and several these# about thinking in general and pondering in 
particular* He starts from the point that X have already mode, and relied 
on eateosively, in ay discussion of * executive action*. Descriptions of 
action are ordered in a hierarchy, and if we want to know what some 
action consists in, we are answered by being given the next lower»level 
descriptions of that action. Opening the bridge consists of cutting 
the tape and saying a few well-chosen words. Turning on the light consists 
of pressing the appropriate switch, and so forth. Ryle asks ”Vhet does 
thinking consist in?** and **What is the relationship between the history- 
description of thinking and the chronicle «description?" The early articles 
are not concerned only with thinking as pondering, wondering, or cogitating, 
but these cases of thinking move more to the foreground of his attention 
in the later articles.
The first claim to consider is made by Ryle in 
"Thinking and Lenouege". which %ms his contribution to a symposium held 
by the Aristotelian Society. Perhaps it is significant that this particular 
claim does not reappear in the later articles. Ryle was concerned to argue 
that tiiere can be thinking ««here there is no use of language, and to offer 
a possible explanation for the point that Iris Murdoch had argued In her 
contribution, that descriptions of thinking are "inherently metaphorical. " 
He argues that "thinking is a polymorphous viord." This means that thihking 
is to be compared to "working", and to "fighting, trading, playing, house­
keeping and faming."
"There is no general ans«#er to the question *%d«at does thinking consist of?* 
There are hoets of widely different sorts of toiling# and idlings, engaging
in any one of which is thinking."
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Ikmson, in "Polvaorphous Concept#." tries out 
various interpretations, end arrives at the following position t
"(1) For primary cases of thinking and working 
%#e can find necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the 
concept other than action content. This adequately explains why action 
content is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition.
"(ii) Cases where %«e are «filling to apply the 
concept, though the necessary and sufficient conditions for primary 
employment are not satisfied, are to be explained by similarity in 
content to typical cases of primary application of the concept. But 
these are cases of secondary thinking or ««orklng only for certain 
limited purposes and in certain contacts."
Earlier, he says, "Arimery thinking is any 
activity devoted to the ansvmring of a question or the solving of a 
problem, theoretical or practical." "Actiocw-content** seems to be at
least very like my * material elements of the action* - "Let us for
syntactical convenience, coin the expression * action-content* as
equivalent to *that of which the action consists.*" — he says early
in the article.
X do not thiidc this is right as it stands, nor 
that it really makes enough of Ryle*s idea. Xn the first place it is 
surely clear the "action-content" is rarely or never the necessary or 
sufficient condition of any description of actions; there are many 
descriptions of actions that do not d^end on any particular "action- 
content" for their truth. There are some mixed descriptions, that 
demand both formal and material elements to be present, instead of Just 
formal elements.
In the second place, X do not think that Urmson 
shows that those cases that he ««ants to regard as primary are so. Umson*s 
argument is:
"If X ««ere to start to speak to Ryle, mnd he said *Hang on a bit, X am 
thinking* it would be a bit upsetting if it later mwarged that he had 
been drifting in idle reverie from one topic to another, or going over
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(not, for example, trying to reconstruct) the fortunes of the heroine 
of a novel. Or ««hat should «#a think of y«e intelligence of a man «d«o 
rejected the view that thiidcing is as tiring as manual labour on the 
ground that reverie ««as minimally fatiguing? Do I comply ««ith the 
injunction 'Think before you act* if I daydream a little about my 
future actions before performing them? Should Benn*s Thinkers 
I^ jbrarx have included detective stories to be ruminated over by the 
evening fire? It seems to me that these cases of idly nmdnating 
over the real or imaginary are quite parallel to «4%at ««e call 
secondary cases of ««orking."
Each question is an implicit argument. But
there are replies.
<i) It is upsetting to go into a shop or a 
bar to buy something and to have to wait for attention, if it emerges 
that the assistants are idly gossiping or drinking tea. It is not (or 
should not be) upsetting if it emerges that they have been serving other 
people or coping ««ith an emergency. Whether one may expect isimedlate 
attention from someone else at soem time and in some context depends on 
«dkat one ««ants with them and what else they are doing. But ««e cannot 
argue from the case of the shop assistants that gossiping is a secondary 
case of talking.
(ii) Nor ««ould one have much time for the nwoi 
«4«o argued that knitting was less tiring than writing an article. JUst 
as there are different kinds of thinking, there are different kinds of 
manual labowr; some are more tiring than others.
(ill) Benn*s Thinker's Library (with which, 
unfortunately, I am not directly acquainted) does not include anything 
to be ruminated over. (Although ruminating over something might be an 
important part of coming to understand it, for some people, at least.) 
But the misunderstanding that Urmson is pointing to us like the mis­
understanding of someone ««ho, being asked to push a car, merely leans 
against it ««ithout trying to move it. He is pushing it, but not in the
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way Intended by the InetructioQ.
(iv) There la a similar point buried in the 
argument from "Think before you act." "Look before you leap" is not 
obeyed by someone who casts an idle glance, but by someone who carefully 
inspcKrts, before he leaps. But an idle glance is just as much a look as 
a careful inspection. Z cannot see %«hy %«e should not regard ruminating 
and day-dreaming as just as primary as pondering etc.
If there are no primary cases of thinking, and 
I cannot see that (Jkmson gives us any reason for supposing that there are,
I think that this interpretation of the suggestion that Udhking is 
'polymorphous* fails,
Ryle's second claim, which does recur throughout 
the series of articles, is that "thinking is an adverbial verb." Just what 
this means is not entirely clear. Ryle glosses the term as "not separately 
do-able" or "not autonomous." (See, for example "The Thinking of Thou^ts"). 
If it means that thinking cannot be a basic, direct, or lowest-level action, 
then we have not gained much; the same is true of very many actions. But 
the comparison that Ryle makes is with "hurrying." We can extract from this 
a useful point, and suggest a criterion for one concept of advsEbiality, 
«diich will throw light on some thinking at least.
One reason for saying that "hurrying" is an 
adverbial verb is that it stands on a special relation to an adverb, namely, 
"quickly." Now it is true that there are adverbs that stand in a special 
relation to "thinking" - namely "thoughtfully" "with care” "attentively" 
and so forth. But in the first place, this seems to be a merely gram­
matical feature of our language. We can always invent an adverb to stand 
in the appropriate relation to a given ver^. Many of the examples that 
Ryle considers do not actually have such an adverb in ordinary English.
So this is not the criterion that Ryle had in mind, anyway. We could
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always Invent a eultabl* adverb, by using *in a ... way* or *ln a ... 
manner.* But Ryle*# other examples are all indirect or non-basic actions, 
and X would distinguish them from "hurrying."
In "Thinking and Reflecting." Ryle says:
"It is sometimes said that «Aile thinking does Indeed need some vehicle 
or other, still see# philosophers are so stingy about the ntsober of 
eligible vehicles ^ t  they re?trictively say that thinking needs for 
its vehicles only bits of Ek^ glish or French etc. ...... What they
should do, it is suggested, is let in lots more kinds of vehicles,
...... I am rejecting this vehicle-passenger model altogether. AdvmAiml
verbs are not verbs for autonoanus doings and so not of autonomous doings 
which, like bicycling and strumming, need some apparatus or other. Hurry­
ing over breakfast does require eating, but not as its vehicle; rather, 
to put it crudely, as an adverb needs some suitable verb or other."
Ryle rightly rejects the idea that thinking 
needs "vehicles." But this seems to mean the idea that thinking needs 
instruments or apparatus. Ryle does not reject the idea that descript­
ions of thinking are hierarchically organised in the same %#ay as other 
descriptions of actions. So we may still say that thinking has constituents. 
Movements of wrist, eye or tongue, prickings of the ears are related to 
thinking in the same way as arm movements are related to signalling.
This may or may not be what Ryle intended. But it is difficult to see
what adverbs have got to do with this. We expect to find a distinction 
between "non-autonomous doings" and "adverbial verbs" and we do not get it.
One might try to distinguish a class of verbs that 
are adverbial by saying that adverbial verbs are not part of the hierarchy 
of descriptions, but rattier describe "the way in which the constituents 
are performed" as opposed to giving either the constituents of any action 
or giving the reasons for the constituents and so justifying a redescription. 
But this lArase will not do on its o«m. For example, one might argue that
to slope arms dbediently is to do so in a csortain way, and doing so in that
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%my is to obey an order. But, to slope am» dbedlontly is to slc^ arms 
because one has bean ordered to. we have no certain way of distinguishing 
"hurry" from "obey", and yet, I would think, %«e need to. "Obey" gives 
the reason for the performance of the constituent actions, and is in that 
respect like an indirect action, and unlike thinking, perhape. (Sometimes 
"obediently" is applied as a "true” adverb. There is a particular sheepish 
and reluctant way that people do things %Aen they are obeying an order they 
resent or that is especially unpleasant. )
The criterion that X suggest is this. Ccmsider 
a man who is running to the station, catching the train, going to work. 
Suppose that he is not exercising or trying to impress anyone, but that 
he is late and so is hurrying to the station. The hierarchy of descript­
ions builds up as "moving his legs", "running to the station", "catching 
the train", "going to %#ork." Each redescription is justified by appeal 
to the reasons for, or the point of, the lowmr-level description. Now, 
the description "hurrying" could be applied instead of the description 
"running." So the hierarchy could be given as "nsining/hurrying to the 
station", "catching the train", etc. But if, for example, he is running, 
not because he is late and wants to catch the train, but because he is 
exercising, the hierarchy builds up in a very different way. It becomes 
"running to the station", "exercising", "losing weight" etc. The 
description "hurrying" can be applied at vAatever stage it may be in the 
hierarchy without any consequential changes in descriptions that can be 
applied higher in the hierarchy. Ncn-adverbial verbs, like "exercising", 
if they cg)ply to mi action, do mean that descriptions higher in the hier^ 
archy must be different from vAat they would have bean if they had not 
bean aqf^ licable.
One might be inclined to object that this 
distinction - even if it is a real one - does not apply to "hurry."
— 146—
The nan running to the station is running, moving his legs in a certain 
way and at a certain speed, because he will not catch the train unless
he gets to the station more quickly than he would if he were to walk. So,
in this case, his hurrying consists of his running (material element) in
order to get to the station quickly (formal element). There is no need
to put "hurry" in a special class at all. But this will lead to the 
conclusion that "hurrying" consists of doing something or other. And 
I think that this is wrong. (But even if one could say that hurrying 
had constituents, it would not necessarily conflict with my suggestion.)
The reason that it seems to me wrong to say that 
hurrying has constituents is this. Redescribing an action is in general 
justified by, and amounts to giving, the point of the constituent actions. 
"Hurrying" is doing whatever it may be quickly, or perhape doing something 
in one ««ay rather than another because it takes less time to do it that 
wav. But the rate at which one carries out an action is not itself a 
constituent action amongst the others, any more than the ««eight of a 
car is a constituent part of the car. So putting on one's coat slowly 
or putting it on quickly may have the same constituents; but they ««ill 
be performed at different speeds. True, one may say tAat the man's 
running to the station (rather than walking) constitutes his hurrying. 
Here, "hurrying" does give a reason or a point. But it is a reason for 
choosing bet««een alternative ««ays of achieving the same end. It is a 
criterion of success over and above the main one - that of getting to the 
station.
Ryle mentions another reason for rejecting this 
conclusion. He says, "Hurrying over breakfast does require eating, but 
not as its vehicle; rather, to put it coarsely, as an adverb needs some 
suitable verb or other." One cannot just hurry, as one can just eat 
breakfast. But that is not yet a clear criterion. There are many other
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actions of which that much is true; any indirect, non-basic, action 
can be seen as satisfying that criterion. (Indeed, Sibley questions 
whether "think" does satisfy it; perhaps one can "just think.") It 
may be that Ryle's point here is the same as the point that I reached 
at the end of the last paragraph. "Hurrying" cannot be, or give, the 
only point, or, to be more cautious, the main point of an action. We 
may fit "hurrying" into the framework of formal and material elements; 
but the formal element implicit in "hurrying" must be a subsidiary or 
secondary one, parasitic on some other point or purpose. And this gives 
a second, non-linguistlc criterion for the distinction, and besides 
explains and justifies the drawing of the distinction at all.
If this is correct, then we can draw a 
reasonably clear and useful distinction between verbs that we may 
call adverbial, and verbs that we can describe as "autonomous doings."
We can say that "thinking" is an adverbial verb; anoC we can explain 
that this means that the various suggested vehicles, like tongue and 
eyeMsovements, or bits of Arench or English, are not constituents of 
thinking. For both of my criteria apply to thinking.
This claim is both true and interesting for 
some cases, but is not really adequate for the philosophically important 
cases, those involving what "le Penseur" is doing - i.e. meditating, 
ruminating, pondering. A tennis player ««ho is thinking ««hat ha is 
doing, is anticipating, supposing, calculating and so forth. Applying 
these descriptions to him does not presuppose that any actions have been 
performed which ««ere not constituent actions of the activity of playing 
tennis. His anticipations, suppositions, and calculations show themselves 
in the constituent actions that he performs, and in the "limitations and 
justifications" that govern his play, and in the way that he reacts to 
and adapts to the situation in ««hich he is. And this applies to all cases
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of "executive action." But Ryle considers carefully a whole range of 
cases that are rather different - although he does not explicitly 
recognise their differences. These are cases like those of "le Penseur" 
or Euclid finding the proof of a theorem and drawing figures in the sand, 
or a man composing a piece of music, «Aether sitting at a piano end 
playing or at a desk and scribbling, or a man designing a yacht, or 
writing an after-dinner speech or a lecture.
These cases are different in one iiqportsnt 
respect. But at the end of the day, it will be seen that their use is 
fundamentally the same as in the cases of executive action. The difference 
is that in these cases it seems that "thinking" is not applied as an 
adverbial verb in my sense. In these cases there are at least candidates 
for the role of constituents. Le Penseur's mutterings, Euclid's lines in 
the sand, t)w architect's arranging and rearranging his toy bricks, all 
have a point «Aich can be given as "««orklng out the problem," "trying 
out this design," "trying to formulate an idea." Doing any of these flings, 
is thinking. But there is no other point to the activities, as there is in 
the cases ««here "thinking" is applied as an adverbial verb, in the context 
of the performance of an executive action.
Describing a tennis player as thinking - as 
calculating, planning, anticipating - does not give the point of any of 
his constituent foot, arm or eye movements. The point of those is given 
in the hierarchy of descriptions that leads up to "playing tennis." The 
descriptions of "what the tennis player is doing", insofar as they describe 
him as thinking, must be seen as ««ays of giving the limitations and 
justifications of the various constituent actions. The vocabulary of 
thinking functions in ««ays related to the role that I have explained for 
"believes" in this context. My suggestion ««as that "believes" is a way of 
identifying the limitations and justificatif^ that explain the plan of the
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action* It Is the plan of the action that shows how the formal elements 
or the point of the action generates the material elements or constituents 
of the action. The special feature of "believes" Is that it allows for 
certain of the agent's mistakes. Other vxMrds *mve other special featur^w*
Thus, "he anticipated that the return would be a lob" indicates that the 
player has predicted and prepared for that particular return, that he hias 
got something right*
But if the same player is sitting down and planning 
his tactics for the match, with the aid of models, say, or talking or 
sketching, the case is very different. He is not now playing tennis; there 
are no actions that are or could be constituents of tennis going on* But 
his talking, sketching or model-moving can be described as "pondering", 
"deciding tactics", "planning the match" and so on. Although he is not 
playing tennis now, the point of «Aat he is doing has still to be explained 
by reference to tennis. The tennis involved lies in the future.
Some actions and activities may be done "thinking 
%Aat one is doing" or "not thinking what one is doing." Some actions and 
activities may be performed mechanically, by rote, out of habit. In other 
cases, if someone is performing that action, it follows that he is thinking. 
One can play tennis, drive a bus, switch on a light, dial a telefAone 
number, pick up one's umbrella, without thinking* One cannot plan, anticipate, 
ponder, ruminate, without thinking what one is doing. Or rather, to do these 
things to think. I suggest that this distinction coincides with the 
distinction between adverbial and non-odverbial uses of "think." Certainly 
the thiidcing of the tennis player cannot be interrupted, or easy or difficult; 
the case of the tcsinis player providw the clearest case for the classic 
arguments against theories of the traditional kind. But pondering, ruminating, 
working out etc. do not suit these arguments so %*11; these can be easy or 
difficult, take two hours, be interrupted and so forth.
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Ryle takes the idee that thinking is adverbial 
to apply to all cases of thinking* It seams, however, that he interprets 
"adverbial** in a mucA idLder sense than I do, comparing thinking not only 
with hurrying, but also with mimicking, demonstrating, and obeying*
(Sm , *0c — Mpl*. "«* «Mulciwi of I— In thta m o m  «•
say only that thinking is **not separately do-able,** and we may ask what 
the thinking consists in* This seems to amount to little more than a 
claim that thiidcing cannot be basic, direct action* Ryle may well be 
rigAt about this* The next stage is to consider whether he is right*
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. ^ 1 FsmnF:
Ryle use# the cases of la Penseur sitting, chin 
in hand, pondering, meditating, pmssling, contemplating etc* and Riclid, 
Arswing figures in the sand to arrive at a proof of a theorem, as his 
stock exemples of this kind of thinking* He develops two ideas Shout 
cases like these* One idea is that "thiidcing is author-optional,** and 
the other is that "thiidcing is intention-parasitic*" Perhaps the best 
and simplest way of describing these ideas is to quote Ryle* In 
'■thinkijKi ha sayat-
"Strolling across a golf course, »# see a lot of pairs and fours of 
golfers playing one hole after another in regular seqiMnee* But now 
we see a single golfer, with six golf balls in front of him, hitting 
each of them, one after the other, towards one and the same green* Me 
then goes and collects the balls, comas back to where he was before, 
end does it again* What is he doing? Me is not playing golf* Ha has 
no opponent I he does not putt the balls into the hole# he lays the 
balls by hand on to the turf from which he is going to hit them*
Obviously he is practising approach-shots* But what distingul shea a 
practice approach-shot from a real one? Several things* Negatively, 
he is not trying to %fin a match since there is no esitch* Nor in 
practising is he both making ^proach-ehots and doing something else 
as well* Positively, he performs each of his strokes as a piece 
self-training* Training for %Aat? Training for making approach- 
shots in matches to come* But he cannot be practising without, in some 
%«ey, having in mind the non-practice approach-shots of future live matches* 
The 'thick* description of what he is engaged in requires reference to his 
thoughts, in some sense, of future non^practice approach-shots* These are 
what it is for* His activity of practising approach-shots is parasitic on 
that of making match approech-ehots* There are two points about practice 
approech-shots that need to be brou0it out for future use:
"The first point is that the 'thick* description 
of them contains a reference to his having in mind wlll-be or mey-be match 
approach shots. He ««ill have practised in vain if his performance in these 
matches shows no improvement*
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"The second point is that the practice approach* 
shots are in some degree detached or disengaged from the conditions under 
%Aich match approach-shots have to be made* The prectiser can play from 
where he likes; he can hit ««ithout having to ««ait for his turn; he need 
not even have a green to play for; a tree stump in a field ««ould do; 
he need only have a mashle ««ith him. Indeed he might do witho%zt golf- 
balls and a mashie; dandelions and a walking stick migAt serve his turn.
As his cira,matanre ■ rtepenrtence and apparatus-depandcnce decrease, so his 
practice-actions approximate more and more closely to being pure 
'voluntaries', that is, things the doing of which is ««ithin his absolute 
initiative and option. I suggest already that his partial detachment 
from the circumstances and the apparatus of golf "matches points up the 
road to le Penseur's total or nearly total detachment from ««hat exists 
and is ^ing on around him#
"There are many activities other tAan practising 
which share ««ith it these two cardinal features of intention-parasitism 
and circimmtance-detachment..."
Later Ryle makes the suggestion that «diet la Penseur is doing consists 
of "intantion^parasitic" and "author optional" doings.
Tha claim that thinking is "author-optional" is 
explained by reference to "detacAment from the circumstances and apparat:» 
of golf matches" and it points to "detachment from what exists and ««hat 
is going on." At first sight, it seems that this comparison gives an 
interesting explanation of one feature of thinking. Le Penseur can carry 
out all sorts of the activities that ««e call thinking ««ithout any equipment, 
with his hands and feet tied, in any place, at any time. His ponderlngs, 
ruminations, plannings and examinings are all "««ithin his own absolute 
initiative and option." It is true that le Penseur is detached ftom «Aat 
exists and ««hat is going on around him in one sense. Ha can think about 
something that does not exist, and he can think about things ««ithout even 
knowing ««hether they exist or not. He can contemplate activities, events 
and objects that are not before his eyes, ««ithout performing them or 
observing them, and independently of his spatio-temporal relations to them.
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But he can be constrained. He may try to work out a problan or coayoee 
a lecture or piece of ausic, but prevented from doing so. Ha may be 
prevented by other thoughts that get in the way; he may be unable to 
concentrate on his task because he cannot help going over soma recent 
incident whether tra%matic or pleasing - perhaps something in his 
surroundings calls it to mind. But he may also be prevented by 
distraction from the outside world. Noise, discomfort and so on may 
get in the way. Ha may be prevented by the necessity of concentrating 
on something else he is doing. And all of this applies as %#all to the 
golfer.
There may also be thinking which le Penseur 
is uriable to pmrfom without equipment of one kind or another. The 
architect or designer may be unable to design his buildings without his 
model bricks, and the philosopher may be unable to compose his article 
«dthout paper and pen. Or it may be that while a good deal of the work 
can be done "in their heeds" they are unable to complete the task 
independently of tha "outside" world. One might reply that even though 
this may be true in practice, it is not true in principle. But whether 
that is so or not, it is difficult to sea any difference bet»m en the 
extant to «diich actions like moving one's finger is within one's own 
initiative and t^tion and thmam cases. Is emving one's finger "detached 
from circumstances, from what exists and what is going on around one?"
There is another interpretation of this idea. 
The point about practising seems to be that what is to count as pract­
ising is dependent on the intentions and purposes of the author, in a 
way that %Aat is to count as performing most actions is not. Whether 
an action of mine is to count as practising is very much up to me; but 
«Aether it is to count as making an approach-shot is not up to me. (Of 
course my intentions are one of the relevant consideratiens. ) So, the
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question «Aether or not some action is to count ss practising a golf- 
s««ing is settled by discovering whether or not the prectiser isproves, 
or at least intends by performing that action to isprove.
But his freedom is limited# Although he can 
practice in his office or ««ith a walking-stick and dandelions, ««e must 
surely expect that at some point he will practice ««ith golf cltd> and 
green. Surely, at some point his practising must consist of trying 
to make tha shot, play the piece or ««hatever. Second, ««e mi#A accept 
that someone «Ao ««as lopping the heads off dandelions was practising 
his golfHndngi but surely we could not say the same of a man who ««as 
««eight-lifting or pruning his roses ««ith secateurs - even if his golf
improved as a res»ilt, and that ««as his intention. Practising golf or
cm aJr
Bwiaming or a piece of music need not al««ays ba^a full-blooded performance,
gu.6 tJuit ttor at least be an attemqit to produce something that resembles the full- 
blooded performance. But of course the füll-blooded performance is not 
"author-optional," and neither is the question ««hether a given action 
resembles some full-blooded performance to be settled Just by appealing 
to the intentions of the agent.
Of course, Ryle does not claim W.ther that
thinking is the only author-optional activity, or that being author-
optional is not a matter of degree. He claims only that thinking is
highly euMior-optional. But there is a real question here ««hether ««e 
can order actions by the degree to which they are author-optional or 
cimmwitanre " ■«lependent in any significant way? One tiavious ««ay of 
doing this is to give soma ««ay of coimting the circumstances that an 
action is dependent on. Initially, one ««euld like to say that opening 
a bridge or taking an X-ray ««ere highly circumstance dependent, ««hile 
moving one's finger or talking to oneself were not. But it is difficult 
to believe that a criterion like this could be constructed.
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One eight reply thet #eure is no reel problem here. 
It is fairly clear «Aere %#a want to put actions on this scale, even if %#e 
cannot specify a hard criterion for doing so. And it seems clear that 
pondering as le Penseur is at one extreme.
Nevertheless there are snags that make it 
«saclear just %Aat the significance of these Judgements is. first, cases 
of thinking or pondering may be placed at different points along the 
scale. "Composing," for example, depends heavily on the conventions about 
musical writing and notation; so one might say ttiat in one ««ay it was 
highly circumstance-dependent. But then it does not require elaborate 
equipment in the way that taking an X-ray does; and so in another «my 
it is highly circumstance-incUqpendent. "Talking to oneself" is very 
like co#^ )Osiag in these respects. So it isn't clear «Aere "talking to 
oneself" is to be placed; and consequently not clear «Aere "pondering" 
is to be placed.
One miçAt try to distinguish between dependence 
on historical or social circumstances and dependence on physical circum­
stances. Thinking is in many cases dependent on historical or social 
circumstances. But since it is independent of physical circumstances,
«# can still maintain that it is highly author-optional. The architect 
may be dependent on his models, the scientist on his laboratory equipment. 
But this dependence is contingent, not necessary. Nor ««ill it do to object 
that talking requires the apparatus of tongue, lips end teeth. The ««ay in 
«Aicdi I use apparatus like cameras and spanners is very different from the 
««ay in «Aich I 'use' my tongue and lips; it is so different that I am 
reluctant even to grant that it really makes sense to say ^ «at I use them.
The architect or scientist may only be conting­
ently daq)endemt on their equipment; it is conceivable that they should 
not need it. But then so is the X-ray technician, the miner, the sailor.
—isl­
and the surveyor. Equally the athlete, the policeman and the pearl- 
diver do not need apparatus to perform their tasks# And although they 
are dependent on physical circumstances of one kind or another, le Penseur 
is dependent on them in the same way. There must be oxygen in the air, 
conditions must be tolerable, there must not be unreasonable distractions 
and so forth.
Ryle's point does have a value in the context 
of the traditional discussion. We can see different examples of thinking 
in a «dder context. But it does not help us to develop a positive account 
of thinking. Nor will we find much help in the notion of "intention- 
parasitism."
The idea that thinking is intention-parasitic 
also needs to be interpreted. For it is at least plausible, even if it 
is empty, to say that any action vihich is not a "basic" or "direct" action 
is IntentixMparasitic to some degree. Whether my arm and finger movements 
count as turning on the light or tapping the wall partly depends on my 
intention in making those movements. But there is a difference between 
this sense of intention-parasitic and the sense that Ryle has in mind.
The man «Ao is practising or rehearsing is not now performing tha action 
he intends to perform. (Z have already suggested in chapter 8 of Part I 
that allo«dng us to state this difference is one function of the ««ord 
"intends" in the languaç^.) I think that this distinction is reasonably 
clear, that it is «Aat Ryle intended (save the marki) and that it separates 
an interesting class of actions.
The suggestion looks like an answer, or at least 
the beginnings of an ans««er, to two problems about thiidcing. It offers 
an ansvier because it offers a way of identifying the "constituents" of 
thinking, and eaqplainlng the relationihlp between "thick" and "thin" 
descriptions of thinking. ("Thick" and "thin" are Ryle's graphic terms 
for them.)
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Qtie problem thet seems to be resolved is the 
problem about %«hat knowledge consists In, For le Penseur's thinking 
ends, as Euclid's does, in the acquisition of knowledge or understanding, 
knowledge and understanding are explained as consisting in the ability 
to do or to say certain things, or perhaps the ability to produce certain 
things, such as proofs, evidence, explwiations, lectures or articles.
The idea that pondering or ruminating is parasitic on the intention to 
produce the relevant things or perform the relevant activities then 
looks very appealing.
Another attraction of the suggestion is that 
the examples of thinking that seems to be intended by the traditional 
"entertaining" are set in the context of a ««ider range of exa^>les and 
can be seen to fit in. For other «camples that Ryle considers are clearly 
intention-parasitic. Composing a piece of music is parasitic on its being 
performed or parformablei designing a yacht or a memorial are parasitic 
on building it; writing an after^-dinaer-speech is parasitic on delivering 
it, and finding the right %«ord for a poem - well, that one is a bit more 
difficult to specify briefly. But all these are just as much examples of 
ttdnking as anything that Euclid or le Penseur may be doing. The difference 
is that they are not concerned to discover truth, nor consequently to 
entertain and accept propositions - except incidentally.
The following quotation from "The Thinking of
Thoughts" illustrates how Ryle talks about the relationship, and shows
how he has developed and systematiaed ideas that he first discusses in
•*The Concept of Mind." This cpiotation reminds one of pg. 273, for example*-
"... when ha (sc. le Penseur) has finished his explorations, he will then 
be able to march along some stretches of his old tracks, pacing this time 
not Interrogatively but didactically. He will then be able to pilot others 
along ««ays along «Aich no-one had piloted him and delete some of the queries 
that he had inscribed on his o»m, originally hypothetical, si^ pa-posts."
Later in the same article he offers a more rigorous parallel*-
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"As jumpdUig a stream in order to find out if it is jumpable is on a 
higher sophistication-level than jumping to get to the other side, so 
exploring is on a higher sophistication-level than piloting, which in 
its turn is on a higher sc^phistication-level than following a pilot's 
lead. Similarly, Euclid trying to find the proof of a new theorem is 
«forking on a higher aceomplislmmnt-level than Euclid trying to teach 
students his proof ««hen he has got it# and trying to teach it is a 
task on a higher accomplishment-level than that on «Aich his students 
are working in trying to amster it,"
Due care must be taken «dth terms like 
"sophistication-level" or "accomplishment-level", Far %le might have 
put his point by saying that exploring or discovering proofs are more 
basic than piloting or teaching and learning, on the ground that the 
exploring or discovering saist come first. But these are also concept­
ually dependent on the piloting or teaching and learning. And tha 
complexity of these relations marks the philosophically central cases 
out from the very simple case of jumping the stream «dth various 
different intentions. One cannot explain a proof that one has not 
yet got, or pilot someone along a route that has never been travelled 
before, or travel from A to B «dthout follc«dng a lead or instructions 
or directions of some kind. But one can jump across a stream in order 
to get to the other side «dthout it having been jumped to find out if 
it is junpàble. Zn the case of jumping the stream, there is only 
parasitism one ««ay. Ikit the more complex relations in the other cases 
mean that the ti#o kinds of activity are interdependent. So Euclid's 
teaching or explaining the proof is the point, or one point, of his 
pondering and trying to find it. So his pondering is parasitic on his 
intentions. But his teaching depends on his having pondered and found 
the proof (or leamt and understood it «Aen someone else has found it.) 
So his t««achlag is parasitic, though not intention-^mrasitic, on his 
pondering. So far, this is only a niggling point. But th^e are other 
doubts about this move.
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It isn*t just that w# Must rissihiir thst diffsrsnt 
kinds of dspsndsnce or parssitiSM may run both %#syse It lsn*t svem reslly 
clear that le Penseur's ponderlngs under et least some of the Interesting 
descriptions» are parasitic on anything at all. We say of a lecturer or 
writer that he is stating his problem» reminding the audience or reader 
of this or that pertinent fact» marshalling his arguments» describing 
his experiment» rejecting possibilities» suggesting a solution» warning 
of possible mistakes or misinterpretations, drawing his conclusion and 
proving his theory* Ha mey be examining a hypothesis here» analysing 
a crux there» referring to an authority elsewhere and so on. But all 
of these are things that we can quite naturally say that la Penseur is 
doing in his unorganised mutterings and head' scratehings alone in his 
study. The lecturmr addresses his audience» and le Penseur addresses 
himself. They each address themselves in the same ways» to what they 
are doing.
Now it may seem that I em ignoring a distinction 
that Ryle is specifically concerned to emphasise. He distinguishes between 
mq^laining or expounding a developed theory end %#crking out and formulating 
that theory. On pg. 273 of "Concept of Mind** he compares tha difference 
between these two to the difference between making a path and using it» 
and ha r^»eatedly emphasises similar differences» as for exemple in the 
passage quoted earlier from **The Thinking of Thowdits." His contention 
is that traditional accounts of 'the intellect' ignore this distinction 
and assimilate making a path to using it» expounding a proof to formulating 
it.
But X do not think that I em making this mistake. 
X em not coemitted to tha view that le Penseur and the lecturer do these 
things in the same ways» or indeed that either proceeds by any kind of 
series of syllogisms or truth-tables. Nor am I committed to tha idea
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that they both do all of the sfiae things* Zn pointing out that le Penseur 
may on occasion do soa» of the same things that the lecturer does, I am 
not committing myself to any particular account of mental acts.
A more fundasantal difficulty stems from tha 
account of knowledge end understanding that is involved. Any particular 
piece of knowledge or understanding mLg^t be relevant to any action or 
activity under some circusmtences or other. We cannot predict in advance 
what might be a reason for doing something. So «dmn Euclid is after a 
proof, or le Penseur after an idea, Uwir panderings might turn out to be 
parasitic on almost any action or activity. Moreover, Wmy need have no 
particular action or activity in mind whan they are pondmring. And in 
this, they will be unlike the smn practising approach-shots. He may not 
have any particular match or any particular shots in mind, but he will have 
the playing of approach-shots in matches in mind. It is even conceivable 
4hat he may not ever actually Intend to play golf for real. Still, the 
criterion of success in practising for him is the playing of approach- 
shots under match conditions, and in that sense at least, he must have 
them in mind. &it the parasitism of panderings where they are concerned 
with knowledge will be even weaker than this. For there is no formulable 
criterion of success for Euclid or le Penseur like the one for the golfer. 
Even their motive for pondering may refer to no actual or possible actions; 
it may be simply curiosity or bewilderment.
This is really a re-introduction of the earlier 
arguments against a behaviourist account of knowledge and belief. I have 
argued that it is wrong to see belief or knowledge as consisting in the 
ability or disposition to do things. Certainly, belief and knowledge 
are closely related to actions; but not as being dispositions or abilities, 
but as part of the conceptual apparatus involved in our practice of giving 
reasons for actions.
But these arguMQts are very far from conclusive. 
One might say ttiat the relationship betv*een knowledge or understanding 
«id sKpounding or explaining is closer than I have allowed. Certainly it 
is close, and one may grant that there is a specially close relationship 
between these terms and the relations «dth other actions or activities 
are less close. But even so, there is a difference between thinking ttet 
has the point of producing a lecture or article, an exposition or an 
explanation and thinking that has the point of answering a question or 
finding an explanation, writing a lecture or article is clearly parasitic 
on other acticxis or activities, on delivering the lecture or reading the 
article. But doing ^let may not be discovering anything; it may be slsply 
reporting something that was disccvered before the voriting began. So think­
ing out the answer to a problem in geometry or science or history and the 
like is not directly parasitic on expounding or explaining. There is another 
possibly distinct stage. Some pondering is directed not to%mrds disccvering 
new truths or proofs, but towards expressing or explaining old ones. That 
pondering is directly intention-parasitic.
It was not altogether cAtvIous that le Penseur was 
doing something like practising or rehearsing# He seemed to be rejecting 
argisents or weighing evidence for real, not practising for doing those 
things. But perha^ I have the analogy wrong. It should perhaps not be 
seen as like the relation between practising a golf-shot and playing it} 
for practising a golf-shot is not making it - yet. Perhaps it would be 
fairer to see the relation as like the relation between practising a 
piece of music mad performing it. For performing a piece of music is 
playing it, perhaps to an audience, and so is practising it, at least 
sometimes. The differences lie, not in what the musician does at the 
next lowest level of description but in the situation that he is in, in 
his intentions and in his reactions to a mistake.
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(To make the coeqparlaom closer, one should thiide 
of someone practising or rehearsing an improvisation, rather than a piece 
of music. % think one can r^iearse an improvisation - in a way. Le 
Penseur*s thoughts are not written for him in advance, in the way that 
the piece of music is written in advance for the musician by a ccmtposer).
But one crucial difference between the cases 
remains. The player*a practising can be assessed in all the tmys that 
a performance would be assessed. They must be, since the point of 
practising would be lost if they wmte not# the point of practising is 
to come to be dble to play, and so to perform, the piece. But it itfould 
be quite inappropriate to assess le Penseur's mutterings or scribblings 
as if they were a lecture or an article. They are not intended to be 
that, nor are they intended to become Umt.
A slightly different way of explaining 
"intention-parasitism" is to be found in "Thinking and Savina" - (Rice 
Uiiversity Studies, Vol. 58, no. 3). Ryle's points here are related to 
those that he makes in the other articles# but the aegAïasis is different, 
and the coeqparlaons are different. Ryle asks -
"... So what can be the heuristic use or point of the uncto^mtic things 
said by us in our discussion? What do we recognise as rendering this or 
that contribution to our discussion successful or unsuccessful? As we 
know, discussions do, sometimes, get Ismes settled or partly settled.
"My focal point is this. The things that A 
and B say to each other, together with their Arowns and sighs, their 
chuckles and hesitations, their grimacee, gestures and emphasis, may all 
or nearly all, be intended as exnerimmtal. i.e. be things said and done 
just in case they may elicit Areeh and even constructive responses, or 
flush old stagnancies away.
"And now, %4uit is for us of central importance, 
precisely the same can be true of things Umt the still baffled Pythagoras 
unconfidently mutters in solitude to himself or dubiously scrawls and 
reeerawlB to himaielf in the samd. These too can be heuristic experiments, 
moves made in the dark, in the faint but not foolish hope that they may
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prove to be self-proddings fonerd. Our question, 'With what heuristic 
intention?' can have for its correct answer, 'Zn order to try out 
whether or not it h w  eye-opening, nemory-f logging, or cramp-easing 
potencies.'...#...
"Thinking, then, can be saying-things- 
tantatively-to-cneself with the specific heuristic intention of trying, 
by saying them, to open one's eyes, to consolidate one's own grasp, or 
to get oneself out of a rut, etc. .........
"Consider for a moment what it is to do something 
eaqperiamntally. A boy expeclmantally turns a tap by turning the handle, 
and not by doing soemthing else as well. Yet it may be, though he 
successfully turns thm tap, his experiment is a failure, since a power 
cut prevents him from seeing \A%at happens when he turns the tap. Our 
adverb ' experimental ly * added not an extra action, but the specific 
inteintion-to<-find-out-what-happens-%d>an-the-tap-is-tum ed *......"
It does seem that Ryle here is accepting a very 
weak sense of "adverbial"# certainly "to experiment is not an adverbial 
verb in any sense. "Experimentally" 'adds' the intention-with-which the 
action is done# and justifies redescribing «bat the boy is doing as 
experimenting. The extra description gives the intentions of the boy.
So we know «bat his criteria of success are, and what his reasons for 
turning on the ti^ are.
(Failure as applied to experiments is aebiguous, 
of course. The experiment may be said to be a failure if it does not give 
the result that was planned or expected. But it may be a success even so, 
if the experimenter finds something out.)
Second, the case of the boy turning on the tap 
is rather different from that of Pythagoras. In a sense ^ley have the 
same intentions - to see «bat happens. But experimental turning on
of the tap is a success in one way if the boy does see what happens -
be«batever happens. In another way, it may only/successful if no «#ater 
comes out of the tap. But it is not the case that Pythagoras' experimmntal 
sayings are successful in the same «mys. It is not the case that Pythagoras'
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cBcparlBonts #re auccwsful haiwenm, #o long as ha finds out %dmt
happsBS* If nothing happens# if his eyas are not opened nor his memory 
jogged# they are failures* If his eyes are opened or his grasp consolid­
ated# they are successful* But there is more than that to it* Pythagoras 
is not interested in these results for their o%m sake# but only because# 
if his eyes are opened# he will find his proof*
Finally# and perhaps most important# in either 
case# there is no longer any close liidc with any future actions# that are 
not now being performed# but which the experimenter must have in mind* 
&q;)eriamnts are successful if they lead to discoveries or understanding*
Some examples of thinking do stand in a fairly 
clear and close relation^iip to actions* Sometimes le Penseur is thinking 
about# or thinking out a future action or a plan of action* Then %dvit le 
Penseur is doing is both related to and distinct from an action* This 
relationship, I suggest# can usefully be compared to the relationship 
bet»#aen a blue-print of a machine and the machine itself* I discussed 
this earlier in discussing executive actions* This relationship# and the 
iwpl led account of thinking# will work for many and varied exasqples# - 
Gunh as# planning a campaign# plotting a coup# sosm» stages of rehearsing 
a play or learning a piece of ausic and so for^*
Other examples of thinking are also related to 
actions# but in much more complicated ways* What the composer of a piece 
of music does is related to vihat the musicians do vdio practise and perform 
it* (But this case is a good deal more complicated than that# as I hope 
to show*)
Whan we consider the kind of thinking that I am 
chiefly concerned with# there is no firm clear relationship to any part­
icular actions* But there is a connection with doing things in general* 
There is a connectiom %iith expounding# demonstrating and teaching# «id
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with the indefinitely wide variety of actions that any particular item 
of knowledge or belief may be relevant to. But although there is a 
connection# there are many cases of thinking idiose point does not lie 
in any actions that may be connected. Itach of the thinking of academics# 
crossword pussle solvers# journalists# etc. is directed toward some future 
activities - expoisiding# demonstrating# teecdiing# explaining# clarifying# 
reporting# answering. These activities have criteria of success# which 
are indicated by what we call good# as in a good exposition. Ihjtt much 
of the thinking of Uwse people is concerned to satisfy only# or mainly# 
the criterion of truth.
There are some cases of thinking that involve 
the notion of truth especially closely. They are judged by asking of 
the results "Is it true?". This is not the only question that is 
appropriate# but it is a particularly is^ xxrtant one in these cases.
It is this connection with truth that marks them out am special# first 
because any connection with future actions is more remove than in other 
cases# and second because this connection gives them special philosophical 
interest.
Ryle*s reference to experiments and explorations 
re-introduce into his account this crucial notion of truth.
Ryle*s programme is fairly clear* So far I have 
done little more than explain %d%at it is and register some of the difficult­
ies that I find with his executian oi it. I turn now to a more searching 
examination of the programme itself. Although the prograsmm loc*s reesonoible 
enough and brings out some interesting and illuminating points# in the end 
the model that Ryle is using does not allow us to see thiiddng - and so 
belief - clearly. We must say at the least that the pyramid of descriptions 
is built up in a much more complicated way than Ryle brings to light. More 
strongly# we can claim that Ryle*s question "What are the constituents of 
thinking?" does not have an answer within the implied model.
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4» Constituents of thiiddLnq.
Sibley# in "Ryle on Thinking" commenta 
on Ryle*a programme am follows
"Ryle is quite explicit that the adverbially qualified activity can­
not itself be an activity of thinking; obviously so# or the adverbial 
account would have failed. ^Ihe notions of being pensive and having 
thoughts do not e3q;>lain# but need to be explained via# the notion of 
intelligently x-ing# %diere is not a verb of thinking** ("Thinking 
and Reflecting." Sibley's emphasis).
"On the whole# in the later articles# Ryle 
provides the right sort of examples. With the tennis player he gives 
Xmings like moving his feet# making eye and arm movements# and swing­
ing his racquet. With other activities# such as those of le Penseur# 
he mentions such inward doings as picturing numbers# saying words to 
oneself and manipulating imaginary chess-owm# together with such overt 
Xf-ings as writing numbers on paper# utterihg words aloud and manipula­
ting real chess-men. All these can be qualified both by thought- 
adverbs and also by adverbs like 'absently#' 'randomly#' and 'without 
attention.'"
m  principle# Sibley's comment seems to be 
a sensible one. He develops an objection to Ryle's account from it. 
But first there is one point to be made. Ihere is an ambiguity about 
the phrase "thought-adverbs. " Earlier# in chapter 2 of Part XI# I 
discussed the suggestion that "obey" %#as an adverbial verb. I claimed 
there that "<^ bey" and "obediently" were not really descriptions of the 
way in which an action is performed# but that they are applied in the 
light of the agmnt's reason for performing the action. But I admitted 
that sometimes "obediently" is a "true" adverb. So it is necessary to 
distinguish betwe«\ different u s m  in this case. The same is true of 
"thinking." "Thoughtfully" can be used to describe ways of pulling 
one's chin# walking or scratching one's head. But these actions are 
not# I think# candidates for the role of constituents of thinking.
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People do sometimes think without doing anything in this particular 
way# just as sometimes people obey orders but not in any particular 
manner.
Sibley critimes Ryle's account on the
grounds that there are examples that he does not consider# and which
do not fit his claim that thinking is not an activity.
"I^le concentrates on examples like the tmmis player and the Paaiseur. 
men thiidcing what they themselves are doing. He scarcely discusses# 
in terms of this theory# the thouç^tful listener at the philosophy 
lecture or the mathematical demonstration. The latter is certainly 
thinking# following the speaker's argument# monitoring# trying to 
accept or reject it as it occurs. But there seams to be no neutral 
X-ing that he need be doing at all# and hmace none to be adverbially 
qualified. All that has been shown positively# I believe# is that 
thinking and pondering are not in one sense activities."
That sense is the "process" sense of 
activities# in which the task of a weight-lifter in holding the %#eight 
still above his head is not an activity# since no change occurs while 
he is doing it.
I am not convinced that Sibley here really 
undermines Ryle's programme in any fundaswatal %#ay. Listening is not 
a thinking verb of the same kind as pondering or planning. One may 
listen to something without thinking about it# attentively or inattentively# 
or absent-mindedly. And although "listen carelessly" does not make
sense# "listen carefully" is not mere pleonasm. The thoughtful 
listener at a mathematics lecture may be thinking about what is being 
said# testing the arguments# drawing corollaries and so fdrth. But he 
may not be. And we can expect to find that his testing and extending 
of the arguments is done in just the same way while the lecture is going 
on as it would be after it is over* He may be talking to himself 
silently# scribbling notes# contemplating images# etc. He may not be
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doing any of these things. So one might claim that "listening" was 
itself a neutral and non-n«ital X-ing.
The listener may be simply monitoring 
what the lecturer is saying# simply trying to follow the argument.
And one might argue that "monitoring" or "following" are built in to 
"listening" in a way that "testing" is not* If someone is apparently 
listming# but does not respond at all to what he hears# either then 
or later# we have grounds for saying that he wasn't really listening 
or at least that he wasn't listening properly. And this may be 
enough to prevent it being a "neutral and non-oMoital X-ing."
Monitoring something is not a matter of 
doing anything in particular. It is a matter of being prepared to 
react (appropriately) to certain changes in the situation. A man 
who is monitoring something# like a man \A)o is guarding something# or 
waiting for something# may be doing almost anything else. The only 
restrictions are that whatever else he is doing should not interfere 
with his ability to perceive and react to the relevant changes.
There are no lower-level X-ings that belong specifically to monitorings# 
guardings or %#aitings. The hierarchy is not built up in the way that 
it is in cases like those of turning on the light or signalling for 
help. 30 we need not expect to find any constituents in the case of 
the monitoring listener* Following an argument is not like following 
a path or a leader. Following an argument is a matter of grasping its 
stages as they are presented and understanding it as a whole. But 
understanding something is not a matter of doing something. It is a 
matter of being able to do a wide variety of things on appropriate 
occasions. So I do not see that we can conclude that Ryle's programme 
is wrong from this case. Either listening is a neUtral X-ing# or what 
is special about listening is just «diat is special about monitoring#
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guarding or waiting*
But perhaps the most fundamental point# and 
one that has implications for both Sibley and Ryle# comes from my 
discussion of basic actions* For Sibley's comment is too simple# 
even if it is not wrong* For he claims that the autonomous X-ings 
cannot be either mental or positively non-mental* Not the former# 
because that would be circular# and not the latter because "Ryle's 
adverbs carax>t qualify physical processes like sweating ami twitching*" 
But a very similar dilemma occurs when vre discuss basic actions* For 
the constituent events of actions cannot be positively actions# since 
that would be circular; nor yet can they be positively not actions# 
since s%#eating or twitching cannot be intended in the required s«ise*
It is actions that are intended or unintended; movements are neither* 
That difficulty is resolved partly by saying that# since there was no 
role in our lives fbr a "purely neutral description"# there was not 
one* Yet it did seem that the description of action in terms of 
physical movements could be pressed into service in order to make the 
metaphysical point that the difference between actions and events did 
not lie in actions including or being caused by a non-physical event*
If that move is acceptable# we can say that 
Sibley's dilemma is a false one* A basic action may be said# for 
certain purposes# to consist in movements# muscle contractions# electro­
chemical processes and the like* So may allow "listening" to 
consist of physical states or processes# or# for that matter# their 
absence*
Sibley has not identified the fundamental 
objection. But thei% are serious difficulties about finding ag^n^riate 
"autonomous and neutral X-ings." I shall return to the problem*
P.T* Geach# in an article called "What do
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w* think with?" (in "God and the soul".) claims that thinking is a 
basic activity# He also argues that "the activity of thinking cannot 
be assigned a position in the physical time-series# " and consequently 
that "materialism" is false# It follows then that he would reject 
the idea that thinking (listening) might be said to consist of 
physical states or processes# There are very good reasons fbr 
treating this idea# and the notion "consist of###" with great caution#
3<*me of them have appeared# and others will appear in this thesis*
Geach says on p#34t-
",##It seems to me that thinking is a basic activity###.If anyone 
holds otherwise# it is up to him to give an account of thinking as a 
noiwbasic activity# I know of no such account that is remotely plausible# 
Perhaps someone might hold that in a given context to think certain 
thoughts is to have certain images# feelings# unspoken words# etc## 
passing through one's mind; but there are fairly obvious objections - 
in particular that on many occasions there seems to occur nothing of the 
sort that could be relevant#"
Geach is a little cavalier with his 
opposition here# I am not quite clear why the burden of proof falls 
on those who claim that thinking is a non-basic activity. Geach 
objects to the candidates that he mentions and that I have been discuss­
ing# But the most that could follow is that thinking is not always a 
non-basic activity. And that would be my own position. There are very 
many different cases, and there is no special reason to suppose that they 
are all alike. But what of these occasions vhmra nothing of the sort 
that could be relevant secaos to occur? we are not given an exaBq>le# so 
there is little direct evidence of what Geach has in mind# I cannot 
think of a clear case# The nearest I can get is this one. The 
contwider in a quis con^tition may pause before he answers the question# 
And he may not in that pause say anything to himself# have any images 
or lAatever# Whetdier or not he does, we may say that he paused in
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thought, that he was thinking or trying to rmsember the answer. Since 
nothing happened in the pause, we have some reason for rejecting these 
descriptions, save as façon de parler. It might be more accurate to 
say simply that he paused, and then answered. But the case is not 
obviously wrong, so it will serve. It still does not show that Geach 
is right. A diver any pause, stock-still, for a moment on the board 
before awJcing his chaaqpionship leap# It does not follow either that 
diving is a basic activity, or that preparing to dive is a basic 
activity.
There are grounds for suspecting that Geach 
has failed to bear in adnd a distinction that he clearly would accept# 
He argues both that thinking is an activity, on the grounds that it can 
absorb us, "%#e can throw ourselves into it %dx>leheartedly, that we can 
be distracted from or that can distract us from other things." He 
could have added that we can spend all morning at it, be interrupted 
and so forth. But he also argues that thinking cannot be assigned a 
definite position in the physical time series. Of course, oumy 
perfectly ordinary actions (and even some events - such as floods, 
storms, germination of seeds etc#) cannot be assigned a position that 
can be defined to any given limit of accuracy in the physical time- 
series. The paradox is resolved if we remember that "think** may be 
used in the same way as "believe." Not all thinking is an activity. 
And Geach shows that he recognizes this in his discussion of "under­
stand" and "mean." It is difficult to believe that he could have bean 
caught so simply. But he is not sufficiently explicit in his discuss­
ion for it to be quite clear that he has not#
This claim of Geach's represents one attempt 
to do without constituents of thinking# But it is important that we 
should find some or at least explain how we can do without# Attempts
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to do without them lead to very weak positions# Oeach's earlier 
book "Mental Acts** is vitiated by this lack, and Hampshire too falls 
foul of it in "Thought and Action. " The following quotation is from 
the latter bocdc, p# 163, 164#
"As my intention to act in a certain way is related to the overt act 
intended, so my belief at a particular moment that a statement is 
true is related to an affirmation of it# This relation can be 
rendered by representing the truncanted or arrested action, the 
momwtary intention or belif, as a disposition to act, or publicly 
to affirm, in a certain way. Unfortunately the word 'disposition* 
has bean used in too many different senses# The shadow-relation of 
mental act to full or genuine act can be better indicated by an 
analogy# Suppose a man is insulted* it may be said of him, 
metaphorically, that he 'looked daggers at his attacker' or that 'if 
looks could kill*, his look would have done so# His expression was 
that of a man killing or striking, but he did not kill or strike#
The real action was arrested and we saw only the shadow of it. One 
can suppose now that not only is the action inhibited, but the facial 
expression also; the man deliberately controls his face. Then the 
remainder is the mceital contmnt, the attitude or state of mind that 
constitutes the man's reaction to the insult# Similarly, having 
heard something said, I hold my tongue and 1 do not say 'No*, as X am 
inclined tot what remains is my disbelief in what is said# If I had 
never had the power of saying 'No*, and if I did not have the power of 
inhibiting my actions, it would never be right to attribute unexpressed 
beliefs to me#"
Of course, Hampshire is right to emphasize 
the connection between my ability to perform 'public* acts and my 
mental life# But he has not got the connection right at all# Mental 
acts, according to Hampshire, are to be found after all publicly 
observable features have been cut away. Actions do occur in attenuated 
form, as the Cheshire cat occurred in attenuated forms. But wh#m the 
Cheshire cat vanished, aixi all its observable features had disappeared, 
nobody said it was still there in any sense# But once the observable 
attack, or the observable denial has vanished, Hampshire tells us that
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there la still something there, namely the mental attack or the mental 
denial. Ghosts indeedi
The olMcùrity of this account is simply 
this. we are led to look for constituents of mental acts by the 
comparison of mental, private acts with public acts. But at the 
same time we are denied any chance of finding constituents by the fact 
that mental acts are private.
The essence of Geach* s account is presented
in the following quotations from pp* 79 and 80 of "Mental Acts"t-
"Gne of the most convincing analogy-theories of psychological concepts 
if the view that modes of description primarily applied to actual bits 
of %#ritt«i and spoken language are transferable to the role of 
describing the content of Judgements — that vdiich is judged. As I 
have remarked, in many languages the same oratio obliqua construction 
is used to report a man's words and to report his thoughts. But I 
would rather not appeal to this fact in my discussion of the 'interior 
language* analogy#..... The primary role of oratio recta is certainly
not psychological; it serves to report what somebody actually said or 
%orote. But oratio recta can be used metaphorically to report what 
somebody thought, 'said in his heart' (without, of course, implying 
that the thinker had the quoted words in his mind)* such constructions 
are frequent in the Authorised Version of the Bible* 'The fool hath 
said in his heart 'There is no God"* 'They said in their heart 'Let 
us destroy them together". Clearly we could always describe judge­
ments by using oratio recta in this way; oratio obliqua is logically 
superfloaus...... And here wa have a clear case of a linguistic
device whose psyAological application is logically secondary to its 
application to sensible things - bits of actual written and qpoken 
language."
What Geach says here is very attractive.
But I think that we must ask two questions. First, what is the point 
of this "linguistic device?" Why do %re need this transferred or 
analogical use? Second, in «diet respects is the transferred or analogical 
use stg>posed to be like the literal use? (Geach attacks the latter
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question in cap# 17, on the grounds that it is bound up with the 
•abstractionist* view of concept formation# But I think that my 
question does have an answer, ultimately, and that it is revealing# )
The difficulty that I want to raise is 
that the answer to the first question tells against our saying that 
the use is transferred or analogical# The answer that Geach 
suggests, and that we find also in Ryle (see below, on his article 
"A pumalinq element in the notion of thinking") is that the point is 
to "describe" or, better, to give the content of judgements# But 
the point of the primary use, that is oB oratio recta# is to "describe" 
or rather report, actual bits of written and spokwi language. The 
difficulty about the transferred use is just that no actual bits of 
language are being described or reported. Geach is saying that 
judging is like saying, only without the conmtituents. But if the 
point or role ^ e  two modes of description is different, and the 
constituents are different or simply absent, lAat analogy are we left 
with? Geach can be defended, but at some cost# And X shall return 
to him shortly. What is immediately important is the point that the 
lack of any natural constituwts for thinking, or for the oratio 
obliqua mode of descriptiw • (description of what?) - leaves a 
serious gap and a central obscurity in Geach's account.
It seems that any account that does not 
offer some constituents of thiidcing will be open to (Ejection on that 
score. There are, however arguments to the conclusion that we c«mot 
expect to find any. But in developing these, it is also possible to 
show what account we ought to give of the a&atter. In fact, this 
process amounts to developing and perhaps clarifying Wittgenstein's 
remark in "Philosophical Investigations" H. 217 that "Talking* 
(whether out loud or silently) and 'thinking* are not cone«>ts of the
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same kind; even though they are in closest connection#"
In my discussion of executive actions, I 
adopted a simple view constituents. The constituents, or material 
elements, of actions were given by the appropriate "lowez—level" 
descriptions, and the move to a "higher-level" description was justi­
fied mainly by reference to the purpose or point of the action - its 
formal eleawmt. Linguistic clues to the relationship were to be 
found in phrases like "He Y-ed, by X-ing" or "In Y-ing, he X-ed."
There are many phrases that express this relationship, or at least 
that express relationships of this kind. For example, there is "To 
X in circumstances A, is to Y" - where intending to Y, or "in order 
to Y" are permitted values for "A". Other phrases are "X-ing counts 
as Y-ing, if A," "Y-ing consists of X-ing, when A", "X-ing in order 
to Y, is Y-ing"or "Redescription of X-ing as Y-ing is justified by A," 
and so forth.
These linguistic forms can conceal 
important differences. For example, these forms fit the case of 
"hurrying" that I discussed earlier. But, as I argued then, the 
case of "hurrying" is sufficiently different for it to be reasonable 
to say that hurrying does not have constituents, at least not in the 
way that turning on the light does.
But there are autonomous and neutral x-ings
in the case of hurrying - the running, the movement of the legs and
arms and so forth, even if these are not to be called constituents.
And these autonomous and neutral x-ings enable ua to avoid metaphysical 
puzzles about ghostly existences, not only in the case of hurrying, but 
also in the case of the thinking involved in executive actions. The
puzzles are avoided by the account I have given of verbs like these in
our language.
But these notions, of "constituent" and of
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"adverblal verb," with their implied models, are too simple to provide 
an acceptable account of What thinking is in eases like those of la 
Penseur and of Euclid* There is a large and varied vocabulary 
involved here, and these models do apply to some cases* But the 
central role of some of the relevant vocabulary escapes these models, 
at least as they have been developed so far*
The linguistic forms I mentioned earlier 
do not apply in these cases* Le Penseur does not mutter in order to 
think; Euclid does not solve his problem in drawing figures in the 
sand, as in cutting the tape, he might have opened the bridge* Nor 
does the scientist, if he is aadced "How did you solve the equaticm?" 
say that he solved it by uttering certain words or making certain 
majdcs, as if they were an incantation* Pondering or solving equations 
might plausibly be said to have constituents; muttering to oneself, 
scribbling, dooding, wriggling in one's chair, pacing up and down or 
sitting still are examples of the kind of X-ings that Ryle has in mind* 
These candidates do not fit naturally into the linguistic forms. But 
this kind of vocabulary does not allow us to describe the course of le 
Penseur*s ponderings* To do that, we need a different vocabulary, in 
which we can describe le P«iseur as surveying the evidence, assessing 
a hypothesis, examining or weighing an argument, and accepting a 
ccmclusion* And the question what th<we things consist in is exactly 
the question that the traditional discussions started with.
Curiously enough, Ryle provides another 
argument to the same conclusion, and a first suggestion of another role 
for these words. The following quotation comes from "A Puzzling 
Element in the notion of Thirtcinq."
"To take a siaqple instance. A rowing enthusiast says that he had 
be«i thinking about the Oxford University crew; and if asked bluntly, 
would deny that he had at that momwit been thixricing about the Cambridge
-177-
crew. Yet It might transpire that his thought about the Oxford crew 
was, or included, the thought that, though it was progressing, it vras 
not progressing fast enough. 'Not fast enough for what?* %#e ask.
'Not fast enough to beat Cambridge next Saturday.* So he had been 
thinking about the Cambridge crew, only thinking about it in a sort 
of threshold way ..... Recounting one's thoughts is not like 
turning bade to an earlier page and trying to give an exhaustive 
inventory of the items onerediscovers there. The question whether 
or not the Cambridge crew had been in the rowing-enthusiast* s mind 
was not one he could settle by racking his brains to recollect a 
bygone fleeting something. In our example it was settled in quite 
a different way, namely by asking him what the rate of progress of the 
Oxford crew had seemed to him inadequate for. When he acknowledges 
that he had been, in a threshold way, thinking of the Cambridge crew, 
one thing he does not say is, *Ah, yes, your question reminds me that 
the Cambridge crew was in my thoughts after all#* He had not been 
reminded of a forgotten it«m but shown how his account of his thought 
had been an incomplete account. He had failed to indicate part of 
its internal tenor."
A closely related point emerges in the 
defence of Geach against my earlier attack. When we report "what 
people say," we are not Just describing or reporting actual bits of 
written and spoken language, but also reporting the content of thair 
judgements. And the transferred or analogical use consists in our 
using language for one of these purposes without the other. And, as 
a first move towards explaining what this amounts to, and towards 
explaining what justifies applying particular terms on particular 
occasions, we can refer to What I said earlier about actions. In the 
examples that Geach gives, the quoted s«itences are being used, (or 
are capable of being used) to explain what these people are doing, or 
explaining what <k>d is doing, or going to do to them. In short, these 
sentences give reasons for what people do. (Reporting what people 
said - the noises they made - is not obviously giving any reasons for 
what they do. )
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Now, the quotation from Ryle show# that there 
le a use of "entertain** in which it is wrong to say that entertaining 
propositions has constituents at all. Anothmr word that is also part 
of the traditional account of belitf is "accept
Price says:-
"Assent is the culmination as it were, of a process s we might almost 
say, the resolution of a kind of conflict."
But, of course, there are not any obvious 
candidates for the role of constituents of accepting. Wd might say 
that "accepting" is an achievement word, like "idnning." "Winning" 
not only explains the point of other activities, such as "running a 
race," "playing chess," etc. but also does not have any special 
constituents of its own. Winning a race dow not involve doing 
anything that one does not do at any other time in the race. In 
one sense of "doing something," it does not involve doing anything 
at all, since "winning" is not a process. One can say "has %#on" as 
soon as one can say "is %dLnning". "Is idLnning" may be an unhappy 
synonym for "is leading" or "should tdn with best play." But one 
cannot say "is in the middle of winning" at all.
Accepting a proposition is in some %#ays like 
"winning." We might say, as Ryle says of the not unrelated word "perceiving," 
in "Dilemwsff*' :-
"The point is that where winning is the scoring of an athletic success, 
perceiving is the scoring of an investigational gniccess." (pg. 109).
We may see accepting a proposition as a terminus, 
though not necessarily a successful terminus, to an invmitigation. Of 
course, we do not always investigate before accepting a proposition - it 
is odd even to say that perceiving is related to any kind of investigation. 
But the analogy may be a helpful one in avoiding certain kinds of mistake; 
for example, the mistake that Ryle is concerned to expose in "Dili
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But the analogy does not really take ua very 
far. "Winning" la fairly clearly defined in each of its contexts. The 
first man past the post has won (roughly) - and so on. And in that sense, 
winning does consist of something - though not a physiological or psy­
chological state. It consists of getting past the post first. But, so 
far as I can see, there need be no similar criteria for the accepting 
of a proposition. Mo words need be uttered, no actions performed or 
stopped, to justify us in saying that someone has accepted a proposition, 
at least in the v«ry wide sense of "accept" that is in question here.
What we have to lo<* to is, so to speak, the status of that particular 
proposition in %fhat the person says and does. A proposition that is 
merely entertained, in the traditional sense, %«ill not figure as true, 
but merely as possibly true. A proposition that has been accepted %rill 
figure as a true proposition in whatever the accepter says and/or does.
And that means, roughly, that a proposition that has been accepted may 
be a reason for saying or doing something. This change in status may be 
marked, but equally it may not be marked. One can mark one's acceptance 
of a proposition in many ways. The most formal or explicit way is to 
say "I accept that p." Simply saying "p", or grunting, are less formal 
%#ays of accepting a proposition.
To see that there does not have to be anything 
that marks the moment when the proposition is accepted, compare "taking 
control" - where this is taking control of an organization. This may be 
marked by some ceremony of handing over - and it often is. But when a 
new head takes control he may simply start to do those things vfhich his 
being in control entitles him to do, %d.thout any ceremony or event to mark 
when his control began. It may even be a gradual process, with the new 
man doing only some of the appropriate things, and gradually doing more 
and more of them until he is doing them all. So there need be no mark
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of the new status of a proposition; it may be that it simply starts 
occurring as a reas<xa for things done and said.
The similarity between "accepting a proposition" 
and "winning a race" may be explained by the fact that winning a race or 
a battle also involves a change of status of the person or side that has 
won. What the change is depends on what kind of victory it was. The 
difference is that, for most of the purposes that wm use "winning," it 
is important that the change should be marked.
accoaht"So there is my altemative/for "believes" and 
some of its cognates. There is no need to loc* for a hierarchy of 
descriptions of the kind that %«e find in other cases. It is tempting 
and not altogether unfair to say that my position is that the role of 
"believes" is to identify what the believer is treating as true, or to 
identify what has the status of being a truth in his thinkings and his 
doings. And one can immediately object that there is a difference between 
someone treating something as true and his believing it. It is quite 
possible to treat scmething as true without believing it. There is a 
move against the behaviourist account of belief that is reminiscent of 
this one; and my response is essentially the same. There the objection 
was that it is possible for someone to b«iave as if he believed that p 
without really believing it. This is what happens in cases of hypocrisy, 
for example. The reply there was that in such cases there %d.ll be occasions 
on vdiich the hypocrite reveals his beliefs, or on which he would reveal them. 
Similarly, the reply now is that if someone is merely treating p as true 
(for the sake of the argument, for example, ) there %d.ll be occasions %dien 
he would not be prepared to do so, if they arise, as %dwm he is asked to 
stake his life that p is true. But there is some force to the objection.
The two phrases "treat p as true" and "believe that p" are not equivalent. 
They mark a useful, and sometimes an important, distinction.
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If p is true, it can be a premiss in an argument 
vfhose conclusion will be torue, if the argument is valid. It can be a 
reason for or against doing something, an objection, a counter-example 
and so on. If p is false, it can sometimes fulfil these roles, but only 
by our using the device of supposing them to be true>Sometimes, people 
use a proposition in these ways, when the proposition is false. "Believes" 
allows us to describe what has happened without our contradicting ourselves. 
Thus it performs the same role here as it does in context of executive actions. 
There is no paraphrase of this. But th*m we do not need one, save for the 
convenience of philosophers. And for that purpose "treat p as true" or 
"having the status of a truth" may serve, provided %re remember the cautions.
It is worth returning to Bernard Mayo's dilemma,
I said that there was something wrcxig %d.th the quemtion "How do we advance 
from or distinguish 'entertaining* from *believing*7" I suggested that 
the dilemma was valid against the traditional account of these mental acts.
But in the everyday sense, the dilemma must be a nonsense; for w  do 
sometimes consider quMtions and then make up our minds about them. How?
Well, the only way in which this could be answered is by e%q>laining about 
argument, evidence and proof* This vdll not give one ans%w, but many 
answers, to the question. Different kinds of question are answered in 
different ways. Theories and conclusions are established by different 
techniques in different fields. It is because Mayo's dilemma seems to 
apply to this "everyday" question that it seems to prove too much.
But the dilemma has no force against my account.
"Haw do we distinguish entertaining p from believing it?" Does S rely on 
p in what he does? Does he use it as an objection? Does he draw conclusions 
from it, without caution or hesitation? Then vre have grounds for saying that 
he believes it* Does he try to find arguments with either p or not-p as a 
conclusion? Is p a supposition or a possibility for him? Than %#e have
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grounds for saying that he (merely) entertains it. "How do we advance 
from entertaining p to believing it?" One answer is this. Advancing 
from entertaining to believing is not like advancing from Paris to 
Brussels. It is more like advancing from corporal to sergeant, or from 
assistant to head. There may be a "%fay" in Wiich this kind of advancement 
happens or there may not. Another answer is this. The only way in vdiich 
we could undmrstand the questicsi is as a request for an explanation of 
the notions of argument, evidence and proof. And here there are many 
ansvrers to be given.
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5. Oblects of thought
Consider an example that, at first sight at least, 
seems to favour Ryle's account# On closer «camination, however, it turns 
out not to* This is the example of a man composing a piece of music# He 
is thinking, pondering or reflecting# He is composing a piece of music*
At another level, he is making marks on a piece of paper, sighing, groaning, 
scratching his head etc# His coaposing a piece of music, rather than his 
designing a yacht, drawing a picture or performing a mathematical calcul­
ation, lies in two points* First, that the marks he is making are notes - 
musical notes - and second that intends that thgwe notes should be played 
as a piece of music; so Ryle might say# What makes the marks he is making 
into notes, as opposed to letters or numbers, is the fact that the marks 
are part of a set of ccwventions vfhich enable them to function as in­
structions to musicians# So far, Ryle's account is perfectly adequate#
We say that a man %dio is writing down notes is cooposing, roughly because 
he is not copying the notes and not writing them down from memory, because, 
not only are they his own notes, but a piece of music. This amounts to 
saying that his reasons and intentions in making one mark rather than 
another are of a certain kind, and that his criteria of success are of a 
certain kind. And, of course, he is relying on an exceedingly cosplicated 
collectif practices and conventions and facts about the world, and 
about music, in ck>ing this. So composing is one exaaple of thinking, and 
composing consists sometimes (not necessarily always) of making marks on 
a piece of paper in accordance with certain rules and with certain intentions.
But on closer inspection this %d.ll not really do. 
The pyramid of descriptions involved here can plausibly be built on the 
description "witing notes." It caiuiot be built in the same way on "making 
marks," And the latter is the candidate for the next lowest level of 
description aft«r "writing notes." The two activities of making marks on
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a piece of paper and composing are of different kinds. They have distinct 
objects* The maker of marks on a piece of paper is concerned with paper, 
pen and ink. The cooq>oser is not interested in any of these things. The 
cosqposer's interest is in iK)tes, keys, chords, expression, themes, state­
ments, developments, recapitulations and the like. The question what 
these consist in does not have a straightforward answer* But they are not 
just marks on a piece of paper.
It is tempting to suggest that the composer's 
intentions, criteria of success and thoughts of future activities are 
%diat make the difference. But this will not do. What are these intentions 
exactly? Clearly he does intend that people should play those notes. Then 
the marks are orders or instructions. But orders or instructions to do 
what, exactly? If vre say "to play certain notes," we must then say what 
the notes consist in. And notes are not simply sounds, much less marks.
At least in much music a note is part of a complicated structure and is 
defined by its relation to other notes. Not just any sound can be fitted 
in to this structure. So a note is not just a sound, nor is it just part 
of a sound-system; it is part of a system of some sounds. We cannot say 
which sounds can and Wiich cannot be fitted in to the system without 
specifying the system. But specifying the system must involve introducing 
the learner to musical activities, and to some degree initiating him in to 
them.
We might say that the composer is instructing 
the musician to do something vdth his instrument - to place his fingers 
so, to press certain keys. But since he may well not know how to play the 
instrument, %re can say only that the instruction is to do "whatever will 
produce the note X." Understanding the relation between what the composer 
is now doing *md the future performance the piece is crucial to under­
standing that he is ccxaposing. But this relation does not allow us to give
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an appropriate neutral specificatlcm of the constituent activities.
It isn't only the ccxnpoier's intenti<xuK that we 
cannot give without referring to musical objects. How are we to say what 
his criteria of success are? For the question how well or ill he courses
has nothing - within limits - to do with the questicm how well or ill he
makes marks on a piece of paper. A skilled composer is not skilled at 
any specialised calligraphy} he need not be able to write down his music 
at all, or be able to sing well, or know all about the theory of music. 
Contrast cases like driving or playing football, where skill at performing 
the relevant constituent activities is relevant to success at driving or 
footballing.
We cannot even say that what the composer writes 
and what the musician plays are the same (notes or piece of music). The 
appropriate criteria of identity are carried by "note" and not by "mark"
or "sound". And, of course, it is essential to the point of what both
composer and musician do that %#hat the coeq>o8«r writes and what the 
musician!plays should be the same.
Composing does fit Ryle's account, in some ways; 
it is partly parasitic on the Intentions of the coaqposer. But the slsqple 
form of pyramiding descriptions that Ryle began with cannot cater for 
this example satisfactorily - even if we Include reference to future 
activities or actions that are not now being performed, and that vdll not 
be performed by the present agent.
The trouble here is closely related to the trouble 
that has been discussed earlier, as It was raised by Sibley. This amounts 
to the problem of finding the right kind of constituwts for the activiti«&. 
Describing a man as making marks on paper does not just leave out the point 
of tdiat he is doing, in the way required by the model of the hierarchy of 
descriptions. It suggests a %dx>lly different set of criteria of success
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and/or reasons for doing things, from those that are suggested when we 
describe him as voriting notes on a piece of paper, or as comq)Osing. The 
difference does not, of course, lie in any of his physical movements, 
but nor does it lie simply in his intentions, reasons and criteria of 
success* For these cannot be specified without reference to music and 
to musical objects such as notes, melodigM, themes, chords, modulations, 
cadmnces and so forth*
These problems arise in other cases of thinking 
too* Thsf arise when le Penseur is concerned not with themes or chords 
but with arguments or ideas# they even arise when the concern is with 
sentences, words or phrases; they certainly arise in the case of £kiclid*s 
worrying about figures car numbers.
The latter case provides another context in whirdi 
related points can be made. There are two points that make calculating 
special. One is, that the processes of calculation have a special status 
in relation to the answers that they prodwe. If the processes are correctly 
carried out, the correctness o£ the answer is logically guaranteed. And 
this is not true of other ways of finding answers. Consequently, it is 
perhaps most plausible to say that the thinking involved in calculating 
consists just of going through the steps of the calculation in the right 
sequence; one may sometimes find the answer in other ways, but this way 
is of central iuq;)ortance, because it defines vfiat correctness is. And this 
point applies also to proving in gweral in mathematics mad logic.
But this ag^oach runs into tlw same difficulty 
that I tried to bring out in the case of the cosq>o8er. There is not the 
same twqptatioa to regard the relevant marks or noises as instructions, 
or as gMsurasitic on any g>articular later actions. So perhag>s the ipoint is 
in some ways clearcur. In the case of a proof, each step is not just a 
series of marks on a gdLece of g>ag>er, but has its place as a reason in the
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argument* Each step is a justification for thm next, or part of the 
justification for some later step. In the case of a calculation, each 
step is a stage in working out what the answer is, and is part of the 
justification of the answer vdien it is reached* If we sisqply describe 
the mathematician as making marks on a piece of paper, we neglect this 
point, that those "marks" have a certain status or role vdthin the 
activity of proving, calculating or arguing. But one mark cannot be 
a reason for another mark. Moreover, the criteria of sameness and 
difference, (i.e. of identity) for marks are not the same as those for 
"numbers," "figures," "diagrams" or "symbols" and it is the latter that 
the mathematician is manipulating or operating upon.
Saying that "calculating" or "proving" consists 
of operations on marks may have a metaphysical point, as a denial that it 
consists of anything else. At least, vdthout the making of marks, neither 
calculations nor proofs can be carried out. But insisting on this obscures 
the crucially Important point that the steps and operations are related 
as reasons. If they are not so related, then w  have a case of doodling, 
not a case of calculating.
So %#e cannot give way to the temptation without 
at least saying a good deal more.
The difficulty about finding constituents of 
these activities is closely bound up %dLth the special nature of their 
objects. The difficulty springs from two sources, idiich have the 
ccmsequence that the objects of the activities are not logically indep- 
enctent of the activities. One is the criterion of success, or the point 
of the activity; and the other is the use or role of the objects. Either 
of these may make it iaq>ossible to give constituents of the objects, and 
so impossible to give constituents of the relevant activities. The 
objects that we may went to identify as constituents of the activities
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carry with them different criteria of success, and different criteria 
of identity, and may be bound with different activities.
This applies to the kind of case of thinking that we 
are centrally concerned %dLth. Prior starts his bock "Objects of Thought" 
thus:
"The phrase 'object of thought* may be used in two very different ways.
An object of thought may be (1) vihat we think, or (2) what wm think 
about; e.g. if we think that grass is green, (1) %dmt we think is that 
grass is green, and (2) What we think about is grass. 'Objects of thought' 
in the first sense are Ryle's 'accusatives of belief' ; they are sometimes 
called 'propositions', not in the sense of sentences, but in the sense of 
what sentences mean."
Outside philosophy seminars we do not often 
talk of propositions as the c^jects of thought - Prior's sense (1).
What petals think about in this sense is (or are) ideas, hypotheses, 
suggestions, theories, assumptions, results, observations, ccsKrlusions, 
reminders, evidence, arguments and so on and so forth. "Proposition" is 
a portmanteau word covering all of these. And here again, it is easy 
to see that if we regard these as sisq)ly smitences or sets of sgmtences, 
the point of the terms is lost. As I have said, to describe someone as 
having accepted a proposition is, in essence, to say that the relevant 
proposition will have a crertain status, or play a certain role in vdiat 
he does and says. But all of these terms for objects of thought attribute 
some status or other to the relevant propositions. One and the same 
proposition can be now an idea, now a suggestion, nor an assumption, 
now a conclusion, now evidence and so forth. But s«itences are not 
not fitted to this kind of transformation.
We can see in the arguments for ' abstractism' ( * )
(*) this term is used by Williamson in "Propositions end AbstractPropositions" to identify the view about propositions that he is c^ ppoeed to, that propositions are not sentences at all, but are some other kind of thing or object, namely an abstract thing or c^ject.
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what the point of the notlcvi of 'paroposition#* la, and the point of 
distinguishing them from sentences. Roughly, to talk abcntt "the 
proposition that the sun is hot" as opposed to the sentence "the sun is 
hot" is to show what my interest is vAen I say "The sun Is hot." If I 
talk about the proposition, then I am engaging in certain sorts of activity* 
What is distinctive sbcnit them roughly is that thm criterion of success Is 
truth* If I talk about sentences, then I am engaging in certain other 
kinds of activity, such e%s philology or literary criticism or crosswords, 
etc* etc* One might compare the situation in which the "same" (Aject was 
at one time a globe (model of the world) and at another a football* In 
that case, we would have a description of the object which %#ould be neutral 
between the descriptions that apply to it vihen it appears inf the contexts 
of these two activities; and that %wuld be, probably, "s;Aiere." And 
because we have that description, %#e could identify the object as the 
same in the two different contexts. But even the description "sphere"
Is not really independent of all activities. One pr<*lem that we face In 
the case of propositions as against sentences is that we have no such neutral 
description. For "sentence" Is related to the jobs of a compositor or 
grammarian or literary critic, for exan^les* "Proposition" is related 
to different activities such as arguing, inferring, deducing, discovering, 
proving etc* etc*, and to the attendant notions of truth, reason and 
meaning*
"Objects of thought" * that is, ideas, theories, 
conclusions, evidence, etc* * are assessed as absurd or reasonable, as 
exaggerated or accurate, as 111-concelved, well-founded, reliable, valid, 
surprising, relevant etc. Even If it is not clear whether we con say that 
sentences are true or false without absurdity, none of these other assess­
ments can be made of sentences* Sentences are open to assessment in very 
different ways, as long or short, as well-tumed, expressive, awkward arxS 
so forth} and do not assess ideas in those particular %#eys*
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In "Propositions and Abstract PropositloiMi."
Colwyn Williamson says:
"I should like to feel that it is obvious that a proposition Is a sentence*
A proposition is not 'expressed,* 'denoted,' or 'meant' by a swtence# it 
is a sentence* A proposition is a sentence in the sense in which an axe 
is a piece of metal attached to a length of wood* This is all there is to 
a proposition in the way in which this is all there is to an axe* And a 
proposition is not lust a sentence in the %#ay in which an axe is not just 
the metal and wood of vdtLch it is made* But to establish the substance 
of the proposition is merely a preliminary to the real task, which is to 
attain some clarity about what it is that makes a sentence a proposition*"
Williamson's task or question can fairly be 
described as finding or describing the formal element of the notion oi a 
proposition* "What is it that makes a sentence a proposition?" is parallel 
to "What is it that makes this %food and metal an axe?" And in some sense 
the answers to both questions are presumably to be found in the same way, 
by looking to the use or function of the sentence or the %#ood and metal.
And this leads to considering the activities and practices in which 
sentences (or wood and metal) are involved*
It is easy to see that a given object may be 
classified in one way rather than another at diffmrmit times* The same 
cbject may be now a cricket stump, now a bas^all bat, now a paperweight, 
now a boundary marker, depending on the use to which it is put* One object 
might be a globe, a football, or buoyancy in a boat* These changes are 
related to the different interests we have at different times, and the 
different activities that we go in for at different times* It would be 
neat and tidy if we could say that the relationship between propositions 
and sentences was like that* So that the parallel between "What makes this 
sentence a proposition?" and "What makes this bit of %#ood and metal an axe?" 
would lead to an answer to our question* But the parallel does not really 
go through* The criteria of identity do not overlap in the right way. Cne
•191*
axe may consist of a particular bit of wood and a particular bit of metal; 
it will not be the same axe as the axe that consists some other bits of 
wood end metal, or the one that is made of different kinds of metal (brcxise, 
ircm, steel, zinc) or even different materials (stone) and different kinds 
of wood or other matwial* But the sentence "x is smaller than y" seems 
to 'be* the very same proposition as "y is bigger than x” (and the 
translations into different languages).
A suitable piece of awtal can be described as 
a bit of an axe. But no collection of words can be described as a bit of 
a proposition} one may doubt whether a proposition can be said to have 
bits at all. While a sentence can be said to have bits} and a suitable 
collection of words can be described as a bit of a sentence.
At the same time, of course, if we are to go in 
for the relevant activities at all, there mist be some words or other that 
are closely related to the relevant propositions. The difficulties im^lved 
in separating propositions from sentences are very well known. See, for 
example, Colwyn Williasscm's acrticle, or "Sentences. Statements and 
Propositions" by E.J. Lemmon (in "Contemporary British Miilosophy" ed. 
Williams and Monteflore. )
We could try another analogy. An arrangeewmt 
objects does not consist of the collection of those objects; yet en 
arrangement mist be of some objects or other. We cannot say that the 
arrangement of the objects is some thing over and above the objects 
arranged. Without the objects, there can be no arrangement of them. So 
we might say that a proposition was an arrangement of words. And we could 
distinguish propositions and sentences by saying that the criterion for 
"same arrangement” was different in the two cases. But it is very odd to 
say that x is smaller than y" is the same arrangement of wxàm as "y is 
bigger thanx,” or to say that "I think, therefore I am" and "Cogito ergo
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sum" are the same arrangement of words. Even if the idea is still teaçting, 
we are left with the question what words consist in. We cannot say that 
they consist in arrangements of noises or of letters, for reasons similar 
to the reasons why we could not say that musical notes were marks.
Why can we not find any neutral description to 
complete the parallel with the sphere^globe/football case? The criteria 
of samaiess and difference for sentences are wholly irrelevant and tdiolly 
inappropriate to such activities as investigating analysing, proving or 
concluding. For the purpose of printer, proof-reader, and linguist and 
for some of the purposes of poets and authors gaierally, the criteria of 
identity inherent in the notion oi a sen twee are well adapted# But these 
criteria identity do not at all suit a translator, a scientist or a 
reporter. These men need different criteria of idwtity, of sameness 
and difference in the 'material* that they work on, namely those inherent 
in the notion of a prc^ Ktsition. In the case of the sphere/gl<^)e/football, 
the different criteria of identity are independent of each other; but 
they do overlap. The different criteria of identity do not overlap in 
the case of "proposition" and "sentence"; hence the tai^tation to 
'abstractism*•
A full explanatiw of this relation between 
propositions and sentences would take me too far afield for my present 
purposes. I am not altogether sure that I can give one that is really 
satisfactory. But it is clear both that the connection between sentences 
and propositions is close and that there is no simple analogy that will 
clarify it. Yet there may be a metaph^ical point to insisting that there 
is a relation and that a proposition is not an entity wtologically separate 
from sentences. I take it that this is what Williamson is after in saying 
that the "substaiyze" of a proposition is a sentence, and also part of Wiat 
Prior, for example, is after in saying that a proposition is a "logical
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constructlcm" * (see "Objects of Thought" chapter 1.) Abstractism, >
understood as a claim about the substance of propositions, does not hold 
up. But any account of the relationship between propositions, sentences 
and marks must take account of the role of the notion of proposition and, 
more important, of all the other notions for which 'proposition' is a 
portmanteau.
Ify suggestion here amounts to this. The notion 
of a proposition carried with it certain criteria of idoitity and ways of 
evaluation of what people say and do. It is 'constructed' as the object 
of certain activities * roughly, those which have truth as essential to 
their point. So what I have said is concttcned with such activities, my 
exclusion may be your hypothesis; your evidence may be my observation; 
vdiat is a reminder to you may be a suggestion to me. And we may describe 
the s^ae stretch of spectch or writing in these different ways.
The role of belief and of "believes" must be seen
W/lll fit . ,in this context. These concepts fét the function of identifying 
propositions vdiich have the status of being true in the believer's 
sayings and doings, without committing the speaker to an opinion of his 
own. Whiüe "knows" does commit the speaker, and "thinks" does as well, at 
least in some contacts.
Prior's sense (2) of 'object of thought' is the
sense in which "%*hat we think about is grass". The central problem about
this sense is %#ell stated on pg. 127 of "Objects of Thought".
".... For it just isn't easy to hold together the following two 
propositions :*
(1) that whw X thinks of Y, aims at Y, 
wŒTships Y, etc., there is always a Y Involved as well as an X.
(2) that in some cases, when X thinks of Y, 
etc., there is no Y there at all.
"Or at least it isn't easy to hold them together 
and at the same time to reject all of the following moves which might make 
them consistent:
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(a) that thinking of an unreal object is quite 
a different sort of activity from thinking of a real one.
(b) that in thinking of anything at all, we 
thereby put ourselves into a relation, not with that that thing, but 
only with an *Ldea* or what*have*you vAiich in favourable cases may 
'represent* a real thing but in unfavourable cases does not.
(c) that there are strong and %#eak kinds ef 
reality or being, swh that all objects of thought whatever possess at 
least the weak sort vdiile only a favoured sub*class possesses the strong 
sort."
My claim about belief (and the related vocabulary) 
is not just that move <b) is vcrong, as well as moves (a) and (c). Themm 
apparently incompatible propositions express a fundamental part of the 
logic of these words, and the task is to show that they are not incon^tible. 
X have tried to do this for "executive actions" by showing how a need for a 
word with the logical properties of "believes" is cwtral to the way in 
which we think and talk about then. 1 have also tried to show how the 
special "objects" of thought are dependent on thinking activities, and 
vice versa.
I hc^ that I have now said enough to make it 
clear that the traditional theory, in fastening on "entertain”, "accept", 
and "proposition", fastwed on notions that are central to "believes".
To make this vocabulary acceptable it is necessary to bring out clearly 
the role of these words in the language and to resolve the difficulty 
about finding constituents, or identifying the lowur-level description 
of these activities, by showing that the demand for them is not legitimate.
The mistakes in the traditional theory are in 
thinking that believing something must consist in a relaticm of the believer 
to something else, or that it was a state of the believwr. Moore spotted 
the first mistake; and I have already quoted his argument. But it is equally 
mistaken to think of belief as a state of the believer's mind; for that too
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deprives the word of its role in the language. If believing is a state 
of the believer's mind, we are again left without a way of carrying out 
the role that I assign to "believes". It is not that belief is a state 
related to a "fact" * or to a vfouid-be fact * but rather the point of 
"believes" is to identify those facts or would-be facts to which other 
states and actions of the believer are or would be related. The would-be 
relations may be the relation of being a reason for ... (or against ....) 
or it may be that the states or actions may aspire to the status of being 
true, or of discovering or producing scsoething true.
I am placing a lot of the weight of explanation 
here on the notion of truth. And cne may well ask vbether it can bear all 
that weight. But I am not committed to the view that truth is independent 
of these various activities; nor do I accept it. On the contrary, truth 
is cwceptually depenctent on these activities. Just as imisical criteria 
and objects are d^>endwt on musical activities. The position that I am 
committed to is that the relation is "hen-and-egg." Neither comes first; 
both must be grasped together. Musical criteria and musical objects cannot 
be explained without referaice to musical activities. But musical 
activities cannot be understood without some grasp of musical criteria 
and musical objects. Similarly the relevant thinking activities cannot 
be understood without some grasp of the objects of thought and the appropriate 
criteria of success - %bich essentially involve truth. Equally the criteria 
of success and the objects of thought cannot be explained without reference 
to the appropriate activities. We learn about these things by being 
initiated into them by others.
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6. Beli^ and reasons
In "Reason in Theory and Practice** Roy 
BdgeXey attributes to belief and "believes" a role that certainly 
seems incompatible with my account* In chap* 3/22 (pg* 89) he 
takes issue with Hampshire's claim that "I believe that p" is 
%#holly normative* He says#
"This would certainly explain how there can be no first*^>erson 
equivalent of 'it is wrong to think that p, but he thinks that p.*
But it would also undermine the view that I have be«n relying on, 
that 'believe' is essentially, in all of its uses, a descriptive 
psychological verb...#"
At its %#eakest, this phrase could mean 
no more than "a verb that is truly or falsely applied to people."
It is true that a sentence whose main verb is "believes" is true or 
false, if significant. But that is even compatible with Hampshire's 
view; at least prima facie it seems significant to say "It is true 
that I ought not to take this..." But Edgeley is committed to a 
stronger view than that. On pg. 92 he says:
".....having the concept of belief (like having the concept of pain) 
presupposes abilities and tendencies to express belief (pain). In
the case of belief, this ability is the ability to answer questions
of the fourth type (sc. 'Is it the case that p7')"
It isn't very clear %#hat relation is 
intended by "presvipposes"; so this isn't a straightforward disposi* 
tional account of belief. But then neither is it very clear Just 
what the account is#
In cap. 3.1, Edgeley refers to "what the
psychological conc^ts designate. " This seems to be yet stronger,
because it isn't obvious that dispositional terms do or could 
designate anything. (If they did, surely that would have to be an
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actual thing....) It would not be fair to build too much into an 
odd phrase or sentence. Edgeley is rather elusive on this point. 
Nonetheless a strong interpretation of "descriptive psychological 
verb** is indicated by what he says about the role of "believes" in 
the language.
Edgeley approaches the topic from a point 
of view that is different from mine. He is concerned %#ith practical 
reasons, with the bearing of reason <m bctions and with the relations 
between theoretical and practical reason. It is not possible to 
summarise, much less to criticise adequately, his careful and 
thorough bocWc here. I am not concerned here with his %#ider claims, 
but only with what he says about belief. I may be doing violence to 
the book by concentrating on one aspect of it out of its context.
But I do not think so.
In the following quotation, one role that 
he attributes to belief, and the reason why that role appears incom­
patible with ay account emerges clearly. The quotation is from p.
104 ff.
"But we can mark off the relation %#e are interested in by saying that 
in this relation the idea of a reason for is contrasted with the idea 
of a reason against. Now: what terms can this relation have? The 
first term is al%#ays a fact or something asserted to be true; that p, 
or the fact that p; these are in general the sorts of things that can 
be reasons...... A reason for something is anything that can be said in
its favour. But what items can %#e say things for in this way? What 
sorts of things can reasons be reasons for?...........even in the most
favoured case this term itself is in a different category from the 
first term: unlike the reason itself it is not that so-and-so........
The phrase 'the fact that p is a reason for....' can be coagjeted by
phrastics of many kinds: not only by verbal nouns of belief, such as
'thinking, holding, supposing, contending, denying, concluding, accept­
ing, rejecting, maintaining, claiming that q,' but also by verbal nouns 
of action.••.and....of feeling, emotion, attitude and mood...."
-198-
So thliking (believing) that p must be a 
distinct state of the believer. Thinking (believing) that p is in a 
different categery from the fact that p. For this piarpose it is in 
the same category as the other kinds of verbal noun that he mentl«is«
And if "being a reason for..." or "against..." is a relation, it 
seems natural to s\q^ x>se that it holds between distinct items.
There is one important point that Edgeley has 
got rig^t these. My problem is to show that what he has got right does 
not entail tdw conclusion that I want to reject, but that it is at least 
compatible with my account of belief. The relevant discussion is to be 
founl in chapter 3. Me compiles two lists - A and B.
A B
(1) «P* implies 'q' (1) The argument or inference from
tpt to *q* is valid, not 
invalid, sound, not unsound, 
eccmptable not unacceptable, a 
good, not a bad argument.
(2) If p then q (2) From the fact that p one can
(legitimately or correctly) 
argue, infer, deduce or con­
clude ^at q.
(3) *q' follows from p* (3) The fact that p is a
(conclusive) reason for think­
ing that q.
(5) It's right not wrong, correct 
not aiistaken to think that q, 
because p.
(6) It is inconsistent to think 
that p and at the same time 
think that not-q.
Edgeley says of these lists (pg. 50)i
"There are two questions: first are the items of List A distinguishable
from those of List B| and if so, second, is there any necessary 
connection between them? The prima facie answer to both of these
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questions is 'Yes.' List A contains truths of reason, some instances 
of which would be analytic, A#l, e.g., asserting that the logical 
relation of implication holds between tt#o propositiwis or propositional 
formulae# Xn contrast, List B is a list of appraisals^ %#hich contain 
both evaluative and psychological conc^ts, the evaluative concepts 
being used in the appraisal of what the psychological concepts designate, 
actual or possible arguments, inferences, deductions, conclusions or 
beliefs; under this interpretation, Bl, for instance, could be 
regarctod as a normative rule, a rule of inference. Yet between the 
items in these two lists, there seems to be a strong logical connection; 
if A 1-4, then B 1 and B 6, and if A 1-4, and it is the case that p 
(whether this is itself analytic, descriptive or evaluative), then B 2 - 
5. This prima facie answer gives a partial elucidation of the view 
that logical principles are 'Laws of Thought': they are not psycholo­
gical laws, but principles necessarily having a normative bearing on 
the psychological states of people."
The basic defence of Edgeley's point, to my 
mind, is this. We do argue, conclude, suipose and so forth. The 
criterion of success in these activities is conceptually linked to the 
notion of truth. One might say in summary that arguments are success­
ful if they enable us to reach true conclusions. But that neglects 
the distinction between truth and validity. It is som»e sort of success 
to establish a valid argument, evmi if its conclusion is false. But 
the notion of validity itself is conceptually linked to truth. A valid 
argument is one in which the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed 
provided that tiie premisses are true. The question of their truth has 
to be dealt with separately. The summary also neglects the point that 
reductio ad absurdum arguments, if they are successful, have false 
conclusions. But still, the point of constructing a reductio argument
is to establish a truth, or to demonstrate that something is false.roittonoLlThe point of arguing from the premiss that 2 has a^square root to the
StLuare. root ofabsurd inclusion is to demonstrate that^2 cannot be a rational number. 
So the summary is defensible, as a summary.
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Now, the links that Edgeley points out 
enable us to ensure that our argments will be successful* There is 
no point to argument that is not conducted in accordance with the 
rules in List B| or at least, there is no point to argument that may 
not be criticised by appeal to these standards*
Edgeley distinguishes two senses of
**reason." One is the relation of something's being a reason for
8(mething else; and this must be distdnguished from another sense*
"In the description of vdiich the word 'reason' occurs in a similar 
construction, as whai we say that something is a (or the) reason why 
something is so, e*g*, the fact that the pressure is low is the reason 
why the %mather is %ret« with respect tu> the second term of this 
relation a reason is purely explanatory, and the t%#o relations are 
different* As Hume in effect half-saw in his account of causality, 
the difference is not a disconnection and there is no ground for 
siq%x)sing that the word 'reason' is ambiguous between these two uses*** 
(p* 104)*
The connection is very close* For this 
sense of "reason** gmmerates rules* And these rules, (in which **reason** 
is used in the sense of **reas<m»for** ) are justified by reference to the 
explanations, (in %hich **reason** is used in the sense of **reason«Why*')*
If the fact that the pressure is low is the 
reason Why the weather is %#et, then the fact that the pressure is low is 
a reason for thinking that the weather is/will be wet* Also, the fact 
that the weather is wet is a reason for thirdcing that the pressure is 
low* (But the fact that the weather is wet is not the reason why the 
pressure is low* And that shows that there is a distinction here.)
When we use a case of the relation of **reason«why'* in argument in this
way, %#e call it ’•evidence*»*
In the case of analytic implications, there
is again a close connection with arguments and inferencec Given that
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John is a bachelor, wm are entitled to conclude that he is a male.
If anyone is a bachelor, he is male^ or iAeA "John is a bachelor" is 
inconsistent with "JOhn is male." The analytic statements are 
justified by the rules of language, by our practice. These same 
rules justify drawing conclusions and constructing arguments. Or 
rather, our drawing of conclusions and constructing of arguments in 
this way is the practice, or one of the practices, that the rules 
codify and the analytic statements exemplify.
So I am agreed with Edgeley that there is 
a very close connection between propositions of the kind in List A 
and those of the kind in List B, whether tlw^ are empirically or 
analytically true. I don't propo se to defend at length the claim 
that the connection is a logically necessary one. One reason for 
saying that it is is that wderstending the appraisals in list B is
an essential part of understanding the relevant propositions. And
that semss to be the view that Edgeley adopts.
Much of this account is perfectly right,
and it explains and elaborates what I have claimed about thinking*
But I disagree %d.th Edgeley's claim that "believes" is a "descriptive 
psychological verb," and I think that this can be shown on Edgeley's 
own terms. It certainly does not follow from what he says about the 
notion of a "reason-for* * * "
The first stage is to elaborate and justify 
my claim that the items in List B are parasitic on the items in List A* 
There are t%#o kihds of argument here; one turns on the "transparency" 
of belief* If the questicm "Is it the ease that p7" is the dominant 
question out of its gro^p of fbur, then surely the analogous questions 
and their answers in list A are dominant over the ans%#srs and questions 
in List B. Thus "Does 'p' ing>ly 'q'?" is dominant over "Is the
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argument from 'p* to 'q* valid?" First, the items on list A give 
grounds, reasons or backing for the ai^raisals in List B. Second, 
if Z am to follow the rules and apply them in my own thinking, the 
form that I must have to follow then must be the form in List A.
SxipposB *p* implies *q*. Then *p* Justifies my believing that q*
What am I to do in order to conform to this rule? Suppose that I 
know that p and that 'p* implies #q** Surely I can conclude that 
q from just these two items* I do not infer that the fact that p 
justifies the belief that q and then conclude that q. That step is 
unnecessary*
TO put the point in Edgeley's terms* If 
the rules that guide thinking justify beliefs, (mental states, ) then 
it is difficult to see how they could guide my thinking, since the
relevant mental states are 'transparent' to me* So the form that
refers to beliefs must be parasitic on the form that does not refer 
to them; that is. List A forms are dcxainant over List B forms*
But the radical objection is that if we 
follow through the idea that belief is a descriptive psychological 
term, the network described by Bdgeley will not %#ork* We need to 
find other ways of fulfilling the roles that Edgeley assigns to belief*
First, "believing that p" must - sometimes 
at least - be allowed to occupy the first place in the relation of 
"being a reason for***" Edgeley claims that the relation holds 
between 'facts' on the one hand and beliefs etc* on the other* But
also one belief may be said to be a reason for another* But this
generates paradoxes which cannot be resolved if we suppose that 
"believes" is a descriptive psychological verb*
First, consider sorites arguments* An 
argument of this form would be "If 'p' implies 'q', and 'q* implies
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*r»f then Implies *r*#" That version could occur in Edgeley's 
list A* But I do not see how it could be properly translated into 
a form aj^ propriate for List B. We can translate "*p* implies *q',* 
«•q* implies *r*," and "#p* iBplies *r*"| but we cannot translate 
the whole arguaent-fdrm# we can say **p is a good reason for 
thinking that q"% and "q is a good reason for thinking that r#"
But# in order to justify saying that **p is a good reason for thinking 
that r” we rmad some connectlcm between "thinking that q** and *q*. 
Edgeley says that these two items are items in different categories*
It is not easy to daiy that* They are distinct* Given that *p* 
is a good reason for thinking that q# we cure justified in believing 
that q# and so forth* But given what we have so far# we do not have 
what would justify us in believing that r; we do not have the item 
that is a good reason for thirdcing that r; we do not have *q*# or 
the fact that q*
The difficulty is resolved very singly and 
naturally if we allow that "thirdcing that q" is also a good reason for 
thinking that r# and that this follows from "the fact that q is a good 
reason for thinking that r***
The point may be clearer if I put it in this
way*
Say that *p* • the fact that p#
*qt « the fact that q#
•r* • the fact that r*
and *P* » thizdcing that p#
•Q* « thirdcing that q#
*R* - thinking that r#
From the argument form as given# we can derive **p is a good reason for 
Q" and **q is a good reason for R"* But wa cannot derive "p is a good
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reason for R"f which we need in order to arrive at the conclusion.
The reason why we cannot derive it is that we need to say **(p is a 
good reason for Q and q is a good reason for R) and that is a good 
reason for thinking that p is a good reason for R". But the 
difficulty is resolved if we can say that **Q is a good reason for R" 
follows from **q is a good reason for R."
This seems reasonable enough. Surely# 
if someone believes that p# believes that 'p* ii^lies *q* and 
believes that q# we would say that his believing that q was reason­
able# whether or not p was true, and whether or not p implied q#
We would say so sinply on the grounds that p was a good reason for 
thinking that q. No separate justification is needed for the belief 
that p.
Indeed# Bdgeley allows the derivation in 
these rules that I am arguing for. He says in 3.15# pg. 76:-
indeed# the normative implication of Ad) is simply a permission 
or licmce to infer# it may seem that contravention of cmy sort is 
impossible* But to the extent that A(l) implies A(4), B(l) implies 
B(6). Thus if Ad) is analytic# Bd) rules out# as inoonsistcmt# 
thinking that p and at the same time thinking that not-q| and therefore# 
more strongly# inferring *not-q* from #p*. A condition of the impli­
cation from Ad) to Bd) is thus that these things should be logically 
possible: i.e. that "A thinks that p and at the *tma time thinks that
not-q" and "A infers *not-q* from #p*" should not themselves be 
inconsistent statements.
"But a still further condition is necessary# 
a condition of the possibility not of contravening but of ocmforming 
to the principle B(l). For Bd) to license the inference from *p* to 
•q' it mnist be logically possible for such an inference to be imade# 
and ther^ore for somecme to believe that q because he believes that p* 
If *q' is a logical consequence# in a somewhat different sense# of his 
thinking that p."
And he eaplains that the different sense is
-205-
related to the notirni of "being committed to** as in "Thinking that p 
commits one to thinking that q."
One might now move to saying that the 
relation of **being a reason for#,." does not hold between a fact on 
one side and a belief on the otlwr# but between beliefs# But this 
runs foul of the two points# One is the point that I could not 
fbllow rules cast in this form# which is a consequence of the trans­
parency of belief# And the other is that a belief is not in general 
a good reason# and is never a conclusive reason# fOr conclusions of 
the ordinary empirical or logical sort that vie are considering here.
And why should it follow? If p is a 
conclusive reason for thinking that q# why should thinking that p be 
a reason at all for thinking that q? One could argue that it does not 
follow at all; since one may always be mistaken# the fact that one 
thinks that p can never be a conclusive reason fOr thinking that q#
we assuaie that p and the belief that p are 
conc^tually distinct states# and that *p* and 'he believes that p' 
are both descriptive# but descriptive of different things# We find 
a crucial conceptual connecti<m between these items but have no way of 
explaining or justifying it#
But on my account there is no problem# On 
my account "believes" is simply a way of saying What is being treated 
as true by the believer# vdthout committing the speaker to a view#
It is this that allows the notion of a mistake# or a difference of 
opinion# So there is a close conc^tual connection between p' and 
the belief that p# and it is simply the result of the logical role of 
"believes" in the language# But that role# and that connection is not 
compatible with "believes" being a descriptive psychological verb if we 
are to understand the phrase in a strcxng sense#
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On my account "believes that •••** will be 
true or false whether it is first or third peracm# And in that s«nse 
"believes" is a descriptive verb. But since its role is to identify 
the status something has# it does not follow that it is descriptive 
in the stronger swse that it "designates" anything.
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7# Belief and evaluation.
According to Bdgeley, there is a more basic 
mode of appraising "vAat psychological ccmc^ts designate" than the 
one that I have been considering. It is by reference to 'the facts'. 
The belief that p is favourably appraised if p# and unfavourably 
appraised if not-p. Professor Mayo in "Belief and Constraint" 
argues for a different c<xmection between belief and evaluation as 
true or false. In this section I shall consider both these doctrines.
I want to criticise the idea that there is 
a close connection between belief and evaluation though I shall not 
reject it entirely. But if belief is a distinct object of evaluation 
in its own right# then it will be tempting to conclude that it is a 
distinct state in its own right. I wwt to show that any apparmit 
evaluation of beliefs is parasitic on evaluation of other things# 
though not parasitic in any simple way on assertions.
The claim that belief is essentially 
evaluative# or that its role in evaluations is a central part of the 
role of "believes" in our language may be compared to the similar claim 
for "wants" and "intends." If such a claim was made for "vrants" and 
"intends"# few people would feel that anything like enough had been 
said. And it might be objected that where we seem to be evaluating 
wants or intentions# we are really expressing an evaluation of some- 
thing else# whether an action or a character trait. This line would 
be particularly tsspting to someone %dv> held a dispositiwal account 
of wants. Such a line would need to be properly defended; but it is 
parallel to my line of objection to the claim that "believes" is an 
evaluative word#
There are also differences between the two
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cases# some of which emerge in the coapllcatlons involved in talking 
about a favourable evaluation in the case of belief* It isn't clear 
that this is an appropriate phrase; or# if it is# its appropriate­
ness is certainly not self-evident*
awe may try to save AB in two ways. There 
is an obscurity about "right" and "wrong" here* Edgeley tries to 
remove it by putting "correct" and "mistaken" after them in his state­
ment of the principle* It may be right to follow the evidence of the 
argument* But that does not guarantee that U»e conclusions are 
correct# or true* So we should contrast "right" and "correct" here*
It is right to believe that p if the evidence is in favour of it# and 
wrong if it is not* But it is only correct to believe that p if p 
is the case* I tm not sure but that "correct" does not itself have 
the same ambiguity that Edgeley is trying to remove* But it is clear 
what he is trying to say#
eut this is not really a way out* On this 
interpretation# AB means only that the belief that p is true if p is 
true. Nc^ body would mnt to contest that# but AB appears to have lost 
its evaluative force* The question "What is wrong with having 
incorrect beliefs?" seems little different from the question "What is 
wrong with believing inconsistent things?" So AB cannot do what 
Bdgeley would like it to do*
we might try to save AB in another way.
Where the evidence is in favour of p# but p is not the case# it must 
be true that there is or could be more evidmnce against p* If we 
interpret "evidence" in the widest possible sense# this will be logically 
true* tdMsre someone was justified in believing that p# but p is not 
true# there must have been some reasons that would have shown that the 
belief was not really justified at all. It is only the whole of the 
A-8 vS U v t/o c U tc c d  CY\ ^ - 8 h  oi  *R€a.sc?v> tw I Ineofy  I t
r w Lt^t F) a*ul ^iraluofvOH.
p, (rKên it vS %rîak(r to  dtujt p  ^OjxcL to tKtwkrkeitr rof-jS."
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evidence that justifies the belief that p; a part of the evidence 
does not justify the belief at all. But the whole of the possible 
evidence is rarely or never available. This requireswnt is far too 
restrictive. Whether or not a belief is justified can only be 
decided in relation to the evidence that is reasonably available at 
the time.
The conclusion that beliefs are right or 
wrong# justified or otherwise# %diether or not they are true# cannot 
be avoided. So evaluation of them is independent of the relevant 
truths# It seems to follow that their existence must also be 
independent of the relevant truths.
But this is too short a way with Edgeley's 
principle AB. No amount of evidence can guarantee the truth of a 
conclusion. this is clearly true when the evidence is empirically 
related to the conclusion. But it is also true in very many cases 
where the arguments are not empirical. For it is always# or at 
least very often# possible that we have made a mistake in constructing 
the proof or working out the answer. this may be what Bdgeley has in 
mind %ihen he distinguishes two ways of evaluating beliefs. One is in 
the light of the evidence and/or the argummts. But whatever the 
results of this evaluation# the belief may still be true or false. 9o 
there is another way of evaluating# in the light of the facts# to put 
it crudely. This may be the point of formulating AB.
If this is to tx>rk# "evidence" will have to 
be interpreted narrowly and contrasted with conclusive demonstration. 
Compare Austin's remarks on this in "Other Minds."
The real difficulty is that there are not 
two distinct ways of evalxiating here. It is misleading to suggest 
that there must be a clearly distinct way of evaluating a conclusion
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apart from aasassing the evidence* The point is siaqply that it is 
nearly always conceivable that a given conclusion may need to be 
re-evaluated# The distinctions that Austin discusses are very 
different from this. Austin is discussing cases where it is mis­
leading to speak of producing (more) evidence# and where the claim 
is justified by appeal to a skill or ability. Edgeley's way of 
putting it suggests that there is some conclusive way of deciding 
on truth or falsity. If there is# why do we bother with, fallible 
evidiHice and deceptive arguments?
AB is not acceptable. But the connection 
between evidence# reasons and truth is central to them. The notions 
of evidence and of a reasw for or against a conclusion have built in 
to them criteria of evaluation (of evidence and of reasons.) FOr 
example# if the evidence misleads us# so that we draw a false 
conclusion# it is bad evidence to the extwt that the conclusions are 
false or unreliable. And by reference to this# we select what is to 
count as a reason and vdiat it is to count as a reason for or against.
Thus# the air pressure's being low is 
evidence that it will rain. This is true in virtue of the causal 
relation between low pressure and rain# But there is no reason Why 
this causal relation should be thought to have anything to do with any 
states of people. Again, it follows from "John is a bachelor" that 
he is a male (if it is true that he is a bachelor# of course.) And 
this is true in virtue of a rule of language. And we have no reason 
to mention mental states in describing this situation either.
Beliefs become necessary when we realise 
that evidence may not be 'all of a piece*. Different bits of evidence 
may point in different directions and soeietimes all the available 
evidence may point in the wrong direction# as we discover after the
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argvnent. Only now does it become necessary to have some way of 
allowing us to say what the evidence is evidence for without thereby 
committing us to the claim that what it is evidence for is the case*
In short, here again we find precisely the same pressure that I 
identified in thecase of eoMCutive actions. we need a way of 
identifying p's and q’s without committing ourselves to them.
"Believes" is one such way. But there 
are many others. One special complication of the notion of belief 
is this. Unlike the notion of a "proposition" (and others),
"believes" (and others) refer to a person. "Proposition" and its 
family are inpersonal; "believes" and its family are not. But we 
can show clearly in this context a rationale for having these two 
different kinds of word in the language. Not only do we need a way 
of identifying p's and q's without committing ourselves to them.
We also need a way of describing how someone is using then without 
ourselves using them. we can cater for failures of the evidence 
with the words "proposition","conclusion" etc. The pressure's being 
low is evidence for the proposition that it will rain. But we cannot 
cater for people's errors and misjudgements in this way. Fred may 
conclude that it will rain because of the ache in his joints - which 
past experience has shown to be unreliable. John may argue correctly 
that high winds mean rain, and predict rain on these grounds; but the 
wind is not high. we cannot describe ttwsse situations without using 
"believes."
The criticisms of AB do not undermine my 
account of belief, and do not show that it was wrong to claim a close 
connection between List A and List B. In fact, my account enables us 
to make sense of the facts.
There is one trap that Bdgeley does not fall 
into. A.P. Griffiths did, in his article "On Belief." (Proceedings
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of the Aristotelian Society 1962/63.) If belief is to play a role
in evaluation, in norms, rules etc., then it is empty to identify it
siuply as "that Which Is appropriate to truth", eod^  allows that "to
say this is not to say what belief is." But it is, he says, to say
how belief can be a "possible conc^t of the public language." And,
as Mayo asks in his reply "Belief and Omstraint" (Sec. IV) i
"Does not the very meaning of 'rule, ' 'criterion' etc., evaporate if 
there is no way of identifying states of affairs which are to count 
as satisfying or not satisfying the rule?"
But the only additional specification that 
Edgeley gives - and it is difficult to see what else he could have 
said - is in the reference to "abilities and tendencies to expveme 
belief" (pg. 92).
There are difficulties in the idea that 
abilities and tendencies etc* can be evaluated at all. Where we 
evaluate an ability or tendency to do X, this always comes to an 
evaluation of X-ing. "He has an unfortunate tendency to get drunk," 
surely means that his getting drunk is unfortunate. As long as his 
getting drunk remains a tendency and not an actuality there is nothing 
to complain about. It is only %ihen this tendency manifests itself 
that there is anything to regret. "His ability to juggle three clubs 
is amazing" surely praises What he does, not his ability. At the least, 
any evaluation of an ability or a tmd«ncy to do X seems to diqpend on 
and follow from that evaluation of X-ing. Could one approve of some- 
one's X-ing but disapprove of his ability to X?
There are cases that seem to be counter­
examples. But on closer inspection they turn out not to be. It may 
be all right to do something once or a few times, but all wrong to do 
it often. And this leads to some of the aidnmrd cases. I may
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dlsapprove of a racing driver's tendency to lose tine on the bends,
%diere I would not silnd if he only did it occasionally# But here it 
is the fact that he X-es often that makes the difference, I don't 
mind if he only does it occasionally, but only because it doesn't 
matter# If it did matter, I would mind that too# So it isn't the 
tendency to X as distinct from X-ing that I approve or disapprove#
It is the frequency# Scxsetimes we might say critically "He t«ids 
to Jab at the notes when he is playing the piano." It may not be 
that he does it always or even often. We speak of his tendency to 
jab, as opposed to his jabbing, just because he doesn't always do it.
But it is the jaW)ing that we are criticising# A case that is 
different again is this one. I can approve of someone's snooker 
playing, but disapprove of his ability to play snooker, as being a 
sign of mis-spent youth. This may be the case where two different 
criteria are being applied. My approval may be a recognition that 
he is very skilful at playing snooker. My disapproval may be based 
on the view that playing snooker is a waste of time, leads to bad 
company etc. Sometimes the case may turn cm my ideas about how much 
and when one should play snoc^er. I may approve of it on this 
Saturday afternoon, but dis^prove of it all of Mwiday to Friday.
In seme cases, we use "tendency" "inclination* 
etc. slightly differently. In this use, the tendency or inclination 
may be suppressed. i may have a tendency to x, or an inclination to 
Y, «fhich is never manifested. The judge may tend towards severity, 
but not show it in many cases; but one may come up in which he does.
If he does I may approve, even though I disapprove of the tendency to 
be severe. But here, I am approving severity in the particular, and 
disapproving of it in general.
So any evaluation of belief coaies to
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«valuation of certain behaviour» especially certain assertions» called 
"expressions" of the belief* Since most of the actions that show a 
particular belief cannot be evaluated as true or false at all» this 
coows to saying that it is evaluation of assertions# But then it is 
not belief, as a distinct state» that is being evaluated» but 
assertions.
It might be argued that belief cannot occur 
in normative statements anyway» since that has the immediate consequence 
that belief is voluntary* And that claim is at least questionable#
Mayo raises this objection against Griffiths in Section III of his 
article; but in section IV he seems to allow that there are norms 
governing belief. Even if we deny that belief is voluntary» it may 
still be possible to evaluate it» to have norms and standards that apply 
to it. First there are norms» standards and evaluations of all sorts 
of things that are not under our control; apples» pictures» etc* And 
second it is permissible to evaluate someone's character and personality» 
even though it is not under his control in any sisg)le way*
One difficulty with the idea that beliefs are 
essentially objects of certain kinds of evaluation stems from the 
transparency of belief# It should be obvious that when I consider 
whether p, or decide that p» it is not my beliefs that I evaluate» but 
*p*» or the proposition that p* Even where I do evaluate someone else's 
beliefs» I do so simply by considering whether p» or more leniently» 
whether *p' is plausible» reasonable or likely; if I am to be more 
lenient still» I may cwisider these questions "given the believer's 
situation" or "given what he knew." JUst as I answer questions about 
whether I believe that p by considering whether p» so I answer questions 
about whether other people's beliefs are correct by considering whether p# 
The belief that p is not an object to be evaluated in these cases» at least#
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Mayo considers in the final section of his
paper the question why I cannot mistrust, or, consequently, trust, my
own beliefs. His answer to the question is thisi-
"Wittgenstain's answer is the by now familiar one: that belief is a
disposition is shown by a person's b^aviour, including under
the latter both the simple assertion of the fact believed, and the 
expression 'I believe. ' My way of looking at the matter, however, 
is from the point of view of the word 'good' which occurred in the 
photograph analogy. The reason tdiy I cannot trust or mistrust my own 
beliefs is that having a belief is not having something which 
favourably disposes me towards something else - the fact believed - 
but rather, to have a belief is to be favourably disposed towards 
something els#| to asserting (or accepting) the proposition believed." 
(Sec. VU)
At first sight this does not fit with the 
role that Bdgeley assigns to belief. On his account, a belief is not 
a favourable disposition towards something, but is something towards 
which one may or may not be favourably disposed. But the quarrel 
betwewi them does not really lie here. For Idie two are concentrating 
on different uses of "believes". Mayo is concerned with first-person 
uses and Bdgeley seems to be mainly concerned with second and third 
person uses of "believes." We would expect a speedcer to be favourably 
disposed towards assertions that p is the case (in sosw sense of 
'favourably') if he says "I believe that p." And we do not know what 
attitude the speaker is going to have towards assertions that p is the 
case if he says "A believes that p." This difference can easily be 
explained by reference to the transparency of belief.
But the point remains that Bdgeley seems to 
have forgotten that "believes" involves t%#o people in the second and 
third person. And although the attitude of the speaker may be uncom­
mitted, the attitude of the believer is not. The believer has evaluated 
what the speaker has not evaluated, or the believer is committing himself
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where the speakmr is not# It is surely odd to choose beliefs as the 
objects of the appropriate evaluation# It %#ould be more natural to 
say that "he believes" and "you believe" gave the results of an 
evaluation, though not the speaker's evaluation#
On both accounts assertions are the object 
of the relevant evaluation# But this is not really satisfactory. 
Certainly assertions can be said to be true or false. But, as 
Edgeley points out, there are many other candidates, such as propo­
sitions, conclusions, theories, premisses, suggestions and so forth.
And if we remember also the related evaluations e^ qiressed by "reasonable," 
"sound," "valid," we can include things like arguments, suggestions, 
assismptions, analyses and so on. One important difference between 
assertions and some of these other things is that the latter can occupy 
the last place in the crucial relation "being a reason for..." If p 
is a reason for concluding that q, it is not straightforwardly a reason 
for asserting that q. The fact that something is true, or that there 
is evidence for it is not, by itself, a reason for asserting it - even 
if there are no reasons why it should not be asserted. Other 
considerations need to be brought into play to justify asserting it, 
as distinct from accepting it.
This claim is not really orthodox. A more 
orthodox position would go something like this. If *p' implies q', 
or is evidence for q, then p is a reason for asserting that q; it may 
not be a conclusive reason, but at its %#eakest it is a reason for 
asserting q unless there are considerations that outweight 'p*.
This view is criticised in the next chapter. 
But if we consider the possible answers to the question "Why did you 
say it was raining?", this orthodox claim seems less than plausible.
"I though you would like to know," "to
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frighten you," "I saw you leaving without your raincoat," "I've been 
hoping for some rain for the gardw," "I was afraid it would rain 
today and spoil our picnic," and so further, are all straightforwardly 
ans%#ers. But "because it was raining," doesn't really answer the 
question, or if it does, gives only an empty answer. It might be 
appropriate if the question was "why did you say that it was raining 
rather than sleeting, or sunny?" And even that question is most 
naturally taken as a question about whether it is rain or sleet that 
is falling, or whether it is really raining at all, rather than about 
what anybody says. The question "Why did you say it was raining?" 
might be answered by giving the evidence that it is raining - the 
noise on the roof, the drops of water on the window. But this inter­
prets the question as "How did you decide that it was raining?" or 
"Why do you believe that it is raining?"
It is tempting to say at this stage that 
although it is not quite clear What the connection is, there is a 
close connection between the notions of belief and of favourable 
evaluation. We need to lo(* a little more closely to see where this 
temptation comes frwa and what we are to make of it.
"Evaluation" needs to be used with caution. 
It is true that we talk of evaluating ideas, suggestions, objections, 
theories, analyses, arguments and so forth. But it is not the ease 
that for every p that I believe, there vna at some time a distinct 
process of evaluation. Deciding whether p may involve the weighing 
or evaluating of pro's, cons, arguments evidence. Equally it may not. 
In fact, it is something of a distortion to insist that deciding 
whether p necessarily involves evaluating anything.
Ryle's argument in connection with the 
traditional theory is particularly relevant here. He complains that
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the traditional approach aaaimilatea constructing a theory to 
expounding it. (See pp 273, 281 of "Concept of Mind** amongst other 
places.) Assigning a central role to evaluating beliefs here 
neglects the role of "believes" in stating the conclusions that are 
reached by le Penseur. Evaluating a belief is like checking a 
multiplication sum; as Ryle points out, the sum must be done before 
it can be chedced. Doing the sum and checking it may involve some 
of the same operations; but the two activities are distinct.
Deciding Whether p is not the same as evaluating the belief that p, 
even though some of the same operations may be involved. Giving 
central place to the evaluation seems almost perverse.
we come to the word "favourable." if our 
attitude towards correct or true assertions is a favourable one, it 
is only one of a variety of favourable attitudes. Assertions, and 
indeed facts too, can be assessed on many different scales; they can 
be evaluated in many different ways. Evaluation as true or false 
is special, however; for it is only if I evaluate an assertion as 
being true that I can be said to have any attitude or disposition 
towards what it asserts, as distinct from the assertion itself. It 
may be right, or all right, to assert that p even if p is not the 
case. So this evaluation is particularly fundamental. And it is 
fundammtal in such a way that one might conclude that "favourable" 
is not the right %#ord.
There is some justification for using it, 
however# The activities that we are concerned with are activities 
like arguing, proving, discovering, examining, questioning and so 
forth. The criterion of success in these activities is conceptually 
linked to the notion of truth. (I defended this swmary earlier.) 
Asserting what is the ease is in general a success in this ccmtcxt;
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and assarting what is not the cas# is usually a failure. We might 
say that someone who believes iwhat is the case has succeeded, or at 
least not failed in the relevant activities. Certainly somewe 
who believes what is not the case has failed somewhere - even if ha 
could not be blamed for his failure. This lifWc between the 
criterion of success of the relevant activities and the notion of 
truth Justifies and explains using the word "favourable" and the link 
with evaluation. we can and do evaluate beliefs, conclusions, 
suggestions, etc., if this means that we decide ««hether they are true 
or false. But it is a mistake to give too much importance to the 
fact.
None of this means that beliefs are objects 
or states. Indeed, views of this kind cannot make sense of some of 
the cosq>lexities, in particular the complexities of the first-person 
use of "believes". But my own account fits them quite naturally. 
"Believes" identifies those things that the believer has decided are 
true. But it does not commit the speaker to a view - except, of 
course in the limiting case of the first person.
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8. Belief and assertion
In this chapter I shall consider the relations 
between belief, truth and assertion. I shall criticise what Edgeley and 
Mayo say about this. Both of them get the relation wrong, though in 
different ways. Edgeley, not surprisingly, gives an account of the 
relation that requires the doctrine that "believes" is a psychological 
descriptive verb, and "designates" something. Mayo's account is much 
more complicated, and it is not obvious just vhere he has gone wrong.
But he does allow an independence to the concept of belief which assigns 
it a far less fundamental role than the one it actually plays. Belief, 
assertion and truth are inextricably and fundamentally intertwined.
Edgeley's account of this matter is part of
his overall position and is linked to his main doctrines. He explains
it on p. 71 of "Reason in Theory and Practice."
"We could say that it is part of the meaning or force of the 
propositional form of words, i.e. any form of words that within the 
convention of the language expresses something that is true or false 
(or, allowing for vagueness, more or less true or false), that its 
basic use is to eaqpress or state the user's belief, conviction or 
opinicn, more or less assured: thus understanding the meaning of,
e.g. the words 'It is raining' involves knowing that these %#ords 
alone, without the addition of the word 'believe' or any of its 
synonyms or near-synonyms can be properly used to state, express or 
communicate one's belief that it is raining. This connection betv^ een 
the propositional form of wiards and belief is, of course, a fairly weak 
one ....
"It is raining" may properly be used to express 
one's belief that it is raining. But it is also proper to use it to state 
that it is raining. The difficulty with Edgeley's account here is just
that the latter use must be the more fundamental. I can learn the latter
proper use. But how am I to learn the former use, if belief is a state
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conceptually distinct from its object? Surely Mayo has the right of it 
whan he says that the rules of language refer to "standard speech- 
situations" and "have nothing to do with belief." The basic
use of "It is raining" is to state or assert that it is raining, not to 
express or state the speaker's belief that it is raining. The sentence 
is only correctly used if %#hat it is used to state is true. It is not 
the speaker's beliefs that determine whether or not the words %#ere used 
correctly, or %d*ther the propositional speech-act was correctly performed.
Edgeley may reply that he does make the necessary 
connection between assertion and truth, via the concept of belief. And he 
may object to me that an act of assertion is correctly performed if it is 
believed,even though idiat is asserted is not true.
My objection is that the indirect connection 
that Edgeley makes is not adequate to its job.
The ambiguity of "correct" creates complications 
again. By one standard it is true that an act of assertion is correctly 
performed if it is true, so long as it is believed. By another standard, 
even a lie, that is neither true nor believed, may be an act of assertion 
correctly perfonaad. My claim that it is correctly performed if it is 
true, %Aether or not it is believed, is correct(t) by yet another of the 
standards that we judge assertions by. And this last standard is fundamental 
to the notion of assertion.
Often, when we speak of a correct use of words or 
forms of speech, we mean "grammatically correct." So it is quite possible 
for me to say "the kitten is under the mat" and to have used the words 
correctly even though the kitten is iK>t under the mat but in the cupboard.
It would then be odd to say that I have used the words incorrectly, or that 
I do not understand the form of speech. Surely whatever I got wrong, it 
was not the Ehglish language. But grammatical correctness and truth are
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not all that far apart* For axaaqpla, if I use the %#ord8 with unconvantional 
raferancas or employ noo-etandard classifications, in one sense what X say 
will be false, and false because I used the vrards incorrectly* Suppose 
X use the word "kitten" to identify what most speakers of English would 
call a "carpet." Or I might use the word "blue" to include "turquoise."
Nevertheless, when someone says something wrong, 
we say that he has used the words incorrectly only when he has made certain 
kinds of mistake, and not when he has made other kinds. We do not say that 
he has used the %#ords incorrectly %dien his mistake is a mistake about truth, 
falsity and evidence. There is a distinction to be mailed.
Nevertheless, someone who utters the words "I 
baptise thee ..." but not in the proper circumstances (infelicitously, as 
Austin would put it) has misused the words, even though he has not infringed 
any narrowly grammatical rules. In the same way, someone who does not 
recognize that questions of truth and falsity are in general legitimate 
when he utters something in the "prepositional form of %#ords" has mis­
understood that form. This is the basic point about "the prepositional 
form of words." Belief, we might say, comes later.
If Edgeley is wrong in this Mayo's account is 
much more promising. The relation is explained in t%fO ways. First, 
there are rules about assertions, connecting assertions and truth. And 
it is via these rules that the concept of belief is to be introduced.
Second,
"Tkuth is a norm-becked concept explicable via a non-normative concept 
belief which is already applicable independently of the norm."
"Both belief and truth arc conceptually - and 
nocmatively - tied to asserting."
%b Section V, he explains
"An assertion is a speech-act performed in a standard speech-aituaticn, 
where the 'standard' situation is not defined in terms of the absence of 
non-standard- making features*
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"Such standard situations era govsmad by rules; 
the speech acts that are assertions carry information in so far as the 
rules are observed, misinformation in so far as they are broken; but 
they convey information, and misinformation, only in so far as the rules 
are presvsned (by the listeners) not to have been broken: %d.thout this
presumption, neither information nor misinformation is possible. But it 
is very important to be clear that these rules of truth-telling, so to 
speak, have nothing to do with moral rules about sincerity and lying, 
and nothing to do, as yet, with belief. They are rules which prescribe 
what we Should say - or rather, forbid what we shculd not say, on pain 
of saying yihat is false. But for those for vdion this is not a pain, 
there are other rules which prescribe truth-telling - or, rather, again, 
(since the fact that some proposition is true is never, by itself, 
sufficient reason for saying that anyone ought to assert it) rules %which 
forbid saying what is false (since the fact that some proposition is false 
is. by itself, a sufficient reason for saying that no one ought to assert 
it). This second class of rules is, of course, the class of moral rules 
concerned with sincerity and decsption. And the 'pain* in question - that 
on pain of which we arc forbidden to say whatever is false - is, of course, 
the pain of doing what is morally wrong."
"We can now introAxze the concept of belief.
A person who disbelieves what he says, or believes something inconsistent 
with what he says, is a person who is consciously doing something %crong, 
to wit, deceiving. This divergence from the moral norm is insincerity, 
as distinct from the divergence from the rules of the indicative languagm- 
game, which was falsity. Sincerity is a non-divergence from the norm; 
as with truth, it is the negative word that, in Austin's phrase, *%#ears 
the trousers'."
Edgeley's claim is that the basic use of the 
propositional form of words is to "state, express or rrssmmirste" one's 
beliefs. Truth is connected to belief by means of his principle AB.
Mayo, on the other hand, sees the connection between a form of words and 
a standard speech-situation as basic and introduces belief in a way that 
makes it parasitic on this basic connection. Or does he? The "non- 
nonaative concept belief"is applicable independently of the "norm-backed 
concept truth!" and truth is to be explained via belief. So belief appears
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to be the basic concept here. But both belief and truth are linked to 
the ccxKept of assertion. And yet Mayo's account of asserting seems to 
make truth the basic concept.
I suspect that the vagueness of the crucial 
terms creates a good deal of confusion here; tarns like 'basic', 
'norm-backed,' 'explain via' are not immediately clear. A lot of guess­
work is needed in clarifying them.
The conclusions that truth is a norm-backed 
concept, that it is to be explained via belief and that belief can be 
applied independently of the norm emerge from Mayo's discussion of 
Griffiths' account of belief. "Believes" must be applicable independently 
of "true;" or at least it cannot be defined sisply as that which is 
appropriate to truth. (Equally, truth cannot be defined simply as that 
which is appropriate to belief - even with the circular but saving words 
"if it is correct.") Ait that is consistent with Mayo's introduction of 
belief. For that introduction to work it is clearly necessary that wsLbe 
able to decide that soomone disbelieves — or believes — %#hat he is asserting, 
independently of the question whether it is true. But that only raises the 
question how it is to be applied; and Mayo's answer is to turn to what a 
man says and does - though he explicitly allows that these need not be 
logically sufficient criteria. And Mayo and Edgeley would agree on that - 
with a proviso about the first pwson.
It would not be fair to take it that Mayo is 
offering two accounts of belief. He is answering two rather different 
questions. Aae is the question how ''believes" is to be applied. And it 
seems to me that what he calls the "introduction" of belief is not an 
introduction by means of criteria of application, but by means of the point 
or role of the conceit in the language. "Believes" is applied independently 
of "true". But the point or role of "believes" is parasitic on the notion 
of truth.
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X am not sure what I am to understand by 
the claim that truth is a 'norm#badced' concept* How does a *norsw> 
backed' concept differ, if at all, from a 'normative' concept? How are 
we to classify concepts as normative or not? Is "wife" a normative or 
a non-normative concept? Or is it just norm-backed? These are not mere 
niggling questions to be pushed aside# The lade of clarity about this 
affects directly how we see the relation between the concept of truth and 
the relevant norms.
There are two related norms that are involved 
here. One is the rule about truth-telling. This rule fits what Mayo 
says in that it ties the concepts of belief, truth and assertion together. 
Mayo recognizes that there is some difficulty about it, but accepts too 
much. Suppressio veri and sugqestio falsi can both be justified. If 
the Chancellor tells the truth about the Government's intentions he will 
cause a panic. Suppressio veri is justified. But if rumour and speculation 
are already rife, even that nay not be enough. So he must lie. Sugqestio 
falsi is justified. And this is no more a trivial qualification than the 
one that Mayo accepts, that the fact that something is true is not enough 
to justify asserting it.
Asserting something is an act. There are all sorts 
of considerations that bear on the question whether I should say that p.
Some bear on the question whether I should say it or keep silence or write 
it; some bear on the question whether I should say p or q or r. The truth 
or falsity of the proposition that p is only one of these considerations. 
Assertions are special. They can be assessed as true or false, and 
justified by appeal to a special kind of reason. But these special features 
do not exempt acts of assertion fkom being assessed in the other ways that 
%#e assess actions.
Nonetheless Mayo is right in saying that %#e must
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assume that people are telling the truth, or at least trying to. The 
obligation to tell the truth is not an absolute one. It is difficult 
to formulate the rule properly, but we must accept that there is such 
a rule.
The other norms are derived from evidence and
proof. We can say sometimes that "the evidence justifies assertir^,
claiming, suggesting that p." There is an obvious connection with any
rule of trutlwtelling. We can treat any consideration that bears on
the truth or falsity of p as one relevant justification of assertions
that p. In the limiting case, %»e can say that the fact that there is a
cow in the kitchen (a standard situation) justifies performing a speectv»
act of asserting that there is a cow in the kitchen. That this is the
kind of thing that Mayo has in mind is shown %disn he remarks in Sect. VI.
"Now for obvious reasons %#e do not adopt principles of truth-telling 
(as distinct from the Principle of TruU* Telling;) we could, but do 
not, formulate principles such as 'whenever there is a horse in the 
garden, I shall say that there is a horse in the garden'."
We do not formulate them because we would need 
an impossibly large number of such rules, and because they are pretty 
well vacuous. At least, I suppose that these are reasons that Mayo 
has in mind. But Mayo does believe that vw could formulate them.
My reservation about all this will be obvious.
A position of this kind commits us to the visw that it is assertions that 
reasons and evidence bear on. It should be clear idiy I believe that this 
is too narrow and misleading.
But the fundamental objection to Mayo's position 
is to his introducing the notion of belief separately from truth. Belief 
is more fundamentally involved here than Mayo recognizes. There are three 
difficulties about Mayo's view. Two bear on the distinction between the 
first and second level of rules of truth-telling. The other bears on the 
notion of a rule itself.
-227-
Pirst, there le the distinction between the two 
levels at which the rule of truth-telling applies. They are not separate, 
as Mayo believes. At the first level the rules of trutlv-telling "have 
nothing to do with moral rules about sincerity and lying,,," Certainly, 
the constitutive rules about assertions must be stated without reference 
to the moral: rules. The moral rules are rules regulating the practice of 
asserting and therefore presuppose the rules that describe the practice, 
the constitutive rules. But Mayo's firs^level rule of truth-telling 
looks like a regulative rule. The rationale is not just that the concept 
of telling the truth, or saying what is false (i.e., the concept of telling) 
requires this rule. Language is meaningful without the rule; but without 
the rule it fails to convey information, i.e. is useless without the rule. 
The constitutive rules of language are the rules governing the "standard 
situations" and so defining what assertions are. But then it is difficult 
to see what difference there is supposed to be betwemi first and second 
level rules of truth-telling, apart from the two different sanctions.
But if the rule of truth-tellihg is fundamental 
to the possibility of communicating infomaticxi (or misinformation) by 
means of language, thma have a rationale for the moral rules about 
sincerity and lying; or rather, we have a rationale for a specific 
sanction against those %dio take advantage of the assumptions that we 
have to make about this. But if the rules, at the two levels, are to be 
seen as really separate, then the moral rules will lack a rationale, and 
the i<kntity of the rules - in that they both enjoin or require t)M sasm 
behaviour - will be simply an odd coincidence.
Besides this, without "believes" and "disbelieves", 
the distinction that Mayo is trying to draw between the two levels cannot 
be stated. It isn't just the notion of sincerity, but that of insincerity 
as well, that depends on the notion of belief. Without the idea that one
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may believe or disbelieve something, "insincere" collapses into "untrue", 
and "sincere" collapses into "true;" or "untrue" collapses into "insincere" 
and "true" into "sincere," And the distinction between making a false 
assertion by mistake and doing so deliberately disappears. The most we 
can say is that the speaker has got it nwrong. For (xie of the points about 
"sincfure" is precisely that one may get things wrong ("divergence from 
the norm") but still be sincere; (and, I suppose, one may get things 
right, and still have been insincere.)
Mayo is wrcmg in thinking that he can find some 
firm ground from %diich to introduce the concept of belief. Belief is more 
fundamentally involved here than he allows. For the notion of a rule 
(of language) depends on the notion of belief.
Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical Investiqaticws" 
has made familiar the idea that unless a "rule" allows a possibility of an 
error it is not really a rule. What he meant to say was not connected in 
any simple way with the notion of belief. For his idea was, essentially, 
but a "rule" that allowed whatever I do to count as keeping the rule was 
not really a rule. It is this, surely, that he relies on in the discussion 
of the diary example a propos of the notion of a private language. Such a 
"rule" would be empty in that it would not entitle us to rule anything out 
as a failure to conform or rule anything in as success in conforming: and
so it would have no force. But this does not suffice to distinguish rules 
from (mere) regularities. If I am in the habit of smoking a cigarette 
evury hour, then there is something that would count as "breaking" or 
"violating" this 'rule'/habit.
The distinction lies in two points. The first is 
that in the case of a rule the question how the rule is to be interpreted 
or applied can always be raised. In the case of a regularity or habit, it 
cannot. This underlies the discussion of the rule "+n" in "Philosophical
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(Section 187. See also Sections 237, end 143 ff.
Cospere also Peter Winch's hodk. "The Idea of a social science"). Mu^ 
attention has been given to this point. Less attention has been given 
to vdiat is important here. Rules can be broken by mistake, or deliberately. 
Regularities can break down, but not either by mistake or deliberately.
(If X do not smoke for three hours, and then smoke two cigarettes in 
one hour, I have not made a mistake.) But vm cermet distinguish between 
mistakes and violations %<dLthcut the concept of belief. Without "believes" 
we can only say that X is doing something different this time, not that 
he has broken a rule or that he is doing the wrong thing.
To acknowledge this involvement is not to deny 
that the rules must be stated and explained without overt reference to 
belief, or that this way of stating them is primary. But grasping the 
point that such statements are rules, not regularities, involves grasping
ŸYVJthe notion of believing sometliing. Compare here by earlier discussion of 
the difference between "Ikjck if you are being shot at" end "Duck if you 
beliswe you are being shot at" in chapter 5 of Part I.
Mayo continues after the passage X qyoted
earlier
"Now it is widely held that belief, at least in very many and most typical 
cases, is dispositional. If belief ware a disposition to say, we could 
evade the difficulties in the thesis that 'belief is what is appropriate 
to truth* thus. Either at the level of the rules of the language game, 
or at the level of the moral rules, the belief«*requlrement is none other 
than the aesertion-requireeent, plus: exactly the seme factor khmt has 
to be added to the actionwreguirament of a moral rule, to wit, the so. 
called motive-requirenent. It is not enough, morally speaking, simply 
to do whatevar is required* it must be done 'in the right spirit', 'fbr 
the right reason*, the act must spring from a natural or secondUneture 
tendency to do that kind of act in that kind of situation. If %#e call ttiis 
'vrilling*, what X have Just said is a way of putting Qkiffiths' dictum that 
*ndlling is what is appropriate to what is right.' In the cases of assertion.
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the extra factor is belief - or would be, if belief were a disposition 
to say* One is required, at the language-gasie level, not just to say 
what conforms to the rules on this or that occasion, but to make a 
practice of doing so - on pain of not playing that particular game*
And one is required, at the moral level, to make a practice of playing 
that particular game at all times - on pain of being a liar*
"Belief is not, or at least not only, a 
disposition to say* But whatever else it is, it is only in so far as 
It Is a disposition to say that it is normatively tied to truth, and 
for the simple reason that the truth is vdiat we are required to tell 
and believe.."
Mayo is wrong in saying that belief is an 
additional requirement on assertion - over and above the rules linking 
situation to speech-act. But he is right that there is a requirement 
on assertions. He links the possibility of holding this view with the 
account of belief as a disposition to say. But he is wrong to do so. 
Surely if belief were a disposition to say, it would not be an additional 
requirement. For a disposition cannot be something additional to its 
manifestations. In any case, it isn't clear in what sense people ever 
say things that they are not disposed to say. True, they sometimes do 
not say things that they are disposed to say, for one reason or another. 
But that is not the same as saying things they are not disposed to say.
A liar might be said to be disposed to say the truth - under some other 
cirosastances. But he is also disposed to say %Aat is false under the 
actual circumstances that he is in.
Nonetheless, there is a point here. It is 
essentially the one that Mayo is making. But May>'s way of putting it 
is misleading. Consider the parallel with "willing." Mayo says that 
"the right is %diat we are required to do, and to be disposed to do."
And this in the context of his claim that "willing" is, at least in part, 
a disposition. In the case of "willing," it was points of just this kind 
that «fere used to support the Dualist account.
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He is right in the following sense. Generous 
acts that are performed not because of generosity or compassion but 
because of wihition or «mbarrassment (for example) are not really 
generous acts at all. But this does not really depend on the disposi­
tions of the agent. It depends on his criteria of success, his reasons 
for acting as he does. Generosity that o»nes fro* ambition is 
•generosity* with the wrong criterion of success, and for the wrong 
reason. And so not really generosity at all* Similarly, it isn't 
enough to say something true; it must be said f6r the right reason.
But «hat ^  the reason for saying something? 
Is a disposition to do something a reason for doing it? I have already 
argued this point in attacking the behaviourist account of belief.
There are dispositions to act, of course, and sometis&es these explain 
acticms. But the kind of explanation that they provide is not that of 
a reason or criterion of success.
Surely the point about assertions is this. 
They must be made in conformity with the rules, and they must be made 
because they are in conformity «dth the rules governing assertions.
That is, they must be made as being correct; that is the appropriate 
criterion of success. And that is the requirement. To say that 
belief is an additional requirement adds only that mistakes and errors 
are possible and to allow fbr then to be described. And that, of 
course, is the essence of my account of belief. Later, in the context 
of discussing the problem about belief and the «dll in the next chapter, 
I shall have something more to say about the notion of a "reason" as it 
is involved here.
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9m Belief and the will
One of the traditional problems about belief 
is the question whether belief is subject to the will or not* Most 
philosophers have rejected the idea that it is. But it was defended 
by Descartes, william James, Newman and âchiller# I shall consider 
two recent articles that deal with this topic; one is the article that 
I have already discussed by Mayo "Belief and Constraint." and the other 
is a defence of Descartes by Anthony O'Hear in Philosophy of April 1972, 
called "Belief and the Will."
Kayo's position is at first sight rather odd.
In Section H I  he takes it as a consequence of the normative theory that 
belief is volimtary, on the grounds that "ought" implies both "can" and 
its subcontrary "can omit." And he concludes that,
"... the question, whether we can choose to believe, is paralleled not 
by the question, whether we can choose to act, but by the question, 
whether we can choose to feel, intend, etc. which is indeed the same 
question, the answer to which appears to be. No. we can exhort someone 
to act - which imqplies that he can choose to act or not to act - and we 
can perhaps also exhort him to act in a certain frame of mind, but t#e 
cannot mean to imply that it is up to him which frame of mind he chooses 
to do it in, which of a range of feelings he chooses to select as that 
of which his acti<m shall be the outcome."
Yet in Section VI, he concludes,
"Though belief may properly be said to be required of us. it is a 
requirement which we ourselves cannot endorse - tmtil after we have com­
plied with it, if vfs do. In this respect belief is, after all, more 
comparable with a moral principle than with a character-trait*"
But it is not clear that the two conclusions 
are really incompatible. Mayo himself recognises that insofar as actions 
in particular, saying, - are "components" of belief, they may be things 
we ought to do or ought not to do. "A disposition, like a character-
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trait," he says, "may or may not be scsMtthing that we ought or ought 
not to have*" But "feelings of warmth or overwhelming conviction, 
on the other hand, se«n not to be the sort of thing wre can be 
exhorted or forbidden to have. " He is inconsistent in attadcing 
Griffiths* account on the grounds that as a normative theory it must 
have the consequence that belief is voluntary* If this consequence 
is rejected, then the two conclusions are not incompatible.
It is not clear that the normative account 
must have the cwsequmrxze that our beliefs are under our control.
Even if our character-traits and frames of mind are under our control 
in some sense, they are not straight-forwardly voluntary. And yet 
arm can make character-traits and motives the subjects of moral 
judgements.
And perhaps some kind of "cosg^tibilist" 
position must be right* For if we accept Mayo's argument in Section 
III, and reject the claim that belief is voluntary on his grounds, it 
follows that there cannot be norms governing our beliefs. But the laws 
of evidence and canons of criticism are clearly not descriptive of our 
thinking, since we all think wrongly at least sometimes. So how do 
they bear on our thought? How can we admit any kind of responsibility 
for our beliefs? so that won't do* And yet accepting any simple 
voluntarist position seems absurd. Believing something or assenting 
to it are not under siy control as are actions like raising my arm.
The Queen of Hearts was being absurd when she said that she could 
believe six impossible things before breakfast, and suggested that Alice 
should practice.
But a coaq>atibilist position must come to 
terms with the principle that "ought" implies "can," etc. And such a 
position needs quite a lot more explanation; as yet it would be too
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vague to be at all satisfactory. we need at least an explanation of 
the way in which the norms and canons of reason bear on belief.
It is easy to say that believing something 
is not an action, and so neither voluntary nor involuntary. And this 
is supported by the fact that we cannot be forced to believe. At 
least we cannot be forced to believe in the ways that we can be forced 
to raise an arm. If we say that reasons or evidence force or compel
us to believe, this must be metaqAorical# Nor is believing something
outside (or inside) my control in the way that falling do%mstairs is. 
Palling downstairs is an accident that I can avoid if I an careful.
But we cannot leave it at that. First, the
traditional defence of voluntarism can fastm on the idea that assenting 
to something is an action, or seems very like one; and even if we 
reject the notion of assent, there are other actions closely related to 
belief that are clearly voluntary - such as saying. Second, we have 
still to explain where our responsibilities fit it, and how norms can be 
relevant here.
A tempting resolution emerges from O'Hear's
discussion. In Part II of his article he says:
"Descartes does not say that %#e are free to believe what we see as 
false. What he does say is that we will (i.e. are responsible for) the 
explicit acts of assent that %#e make. we are responsible for them 
because %#e acc^t the reasons on %#hich the beliefs are based. We may, 
if they are adequate and convincing, have no choice but to accept them 
and to assent. This Descartes does not deny; as we have seen, he 
thinks this is the height of freedom."
And then in Part III, he says:
"The conclusion from this examination of Descartes* vie%#s on error and 
the place of the will in judgements is that when I explicitly advert to a 
belief, in making my decision on that belief, I use certain criteria and 
methods, the responsibility for which I must be prepared to take."
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But this does not really help* It Is far 
from clear that we can be said to dioose the criteria and methods that 
we work by. The di££iculties that created the original problem recur 
in this solution*
Consider a simple and standard case, that of 
calculation, and of addition in particular* What is 351 4 217? In a 
sense, I can use any method 1 like to arrive at an answer. But walk­
ing t%fice round the quadrangle would be senseless; that would not 
generate a number, and so not even a candidate answer. If I did that, 
either I would not be trying to arrive at an answer, or I would be 
irrational. I can guess, count tea leaves, stick pins in a table of 
nusdPers, or subtract and multiply the result by another number, chosen 
by some criterion. I might produce the right result. But the right 
result is defined as the result obtained by correctly applying a 
certain procedure. No other procedure gives the right results consistently, 
30 there is good reason fbr using that method. It could even be argued 
that any other procedure is not really addition; or that it is not really 
a method fbr arriving at the answer at all.
Certainly, I can choose my procedure in a way 
Miich I cannot choose my beliefs. I can go through the motions of 
counting my tea leaves or write down 351 - 217 « 134 x 6 (the number of 
digits in the original question) « 804. And I can do this perversely, 
knowing that the correct method is 351 217 * 568. I can do it because
applying the procedure is a series of actions which I can choose to per­
form. But exercising that choice involves abandoning the criterion of 
success implicit in the question - unless, perhaps, I apply the procedure 
as an experiment. It involves giving up just trying to get it right.
And then I am no longer calculating - even if I am writing down numbers 
in accordance with rules#
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In many cases where we are explicitly trying 
to come to a conclusion, there is no clear-cut method. Even where 
there is, (as perhaps in questions about mechanics) applying the 
procedure does not guarantee the correctness of the results in the same 
way as it does in mathMmatical calculation. But nonetheless, there 
are rules of evidence, and canons of criticism, vbich it is in my po%^r 
to ignore, even if the price is that I ma no longer 'playing the same 
game' as everyone else.
But these are not just games that we play, 
we cannot treat calculating, or thinking out a problem, as if it were 
chess or football. To adapt an argiment of Mayo's, anyone who rejects 
rational criteria and methods for arriving at answers is, ex hypothesi, 
not being rational. But, to the extent that he is not rational, he is 
not in control of himself, and so cannot be said to be choosing.
Besides, what could the criterion be that I use when I choose my criteria 
and methods? If the choice is to be raticmal, there must be one.
Indeed,if the choice is to be rational, the criterion could only be that 
the criteria and methods that I use are those that are most likely to 
lead to the right answer. And if the choice is not to be rational, then con 
we eask say that there is choice here? And finally, even if the notion of 
choice makes some kind of sense, it is surely clear that we do not choose 
the criteria and methods that we use as we choose our clothes, er our 
pastimes.
But these questions and problems are essentially 
the same as the questions and problems about rational assent. O'Hear has 
simply moved thoa back a stage. Bat moving them bade a stage generates 
an infinite regress.
Incidentally, the issue of cognitive relativism 
has no bearing on this. Evan if relativism is true, it does not seem to
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follow either that Individuals can choose and change their criteria 
and methods like their clothes and jobs, or that socieities can do so 
as they can choose and change the qualifications for citizenship or 
their trial procedures. Consider here Winch's article "Understanding 
a Primitive Society." Nothing there, surely, gives grounds for say­
ing that the Azande can change their ccnrtc^ tual system if they want to, 
or even that they are re*^ pmnsible for it.
In Part H I  of his article, O'Hear does 
make a valuable and suggestive point,
"In fact, it is at the point of applying the rules for coming to 
cognitive decisicms that %m  do have control over what we believe, and 
where the will may be said to be operative,"
O'Hear does not distinguish betwew the two 
points. But this point is not the same as the one I have been 
discussing. Here, we have responsibility for the w ^  in which we 
apply the rules, and that is compatible with not having any responsi­
bility for the rules themselves. ait precisely what he was saying in 
the earlier quotation was that we had responsibility for the rules.
we can quite naturally be held responsible 
for carrying out a calculation properly. People are blmaed sometimes 
wh«i they do not. we do not choose the rules and Mthods of calculation, 
but we can be held respwmible fbr following them and executing them 
properly. Someone who has got a calculation wrong, or who believes 
what is false, may have been careless or negligent; and those are 
things for which we are blamed. If I carelessly knock over my coffee,
I can be blamed for it. Knodcing over my coffee was not exactly a 
voluntary acticm; I did not want to do it, or set myself to do it, or 
try to do it. And in one way it was not within my control, fbr if it 
had been, I would not have done it. But I could have avoided doing it 
if I had taken more care, and exercised the control over my limbs that I
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am normally taken to have. In this sense it was within my control, 
and it was something "subject to my will."
But what we are held responsible for on this 
account is for executing certain procedures, or for being careful.
If we have been careful and if we have executed the procedures 
properly, we cannot be blamed for the results. I cannot be held 
responsible for a number. Nor can I be held responsible for the fact 
that 568 is the right answer.
Sometimes the fact that someone holds a 
particular belief may show something about his character. My belief 
that, despite all appearances, Fred is up to no good, may be a reason 
for saying that I am suspicious and mistrustful character, even if there 
is evidence for my belief. And so I may be open to moral assessment.
But then the assessment is of my character, not really of my belief.
So there are ways in which I can or might be 
blamed, held responsible, be open to moral awessment because I believe 
that p. This is not quite the same as saying that beliefs are open to 
moral assessment, but it is enough to explain our practices. It is 
tempting to argue that if p is true, the question of blame does not 
arise but that it does arise if p is false. Certainly, if I got the 
right answer that is evidence that I was not careless in getting it.
And if Fred is up to no good, that is evidence that my suspicion and 
mistrust were not to be blamed. But in neither case is the evidence 
conclusive, so the principle is not a hard and fast one.
The question remains why blame and responsi­
bility cannot directly get a foothold on belief. The first answer turns 
on the transparency of belief. If I have arrived at the total correctly, 
blaming me for believing that it is 568 is like blaioing me for the fact 
that it is 568.
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The second answer is more complicated, but 
more illuminating# It turns on the notion of a "reason for*#*##"
We can distinguish four uses of the notion of a reason#
(1) A reason as what explains or makes sense of something*
Examples are e^ qplanations giving causes - "the reason 
for the thunder is*##*" - or some explanation in mathe­
matics or logic - ("explanatory" use#)
(2) A reason for believing something# In this context the 
notions of evidence and argument are crucial. - 
("evidence" use.)
(3) The reason why something is so can be given in terras of 
its function or purpose# The reason why a yacht has 
ballast is that the ballast keeps it steady in the water 
(etc*) - ("purpose" use*)
(4) A reason for doing something* - ("action" use*)
There are all sorts of relations between 
these uses# I have already tried to distinguish between the evidence 
and action uses# The esqplanatory use is related to the evidence use* 
There is an obvious similarity between the purpose and action uses*
There is also a connection between the explanatory and purpose uses via
the notion of explanation*
But it is the contrast between the evidence 
and action uses that is relevant to us here# There is one crucial 
difference* If p is a reason for doing something, it is so only on 
condition that the agent wants something (to put it roughly.) Its 
being dark is a reason for switching on the light only if the agent
wants to see# If he wants not to be seen, its being dark is not a
reason for switching on the light# But if *p* is a reason for believing 
that q, then it is so independently of any wants or desires that the
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subject may have* The flash of lightning is a reason for believing 
that it will thunder soon, and my wants and cbsires have nothing to do 
with it.
We might look for an explanation to the 
relation between the expleinatory and evidence uses* Explanatory 
reasons generate and justify evidence uses of "reason*" And 
e^ qplanatory reasons are clearly indqpendent of my wishes*
One consequence of the difference between 
esq)lanatory and evidence uses is this* If my reasons for believing 
something, or for accepting it, really are reasons for believing it 
or accepting it, they are reasons whatever 1 may want* But if my 
reasons for believing something are only reasons given that I want 
6(xmething, then they are not really reasons for believing. Now this 
can happen, and it seems to me that this is exactly what we call wish­
ful thinking* The difference between wishful thii*ing and "proper" 
thinking is that I have reasons for thinking and accepting something 
which are not indépendant of what I want* This connection with what 
I %mnt is what gives the notions of blame and responsibility a foothold*
Suppose that Fred believes that Pygmalion 
will win the 3*30* He may believe this because he has seen the horses 
run, because Pygmalion's form is better than the others* and so forth*
If his reasons are of this kind, they are good reasons for his belief. 
What hs wants has nothing to do with it. But if he believes it because 
he has put his shirt on it, then the reason for his belief is that he
has put his shirt on it* That could only be a reason if he wanted to
keep his shirt* If he wanted to lose it, that would be a reason for 
believing that Pygmalion would not win the 3.30.
This does not yet explain cases where 1 have
been negligent* In these cases, my reasons may not have anything to do
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with what I wxmt* If I carelessly give 668 as the answer to 351 + 217, 
it does not follow that 1 want that answer, or that I am thinking wis>>- 
fully* I may even wish that the answer was 568»
Part of the explanation is just that I have 
been negligwt (in doing something) and so I can be blamed or held 
responsible in just the same way and for just the same reasons that I 
can be blamed or held responsible in other cases of negligence. But 
notice also that in these cases, I don't have any (good) reasons for 
believing what I do believe. At least my reasons are deficient, and 
avoidably deficient. So it does seem appropriate that I should be 
blaoMsd.
Ky suggestion comes to this. The apparent 
paradox is that we seem to be held responsible for our beliefs, and yet 
we cannot be because they are not under our control# The solution lies 
in distinguishing what we can, and what we cannot, be held responsible 
for. A detective who follows the procedures for investigating a crime 
carefully, thoroughly and impartially cannot be blamed if he arrives at 
no answer or the wrong answer. But he can be blamed if he arrives at 
no answer or the wrong answer and his investigation was not carried out 
properly. Whether or not he does that Is within his control. It may 
be brought about by something about his character, by his having some 
want on which the case bears or by negligence. Whatever the reason, 
his failure will mean that he believes that Fred is the man (or he is 
not) without (sufficient) reason. If he could have avoided that, we 
can blame him without conceptual absurdity.
There is a good deal more to be said on this 




"Believes" raises pr^lees for logicians that 
have been such discussed* Quine*s wrestlings have been particularly 
isportant and stimulating. The problem about "believes” is a special case 
of the problem os it arises for all words that express "propositional 
attitudes" and. Indeed for all model contexts. But the very general 
problems of model logic are beyond my scope here. Essentially, the 
problem is that propositional attitudes violate the principle, celled 
"Leibnis* law", that the terms of a true statement of identity can be 
substituted for each other, salva verltata.
Much has been written about this welL4cna%si pro­
blem. It has ramifications in many other areas of philosophy, in particular 
in theories of reference, model logic, and philosophy of mind. There are 
various resolutions of it, notably from Mainong, Frege and Russell. Z 
shall not attempt to survey these discussions# that would take me too 
far afield. Quine's resolution is. In effect, to restrict the application 
of Leibnis* law to "referentially transparent contexts.”
In "referentially opaque contexts,” such as 
the sentences containing "believes", Leibniz' law does not apply. A good 
criticism of ttiis view is to be found in Idnsky's book "Referring". chapter 
7. The difficulties centre on giving a definition of referential opacity 
%«lthout falling into circularity or appeal to Leibniz' law itself.
Leibniz' law seems to offer a simple way of saying 
what identity is; and this underlies the view that logic must be extensional. 
But this problem appears to block that view and that way of saying %Aat 
identity is# ftrentano uses what is fundamentally the same feature of 
language as a criterion for distinguishing "the physical" from "the mental." 
See "Psychologie von Ebpirischsn Standcunkt" Vol. I. Ek 2 cap 1. I shell
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here disnis» only the view that aiftmtltution of expraealona #*t refer to 
the amm object 1# not pereiesible in certain use of 'Taelievee".
In "Wart •ed Obj»ct" p. 30, Qulna dlatlnoulrtiM
the two cases thus:-
"A construction that may be transparent or opaque is the belief construction, 
'a believes that p«* Thus, siqppoae that though
(7) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, 
he is ill-informed enough to think that the Cicero of the orations and the 
Tuily of be Senectute were two. Faced with his unequivocal denial of "Tully 
dwounced Catiline", we are perhaps prepared both to affirm (7) and to deny 
that Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline. If so, the position of 
"Cicero” in the pert "Cicero denounced Catiline", considered apart, is not 
purely referential. So "believes that ‘ (so ccmceived) is opaque.
"At the same time there is an alternative way 
of construing belief that is referentially transparent. The difference is 
as follows* In the opaque sense of belief considered above, Tom's earnest 
"Tully never denounced Catiline" counts as showing that he does not believe 
that Tully denounced Catiline, even while he believes that Cicero did. In 
the transparent sense of belief, the other hand, Tom's earnest "Cicero 
denounced Catiline” counts as showing that he does believe that Tully 
denounced Catiline, despite his own misguided verbal disclaimer.
”'Cicero* has purely referential occurrence in
(7) or not according as 'believes* is tak«i transparently or not ..."
But the transparent sense is not unproblematic. Quine offers the following
case (p. 148/149):-
”.. Iwhere *p* represents a sentence, let us write 'dp* (following Kronecker) 
as short for the description:
the number x such that ((x « 1) and p) or ((x « 0 and not p).
We may suppose that poor Tom, whatever his limitations regarding Latin 
literature and local philanthropies, is enough of a logician to believe a 
sentence of the form 'dp » 1* when and only v^fhen he believes the sentence 
represented by 'p*. &»t then we can argue from the transparency of belief 
that he believes everything. For, by the hypotheses already before us,
(3) Tom believes that d(Cicero denounced Catiline) - 1.
But, v/henever *p' represents a true sentence, 
dp m d(Cicero denounced Catiline).
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But then by (3) and tha transparency of belief.
To# believes that dp « 1, 
fro# %diich it follows, by the hypothesis about To#*s logical acumen, that
(4) To# believes that p.
But *p* represented any true sentence# R^>eating the argument using the 
falsehood "Tully did not denounce Catiline" instead of the truth "Cicero
denounced Catiline," we establish (4) also where *p* represents any
fals^wod. To# ends up believing everything."
And yet he also shows (p. 147/146) that there
are occasions %<hen we do need the transparent use of "believes." There is
an important difference between:
(1) To# believes that someone (is such that he) denounced Catiline,
and (2) Someone is such that To# believes that he denounced Catiline.
Quine drives the point home %#ith the following
(p. 148):-
"Thus see %diat urgent information the sentence 'There is someone whom I 
believe to be a spy' imparts, in contrast to 'I believe that someone is 
a spy* (in the %#eak sense of *Z believe there are spies'".)
Quine identifies this as a "second intersecting
ambiguity". The first is the problem about substituting definite singular
terms.
Quine concludes on p. 149:-
"In general »d%at is wanted is not a doctrine of transparency or opacity 
of belief, but a way of indicating, selectively and changeably, just %#hat 
positions in the contained sentence are to shine through as referential on 
any particular occasion.
"A %#ay of doing that is to agree to localise 
the failure of transparency regularly in the 'that* of 'believes that* 
and the 'to' of 'believes to', and not in the 'believes*. Thus we may 
continue to write 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' %#hen %#e 
are content to leave the occurrences of 'Cicero' and 'Catiline' nan- 
referential, but write rather:
(5) Tom believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline 
if we %mnt to bring 'Cicero' into referential position."
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I must confess that I do not see how this 
resolves the problem about Tom and dp # 1# For we can just as well write* 
(3*) Tom believes d(Cicero denounced Catiline) to equal 1#
Tom believes dp to equal 1#
(4#) Tom believes p (or 'p*)«
Perhaps both "Tom believes the sun is shining" and "Tom believes 'The sun 
is shining'" are malformed. But "Tom believes the sentence «The sun is 
shining'" is not obviously so.
There is a more serious and more fundamental 
difficulty. We really need some criterion other than failure of sub­
stitution for saying when positions are referentially opaque. The 
alternative is to define referential opacity in terms of the failure of 
substitution. These lines of objection are discussed in detail in 
L. Linsky "Referring" chapter VU.
If a particular term can be put in referential 
position then it is being used referentially. But just what are the 
considerations that guide us in sometimes allowing "Tom believes Cicero 
to have denounced Catiline" and sometimes insisting on "Tom believes that 
Cicero denounced Catiline."? We can guess at the contextual features that 
would be relevant. But they surely merit some discussion.
Such discussion might also reveal the answer 
to a more important question. Why does substitution sometimes fail?
What is the need for this feature of our language?
There is a false premiss in the argumsnt for 
this view. It is that substitution of expressions that refer to the 
same object salva veritate. is not possible in these contexts. It is not 
that substitution is not possible, but that it is subject to special rules 
and restrictions in these contexts, because we are playing a special 
language-game.
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Eddy Zemach, in Analysis of 1969, resolves
the problem in this way:-
"Consider, e.g., the statement:
(7) ftrs. Jones^ believed that the defendant was a policeman"made 
by Itrs. Jones' attorney at a trial. Clearly 'the defendant' is here 
proper-used.* The attorney does not %fish to imply that Mrs. Jones 
referred to the prowler, at the time she considered him to be a police­
man, as 'the defendant.' Therefore, although Mrs. Jones may never have 
referred to, or could never have referred to, the defendant as 'the 
defendant, ' we can use the term 'the defendant* in order to refer to the 
entity concerning which Mrs. Jones had various (say, false) beliefs.
After the man is convicted, the lawyer might say that
(8) Mrs. Jones believed that the murderer was a policeman and (if
'the murderer' is again used in the lawer's present language and not
in the language of Mrs. Jones at the time she held this belief) this 
would not imply
(9) Mrs. Jones believed that a certain murderer was a policeman
(9) %#ould Indeed follow from (8) if 'the murderer' in (8) %#ore proper­
used by Itrs. Jones, rather than by us or by her lawyer, to refer to 
the entity she had believed to be a policeman.
"Quine's distinction between referentially 
(^ paque and referentially transparent contexts may be replaced now by a 
simple principle permitting an unlimited substitution, salva veritate. 
of all co-referential terms, in all (including oblique) contexts. This 
principle, however, %#ould not permit the free substitution of homonymous 
terms, and, according to the above analysis, 'the murderer' as used (if 
it were used at all) by Mrs. Jones in the past, and 'the murderer' as 
used by the attorney in the present, are nothing but hosonyms; they are 
used to refer to different entities altogether. If in some Tibetan dialect 
Chairman Mao is referred to as 'Nixon', this term is only homonymous %dLth 
our term 'Nixon* and hence is not co-referential with (and therefore not
* This phrase has been introduced earlier in the article to distinguish 
terms being used to refer to whatever the present user would use them 
to refer to and their being used to refer to whatever somebody else 
would use them to refer to (other-use.)
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substitutable for) 'the 36th president of the Ikiited States', in any context*
"Note, that deviant referential uses of terms 
can result from the misapplication of standard criteria as well as from 
the correct application of deviant criteria of reference. The use of 
'Nixon' to name Chairman Mao exemplifies the latter case. To illustrate 
the former, let us take the case of Mrs. Jones who mistaking her husband 
for a burglar, shot him to death. Her la%#yer %KXild certainly contend 
that #tr. Jones %ms killed because
(10) Mrs. Jonmi believed that Mr. Jones was a burglar.
Yet (in another sense) Mrs. Jones never believed that her husband, Mr. Jones 
was a burglar....."
2Semach is looking in the right place. But the 
way that he states the distinction between proper-use and other-use is not 
adequate. For, in either case, the term may not refer at all. And certainly, 
it would be odd to say that "Zeus" in "The Qre^cs believed that Zeus con­
trolled the lightning," vms being used to refer to anything, even to what 
the (keeks would use it to refer to. But this is not a serious defect.
More serious is the oddity of saying that "Nr. Jones" is homonymous. The 
comparison with the case of "Nixon" as used in English and in Tibetan 
dialect is very weak. Both the lawyer and Nrs. Jones agree as to the 
correct reference of "Mr. Jones". For a supporter of James Stuart, the 
Young Pretender in 1745, "the king" refers to one person. For a siqpporter 
of (Seorge, "the king" refers to a different person. But surely both are 
speaking the same language or dialect, namely English - or at least they 
are not speaking different ones.
Now, Zemach may be committed also to the view 
that strictly, we should stick to the believer's use of the relevant %#ards.
At least that is the only way to make sense of his resolution of Quine's 
example.
"Quine's argument is, however, fallacious, and the fallacy lies in the 
same confusion of proper-use with other-use. 'Tom believes that dp # 1' 
does not say anything at all about Tom's way of referring to the number
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vihich have referred to by *dp* and concerning %dilch Tom believes that 
it is equal to 1. Hence it is incorrect to say that Tom believes that p# 
As far as we know, 'dp* and 'p* may not even be in his active vocabulary 
at all."
But it is not obviously incorrect at all.
It is only incorrect to fail to draw the distinction between proper-use
and other-use. We are permitted, it would seem, to proper-use the 
relevant terms; and then it ^  correct to say "Tom believes that p".
It is only incorrect to do so if the terms are being other-used. Zemach
has permitted proper-use of terms in giving the two examq^ les about Mrs. 
Jones and hmr lawyer.
So, if this is to be a resolution at all,
Zemach must be committed to the view that proper-use is not quite proper, 
logically speaking.
This does not accord well %#ith our practice. 
There is nothing wrong in saying that Oedipus wanted to marry his mother, 
provided the audience knows the story. It is not false. It %#ould be 
misleading if the audience did not know the story - hence the proviso.
But it would also be misleading to say (to any audience) just that 
"Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta," (idko is Jocasta?) or "Oedipus wanted 
to marry the former king's wife." It %#ould be misleading because it would 
fail to describe or take account of a crucially important fact about 
Oedipus' situation. In fact, there is no substitute here for a proper 
explanation of Oedipus' situation. Without it, any statement about what 
Oedipus %#anted is misleading; %#ith it, no statement is.
Again, take Quine's example, "Tom believes 
that Cicero denounced Catiline." On p. 141 ff in "Word and Collect" he 
discusses pussies of the familiar kind (deriving from the fact that Cicero 
may be known as "Tully." 8iq>pose that it is important to know what Tom's 
beliefs about Cicero are. Say a decision about his examination results
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hangs on it. If the examiners were old-fashioned, or came from another 
country with different conventions, and knew Cicero as Tully, then it 
would be appropriate to say to them that Tom believed that Tully denounced 
Catiline. It would be appropriate even if Tom %fould deny it, because he 
did not know about the alternative name for Cicero and used "Tully" to 
refer to someone else. If we refuse to substitute here, we would mislead 
the examiners and allow an unfair result. Linsky says in chapter 7 of 
"Referring":-
"In oratio obliqua I am not responsible for reproducing the very words 
in which a perscm expresses his propositional attitude. That, one might 
say, is the whole reason for the existence of this mode of speech. That 
is what distinguishes it from the oratio recta mode. Of the extreme 
utility of the oratio obliqua form there cannot be any doubt. Imagine 
the burden vihich we would take upon ourselves in reporting what others 
say or want or know if in doing so we were not allowed to deviate from 
the very words they used in saying what they said or expressing vdiat 
they went or know."
"What the indirect forms allow us to do is to 
convey the content without reproducing the words. How far are vie allowed 
to stray from the actual words spoken? There is, of course, no fixed line 
over vfiich one must not pass without falling into falsity. The governing 
rule here is that one must not mislead one's audience. Whether or not 
one's words are misleading of false depends vpon complex features of 
the setting in which one speaks, including principally what one knows 
or believes that one's audience knows or believes. It is absurd to 
suggest that in reporting another's words in indirect discourse any 
deviation renders my account false. For the conventions governing the 
use of this mode of speech are not such that my audience will take me 
not to be deviating from the actual words I am reporting in oratio 
obliqua construction. In general the dichotomy, true or false, seems 
less in place here than the dichotomy fair/unfair or accurate/inaccurate. 
Wtiat one wants is a fair or accurate account of vfiat someone said or knows 
or wants. The r^xarter's obligation is not to mislead in his deviations; 
it is not to deviate."
We can make a stronger claim. Deviation may
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not just be permitted* It may be required in order not to mislead, as in 
the exaoiq>les of Oedipus or my version of the story about Tow.
It would be tidier if we could either p^mit 
free substitution or ban it completely. But either way out frustrates 
the oratio obliqua mode and makes it useless. Whether substitution is 
free or banned, we may arouse false expectations about the believer ini our 
audience. Suppose that Ralph believes that the grey-haired man on the 
platform is the mayor and that the man in the brovn hat (whom he has seen 
CXI the beach) is a spy. But he doM not know that they are one and the 
same man. Depending on other circumstances, it might mislead the audience 
to report either that he believes that the mayor is a spy or ^at he 
believes that the mayor is not a spy, or that he does not believe that the 
mayor is a spy.
Linsky does not go far enough in another 
respect. He allows that oratio obliqua is useful, but seems to think 
of it as a kind of shorthand; it would be burdensome not to deviate, 
but not, it seems impossible. Nit my arguments against <3each earlier 
bring out the point that oratio obliqua does not merely report actual or 
potential utterances. The sentences that occur in oratio obliqua are not 
merely being mentioned qua pieces of language, as they are in oratio recta. 
They are being used, although not in the ordinary descriptive straight­
forward way. They are being used to give the reasons and conclusions etc. 
of the subject. What is being reported is not just a bit of actual or 
potential language, but something that has an actual or potential use or 
role for the subject. What is being reported is the actual or potential 
reasons and conclusions of the subject. And this is what giv€»s meaning to 
the notion of the 'ccmtent' in discourse.
There is also the "second, intersecting ambiguity" 
to be ccmsidered. There is an important difference between 
(1) Ral]^ believes that soemone is a spy.
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and (2) Someone is such that Tom believes that he is a spy.
Both constructions are necessary to our language. The difference is 
clearly important. In (2) the speaker is cooedtted to thmre being some 
individual who is suspected. There must be someone that both Ralph and 
we could identify as the putative spy. (1) commits the speaker to much 
less. It impliw that Ralph does not have any particular individual in 
mind* In fact, as Quine points out again, most of us would probably agree 
with Ralph, at any time# (1) could be true even if there viere no spy.
Suppose %#e now consider
(a) Ox) (x wears a brown hat & Ralph believes that x is a spy)
(b) (3x) (Ralph believes that (x viears a brown hat & x is a spy)
(c) Ralph believes that (3x) (x wears a brown hat & x is a spy)
Any of these could represent "Ralph believes that the man in the brown 
hat is a spy." Nit there are important differences between them, (a) 
gives an identification which speaker and hearer are «cpected to under­
stand, but not necessarily Ralph, (c) is compatible with there being no 
brown-hatted man and no spy. It gives Ralph's way of identifying the 
man - if there is one. (b) is different again, (b) cosmits the speaker 
to the existence of some individual who is under suspicion and gives an 
identification of him that Ralph has. It is not necessarily one that 
speaker and/or hearer will use.
The differmnt positions of the quantifier here 
allow for the complexities of the situation in which Ralph, the speaker 
and the hearer are all involved. To reject any variant is to ignore 
these complexities.
It may seem that my account of belief commits me 
to a different view of this problem. If I were right, then surely free 
substitution should be possible. Belief is a way of identifyir^ those 
things that have a certain status for the subject - namely that of being
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true, and so of being actual or potential reasons for him doing or thinking 
certain things. But sentences are not reasons# they give the reasons.
It is difficult to see %diy the sentence "There is no God" or even the 
uttering of it, should ^  a reason for God punishing anyone. Or tdiy 
the sentence "There is a draught" should be a reason for shutting the door. 
Surely the reason for shutting the door is the fact that there is a draught# 
and the reason for punishment is the wickedness and impiety exemplified not 
merely by uttering the sentence, but by believing it, acting on it. But 
if it is the draught or the impiety that is the reason, then surely sub­
stitution should be possible. If the reason for arresting Bernard J. 
Qrtcutt is that the man in the brown hat is a spy, and he is the man in 
the brown hat,then "the grey-haired man is a spy" will follow. If he is 
the grey haired man, and it must be the same reason for arresting Bernard 
J. Qrtcutt. Clearly it is not a different one.
We immediately run up against the central 
problem about thought. We cannot say that 'things-in-the-world* are 
reasons. What would my reason be vrhen X have made a mistake? %  answer 
is to say that when I have got it wrong, there is nothing that is ray reason. 
And it is the point of having "believes" in our language that %iith it we 
can make sense of people's mistakes# without it %ie cannot. Edgeley's 
answer to the question "What are the items between which the relation 
of 'being a reason for' holds?" was that it held between a fact on one 
hand and a belief or an action (basically) on the other. But I showed 
there that this could not be sustained.
My account of belief gives "believes" a crucial 
role in making sense of the situation %ihen someone has made a mistake.
If Bwmard J. Qrtcutt is not a spy, there is no reason for arresting him.
So if Ral#* arrests him, and he is not a spy, there was no reason for 
arresting him# and consequently, Ralph could not have had one. "Believes"
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allow ua to make sanae of Ralph's arresting him* And we can then say 
that Ralph did have a reason, though in a different sense of "reason." This 
sense is an extension of what must be the primary case, where Ralph does 
have a reason, because Bernard is really a spy. But the extension involves 
giving up the status of being a relation for "reason for •••". We now 
have to say that "being a reason for ..." is,a 'would-be' relation. This 
may seem strange, but then the situation is strange.
Certainly LeDxiiz* law seems to be right in 
straightforward descriptive contexts. If "a." and ”b" ere thought to refer 
to the saoie object, and it is found that to substitute one term for the 
other changes the truth-value of the relevant sentences, we have strong 
grounds for saying that they refer to different objects. But oratio 
obliqua contexts are not straightforward descriptive contexts. The 
sentences within oratio obliqua are not being used to describe anything.
Or rather, insofar as the speaker accepts what is within oratio obliqua 
he can indicate that this is so# sometimes he must do so. But the use 
of the relevant sentences is to give someone else's 'reasons'. So vte 
should not expect exactly the same rules and laws of substitution to 
apply. "The man in the brown hat" and *T!he grey-haired man" and "Bernard 
J. Qrtcutt" may be freely interchanged %ihen are describing him. But 
they have, or may have, different implications for action and for thought 
even if they do refer to the same man. So when we are giving reasons 
for som^KxSy's doing sosiething, we cannot expect to be able to substitute 
in the same %iay as whw we are describing something.
In the context of giving descriptions and 
determining truth-values, we can say that it does not matter whether the 
man is referred to as "the man in the brown hat" or "the grey-haired man" 
or "Bernard J. Qrtcutt." We may pick our reference freely, although 
practical considerations make it iaqportant that we should pick a means
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of identifying him that %dll identify him for our audience. But when 
we are giving soaMone else's reasons for doing scoMthing, we are subject 
to an extra complication in picking an appropriate way of referring.
But we are then involved in a different language-gane or practice.
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XI. Aootc of
This problem of sv&stitutlon is one of the 
prcblems that has been discussed under the heading "logic of belief."
Some philosophers have attempted to construct a formal logic which includes 
an c^ e^rator, or more usually two operators, the rules for %dtose use are 
intended to represent the words "beli#ve" and "know". X shall not discuss 
here the view of philosophy that underlies such a programme. But it seems 
possible to mount a simple and brutal argument against any such attempt.
It seems clear that any such atteayt must assume 
that human beings think rationally, that is, that they always accept the 
logical consequences of any particular belief. For example, Hintikka In 
"Knowledge and Belief" says <j^ 30/31):-
".. it is clearly inadmissible to infer 'he knows that q' from 'he knows 
that p* solely on the basis of the fact that q follows logically from p, 
for the person in question may fail to see that p entails q, particularly 
if p and q are relatively complicated statements. The state of his kno»#- 
ledge might be comparable with that of a man %<ho knows the axioms of some 
sophisticated mathematical theory but who does not know some distant 
consequences of the axioms. Nobody would criticise him for inconsistency.
Nmace there need not be anything nonsensical, 
irrational, or dishonest about a set of sentences which X have called 
inconsistent even when they are uttered by one and the same person on one 
and the same occasion. They are not inconsistent in any psychological or 
quasimpsyd%ological sense of the word. They may even be true simultaneously. 
This does not go to show that our rules are incorrect, however. What it shows 
is that the notion which U&ey define is unlike inconsistency in the current 
senses of the word and should be carefully distinguished from it. It shows, 
in short, that our terminology is inappropriate.
.. .... What my notion of consistency aoKxants to 
In typical c—  1» W m l t Y  SS.S3£iS*'‘ In onJ— to »—
this, suppose that a man says to you, 'I know that p but I don't know whether 
q' and suppose that p can be shown to entail logically q by means of some 
argument %ddch he would be willing to accept. Then you can point out to him
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that what he says he does not know is already implicit in what he claims 
he knows. If your argument is valid, it is irrational for our man to 
persist in saying that he does not know %d%ether q is the case."
But people are not rational# or at least 
not always rational. Certainly they cannot follow the consequences of what 
they know very far. we might conclude brutally that belief certainly
cannot have a 'logic* and perhaps knowledge cannot either. Certainly 
an enterprise such as Hintikka*s cannot tell us anything about the real 
world.
But it is not as simple as that. Hintikka
says (p.34):-
"It is also seen at (xice, however, that our results will not be completely 
unrealistic, that they are to some extent applicable to what people actively 
know. Or rather, the virtual implications we are studying are to some extant 
parallelled by strong pragmatical implications. There are no logical reasons 
why som^Dody who knows that p should know that q even wh«i q*s following 
from p is perfectly obvious. But such cases are likely to be exceptions 
If the consequence is quite obvious, we might even be reluctant to say 
that he does not know that q, although he denies it himself, on being asked, 
that he knows it# we might be tempted to say Instead that he did not under­
stand the question, that he was confused ('caught off guard') - that he 
'really* knows, or even that he must know."
I think that we can go rather further than 
Hintikka here. Understanding or grasping some of the implications of a 
particular belief is a criterion of saying that someone has that belief 
at all. Someone %#ho drew none of the obvious conclusions and accepted 
only bizarre implications of something that he claims to believe would 
give rise to serious questions about just what it was that he did believe.
Nor is this restricted to logical implicaticxui and consequences. The 
question, just where and how we are to separate the consequences that 
someone must see if he is to count as believing that p and those that 
he may not see, is an interesting and important one. I suspect that it
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does not have any general answers. But In any case, answers to this 
question would not illuminate the notion of belief, but rather the 
concepts involved in having the belief. That is, this problem is really 
the same as the various problems about meaning and understanding.
Incidentally, this point is strongly reminiscent 
of a point that Edgeley makes (on pg. of "Reason in Theory and Practice") 
in defending the idea that some logical relations are non-substantive - do 
not have substantive and normative implications as most do.
But this point cannot do ware than modify the 
brutal argument. It does not dispose of it. The real objection to it is 
that it is founded on a misunderstanding of the enterprise. Hintikka draws 
an instructive parallel (p. 38).
"The applicability of our results may thus be said to presuppose a certain 
amount of rationality in the people whose attitudes are beii^ discussed.
In this respect, our logical theory is comparable with certain other 
theories (e.g. the theory of games) %ihich may also be said to depend on 
an assumpti(xi of rationality."
The theory of games does not describe people's 
actual playing of games. But it is extremely useful to those who play gasms. 
For it can be applied to games to show what the players should do, or what 
they can do. (There are various restrictions and assumptions, but they do 
not vitiate the point.) Attempts to formulate a "logic" of belief and/or 
knowledge must be seen in a similar light. The point of the enterprise lies 
in providing rules and criteria that can be applied by someone who wishes, in 
Hintikka's phrase, to be "immune from certain kinds of criticism."
How would this enterprise differ from "straight" 
logic? Surely what I have just said is one good way of describing the point 
of ordinary propositional or predicate logic? There is no real difference. 
But there are, perhaps, some special problems vrhich can only be expressed 
with the aid of the notions of belief and of knowledge; so long as these
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problems arise from the possibility of mistakes, whether of omission and 
of commission, such a logic could not conflict with my account of belief.
Some confirmation that ray view of this enter­
prise is right, at least in Hintikka*s view, comes on p. 39 of "Knowledge 
and Belief".
"One of the chief tasks of ray essay is to formulate, to explain and to 
defend certain criteria of logical consistency (my *def«i8ibllity*) in
terms of which criteria of logical consequence (my 'virtual implication')
may be defined."
Further confirmation comes from looking at some 
of the problems that are discussed under this heading. For example, there 
is the Lottery Paradox. A discussion of this can be found in "Belief and 
Knowledge" by Robert J. Ackermann. Suppose a lottery is to be held; three 
slips of paper marked 1, 2, and 3, are placed in a hat; one is to be drawn 
out of it. The probability that the slip marked 1 will be drawn is 1/3.
The prcdsability of 51 is 1/3. So it is ratioaal to believe (it says here) 
that the slip marked 1 will not be drawn, (i.e. - SI). Similarly for 
(-S2) and (-S3). So we can conclude (it says here) that (-51 & -S2 & -S3).
But we already know that (SI or 52 or S3), which contradicts it. Again,
(SI or 52 or S3) has a probability of 1, since one of the slips will be
drawn. Each of -SI, -52, -S3 has a probability greater than 0.5, (since 
the probability of each of 51, 52, S3 is 1/3). So the probability of 
(-51 & -52 & -S3) is greater than 0.5. But that is incompatible with the 
fact that (51 or 52 or S3) has a probability value greater than 0.5 (i.e. 1).
1 have registered the assumptions noted by Ackermann 
by an expression of scepticism* The only other assumption is that numerical 
probability values can be attached to the statements ; and that seems 
reasonable for this case. Whatever the resolution, we will learn from it 
about rationality and/or about probability. We do not really need the 
concept of belief at all, even though Ackermann states the problem in terms
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of the beliefs that cxie may have about the lottery.
On p. 25 of his book he ends a passage in which 
he develops a criterion for saying when someone's beliefs are consistent 
by remarking that "our" intuitive motivation is that a's beliefs are 
consistent only if they could all be true. Quite. Consistency of belief 
is consistency in its standard and straightforward use. We cannot quite 
leave it at that, however. Standard tests of consistency cannot cater 
for agnosticism, for the case vd^ ere someone does not believe that p, but 
may not believe that not>*p either. Standard logic must have a truth-value 
for every statement. But surely a resolution of this will give a more 
sophisticated notion of consistency and teach us something about that, 
rather than about belief per se. In any case this problem does not 
invalidate ray claim. For it arises from the possibility that people may 
get things wrong by omission as well as commission. If p and not-p are 
contradictories, not to believe either is to fail to believe, or to fail 
to accept, one true statemmat. And that is to get things wrong. And 
this applies even if the failure is excusable - as when "he could not 
have known" - or even justifiable - as when "the evidence that was 
available just was not good enough."
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12. Speech acts.
A claim that has been made, and that still 
commands some support, is that ’T know that p" and "I believe that p” 
are essentially speech-acts. That is, they are to be compared to "I 
promise that p," or "I warn you that p." The crucial point of this 
account is that it means denying that sentences (or statements) beginning 
"I believe" and "I know" are either true or false, and so are not des­
criptions of anything, and that it means asserting that the "first-person" 
use of these words is primary to them. Certainly these claims do seem 
to apply to "I premise" and "I warn."
In my earlier discussion of Edgeley's account 
in chapter 6, I encountered the problem that it is not altogether clear 
what "descriptive" means; ttiere are several rather different meaning 
that can be given to it. I argued that Edgeley needed a stronger sense 
of "descriptive" than Just "capable of being true or false". I rejected 
the claim that belief was descriptive in a strong s«nse. But I accept 
that "believes" is descriptive in the weak s«ise that sentences or state­
ments containing it are true or false. Although first-person uses are 
sp€&cial, I do not think that they are so different that such uses are not 
true or false, or that they are logically primary. Consequently, I reject 
the speech-act analysis of "believes." Essentially, I agree with Jonathan 
Harrison's conclusion in "Knowing and Promising" (in Mind 1962) that this 
account was an example of over-enthusiastic application of a real and 
important discovery.
There are two versions of the speech-act
analysis. One is Austin's. In "Other Minds" (Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 1946) he says:
"When I say 'I know,' I give others ipv word: I give others ay authority
for saving that *S is P.*
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"When I have said only that I am sure and prove 
to have been mlstakw, I am not liable to be rounded on by others in the
same %#ay as when I have said *I know.' .. ."
It may be a little unfair to attribute this 
theory to Austin without comment. He precedes his discussion %iith the 
remark that "the parallel between saying 'I know* and saying *I promise* 
may be elaborated." He does so as his discussion of "If I know, I can't 
be wrong." This is only one quite short section of a long paper. He 
spends a great deal of time on an acute discussion of "I know ..." vdilch 
does not seem to depend on this claim at all. Austin followed this idea 
up with due caution and perhaps would not wish to over-enq^asise it, but 
only to use the parallel to explain vdiy, if I know, I can't b^ wrong.
Urmson in "Parenthetical Verbs" (Mind 1962) 
was less cautious. His account fastens on sentences of the form "England
are batting to-day, I believe," or "I regret that he will be late." The
main verbs in these sentences are what he calls parenthetical verbs.
Their function is to orimnt the hearer to treating the accompanying 
sentence or propositicm in a certain light. Thus "I regret" orients the 
hearer to treating whatever it is as something unfortunate or regrettable. 
"I believe" and "I know" orimnt the hearer to treating whatever it is as 
more or less certain, more or less well-backed by evidence.
Jonathan Harrison discusses speech-act account 
sympathetically and fully in "Knowing and Promising" in Mind 1962. He 
concludes in Section V:-
"The upshot of this is that the suggestion that 'I know ....' is like 'I 
promise ...' is, at the very least, extremely misleading. I would not 
personally like to say that thmre was no resemblance between them, but it 
seems clear that the differ wees are more obvious and more important than 
the resemblances. One of the most important differences is that someone 
saying 'I promise ...' is thereby promising, whereas someone saying 'I 
know ..' is not thereby knowing, but simply claiming that he knows. Hence,
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though the question whether he really has promised may turn on the question 
whether he has said *I promise and not on the question whether what
he said when he said *1 promise •••' is a true statement about himself, 
the question %ihether he really knows does not turn on whether he has said 
*I know •«•*, but on whether, having said *I know he has said something 
about himmelf which is true»'*
I think that this point is a good one; and in 
fact most of the arguments that he considers earlier turn on, or are 
related to, this difference» Austin did recognise it, and minimised its 
iiq}Qrtance| but X don't think he succeeds*
Harrison says in Section IX:-
"SooMone who says 'I give you my word that it isn't loaded', 'I guarantee 
it isn't loaded*, 'I swear it isn't loaded', can properly be described 
as having givrnti his word that it vas not loaded, but someone who simply 
says 'I know it isn't loaded* cannot. He is doing, vdiat the others are 
certainly not doing, stating a fact about himself. The effect of his 
stating this fact may be the same as the effect of his saying *1 swear 
the gun is not loaded* ; someone does, or does not, pull the trigger, 
depending upon what it is they wish to achieve. ....... 'X know the gun
is loaded* entails 'The gun is loaded* which may be what his hearer wants 
to know. But pfsrhaps he already knows this, and wants to know whether 
the speaker knows this too. In this latter event, *I swear the gun is 
loaded* would not do for giving Y the information he needs."
Saying "I know ..." or "I believe may have 
the "speech-effacts" that Austin and Urmson identify. But that is not 
enough to back any strong version of a speech-act account. Someone %iho 
makes a straigh^orward statement may be doing these things as well. 
(Consider, in the context of the quotation from Harrison's article, "The 
gun is not loaded.")
There is one kind of objection to the speech- 
act account that cannot be sustained. This is essentially that the account 
cannot be applied to second and third person uses of "know" and "believe"; 
or at the least that it needs to be substantially modified. This would
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that the accounts would have to be very different between second or third 
person uses and first person us#B. It is true that in the cases cxE pro­
mising and warning there are big differences as well. But, to take one 
natural account, if "Jones does not know that she will be late" (uttered 
by Smith) is true - or false -, it will not be incompatible with "I know 
she will be late" uttered by Jones. And that would be a powerful objection.
But there is a less paradoxical way, and one that 
leads to a position very like mine. This is to say that "know" and "believe" 
indicate the attitude, or give or withold the authority of both the subject 
and the speaker to whatever is said to be known or believed. This was 
argued by B. Harrison in Philosophical Quarterly 1963# He considers the 
following example. Jones believes that he has cancer. Smith knows this, 
but does not believe it to be true. But Smith could not say "Jcxies knows 
that he has cancer;" he must say "Jones believes that he has cancer" unless 
he wants to mislead his audience. Robinson knows about Jones' belief/ 
knowledge, and does believe it to be true. He would say "Jones knows that 
he has cancer." If he were to say "Jcxies believes that he has cancer," 
he would be refraining from expressing his own view. Since this might
lead to his hearers to take it that he does not have one, he might lay
himself op«m to blame or criticism, unless his reasons for doing so were 
good ones. (There are other cases and Harrison does consider them.)
But this is not enough to support any full-
blooded version of a speech-act account. Even if ray choosing "Jones 
knows instead of "Jones believes ..." indicates my beliefs or
knowledge rather than anything about Jones, this is not enough to justify 
saying that "know" and "believe" are simply speech-act words. For I am 
making a claim about Jones as well as (implicitly) indicating my opinicni 
about what he knows and/or believes.
"I know ..." and "I believe ..." are special.
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however. Hy account doea allow for this. My explanation is given for a 
situaticm when speaker and subject are different people; when speaker 
and subject are the same person# we get a special case. In a sense "I 
know ..." in ”1 know that p#" and "I believe in "I believe that p" 
are superfluous and pointless. Normally, simply asserting that p indicates 
that I know or believe that p. But they do have a point of a kind. For 
we can and do use these words to give special force - but not always the 
same force - to the assertion ”p". The fact that, in second or third person 
uses, "believes" does not ccxseiit the speaker, can be used in the first person 
to indicate some degree of uncertainty about "p". The fact that "knows” 
does commit the speaker can be used to give special importance or emphasis 
to the claim that p.
"I know" does not necessarily imply special 
certainty. Suppose I am assembling an engine, in particular the cylindttc 
head. I put the valves in without grinding them in. Somecxie points out 
to me that the valves will not seal properly unless they are ground in.
I may reply "I know that, but I want to check that they fit before I grind 
them in." Here I am using another facet of the second or third person use 
to emphasise that the relevant fact is available to me. And, of course, 
it has been pointed out often enough that "believes” does not imply any 
uncertainty in the believer * s mind. I am not relying on that claim in 
explaining the first perscxi use. X am relying wi the fact that "He believes 
...” does not commit the speaker. It is in virtue of that that we can use 
”I believe ...” to indicate our own uncertainty.
Not that "I believe ...” need always imply 
uncertainty. For example I may say that "I believe that the defendant 
was present at the scene, but I do not believe that he murdered the victim.” 
In this case, I am drawing a contrast.
But still,one could plausibly claim that this
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sentence could only have a use in special circumstances, where some issues 
were still in doubt. One night say it before the trial, or in the context 
of rejecting the findings of the court. It would be odd to say this where 
there was no (reasonable) question but that he was present but didn't do 
it. So in a way "believes” here does indicate uncertainty about the 
matter. The uncertainty need not be in the believer's mind, nor in the mind 
of the me«È>ers of the court; it may st«o simply from the fact there is 
disagreement.
It seems worth mentioning one other point here.
It may be objected that my account is deficient in an Important respect. 
Simply believing that p and p's being true are not enough to justify 
saying "Jones knows that p”. He may have got it right, but he may have 
simply guessed. And we could not then say that he knew. I am not convinced 
that he then believes it either. But that only pushes the problem back a 
stage. We need something more about Jones, such as that he is in a position 
to know, that he has the relevant skills for finding out, that he has 
appropriate evidence and so on. Saying that Jones knows implies more than 
just that he has got it right. And it is this difference that is crucial 
for the theory of knowledge.
It may be objected. But I do not see this as 
fundamental. Any such difference can be included in my account vlthout 
altering its essential structure.
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Conclusion
The best way to conclude this thesis Is to 
offer a summary or brief explanation giving its conclusions. It is 
not possible to state a view or doctrine or thesis that has been put 
forward and defended. Part of the reason for this is explained In 
the Introduction. The role of a word or concept in the language can 
be shown or explained. We can show what could not be said If we did 
not have it, and esqplaln what conceptual needs it satisfies. A 
corollary of the idea that the meaning of a word is the use to which 
it is put is that «re cannot expect to get far by offering paraphrases 
or definitions.
The first part of the thesis is the simplest. 
Here the role of belief in e3g>lainlng actions and the pressures that 
make It necessary for us to have "believes** can be shown quite simply.
Sut it is necessary to explain the context in which it plays this role 
at some length. The inadequacy of coi^ >eting theories is that they do 
not allow a proper account of the way in which we talk about and 
esqplain actions. This is an important, even, central, use of "believes," 
so the deficiency Is serious.
"He believes that...." allows us to idmitify 
the limitations and justifications that bear on the performing of a 
particular action. But it does so in such a way that it is conceptually 
possible to make mistakes about these limitations and justifications.
The speaker is witholding a commitment which the believer has made.
It is the notl<m of a mistake that makes the difference between acting 
on p or acting as if p were true and believing that p and consequently 
doing A. Someone who acts on p or as if p were true has not made a 
mistake if it turns out that p is not the case.
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The connection between actions and mistakes 
is fundamental* Along witli the notion of making a mistake goes the 
notion of getting something right* One important difference between 
actions amd events is that actions succeed or fail* It is this that 
creates the need for a special form of explanation, which I outline in 
the schana of formal and material elements* It is this that creates 
the need for a way of saying that scaaeone did A because p even when p 
is not the case* We need to be able to specify that p was the reason 
for something done without committing ourselves to the truth of p*
Without the concept of belief, we could not talk about people's actions 
in the way that we do*
Failures of the kind that are catered for 
by the concept of belief are not the only kind that actions and people 
are heir to* Direct or basic actions are immune from this kind of 
failure. But they are liable to other kinds* And in Chapter 8 of 
Part I, I suggest that some other special situations may explain the 
role of "wants," in a parallel way*
It is possible to give a clear meaning to 
Ryle's suggestion that "thinking" and words like it are "adverbial."
This may not be quite what Ryle had in mind when he made the suggestion. 
"Adverbial" verbs occupy a special place and play a special role in the 
hierarchy of descriptions of actions. Verbs that describe thinking 
explain what the limitations and justifications are that bear on an 
action, but also show what their status is, especially their status in 
relation to the notions of evidence, certainty and truth. (Other verbs, 
such as "hope," "fear," "regret" show what their status is in relation 
to our interests and feelings.)
Cases of thinking where no executive actions 
are being performed are rather different. Some, like cases of planning.
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are related in fairly straightforward ways to executive actions. But 
cases of great philosophical interest are those like le Penseur and 
Euclid. They are not so simple. The kind of thinking they exemplify 
has been at the centre of traditional discussions of the topic. They 
are of special interest because of their connection with the concepts 
of knowledge and of truth.
It is natural to ask the philosophical 
question "What are the constituents of thinking?" There may be diffi­
culties about it, but Ryle's attempt to answer it succeeds in at least 
some cases. Certainly the question does seem to demand an answer.
But the vocabulary that is important, including "believes", is as yet 
unesqplained. So it is important to see why the question does not have 
an answer for these cases.
Much of this vocabulary, especially "believe" 
and "entertain" and "accept" does not describe any constituents. It 
has the different role of explaining what may be called the content of 
thought and of speech. A cwitral aspect of this role is the explaining 
of the status qua true or false of the relevant propositions. "Having 
the status of a truth" is mainly a matter of being a reason in thought 
or in action. This is essentially the same role as that outlined for 
"advert>ial" cases of thinking, where an executive action is being 
performed.
Something of «rhat this means emerges in the 
discussion of intentionality in chapter 10. Whem Leibnis' law is applied 
to language used for this purpose a difficult choice is forced on us.
But to choose either way makes it impossible for us to do what we need 
to do with the language. The logical complications are an inevitable 
consequence of v^at we are doing.
The activities that we are interested in are
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such that neither their objects nor the activities can be tied to 
"constituents*" The candidates for the role of constituents are 
related to other activities and carry different criteria of Idmitity. 
Thinking of this kind is a special field of activity orrather a 
collection of special fields of activity. As in the case of music, 
the activities, the objects and the criteria of success are all inter­
related and interdependent* What ties together the special fields of 
activity that we are interested in here is the central importance of 
the notion of truth and consequently of a reason*
Each of chapters, 6, 7 and 8 is concerned 
to do two things. Each one meets an argument that "believes" 
designates or describes something, or that the role of "believes" is 
independent of the notions of truth, reason and argument. At the 
same time the way in which the concept of belief plays its part 
emerges more clearly in each of tlw areas being discussed. The possi­
bility of mistakes and deficiencies is built in to the language at a 
very fundamental level. "Believes" is not something tacked on to the 
basic conceptual structure of language (Chapter 8) or of thought 
(chapters 6 and 7.)
Chapters 9 to 12 of part II are less closely 
related to my main th«ne. I have already shown where chapter 10 fits 
in. Chapter 9 sketches a resolution of another tradltbnal problem 
about belief. The crucial point emerges from the discussion of the 
notion of a reason. But it is also important to bear in mind the 
whole context of what is involved in thinking. Chapter 11 shows the 
limitations of the attempt to proceed by constructing formal systems 
that include the concept of belief. Chapter 12 discusses the competing 
"speech-act" account and shows that ray account can cater for the special 
case of the first-person use of "believe."
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